Boumediene, Munaf, and the Supreme Court\u27s Misreading of the Insular Cases by Kent, Andrew
Fordham Law School
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
2011
Boumediene, Munaf, and the Supreme Court's
Misreading of the Insular Cases
Andrew Kent
Fordham University School of Law, akent@law.fordham.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Andrew Kent, Boumediene, Munaf, and the Supreme Court's Misreading of the Insular Cases , 97 Iowa L. Rev. 101 (2011)
Available at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/250
Boumediene, Munaf and the Supreme
Court's Misreading of the Insular Cases
Andrew Kent*
INTRO DUCTIO N ...................................................................................... 10 3
I. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF ARGUMENT ....................................... 103
A. THE CONSTITUTION'S DISPUTED SCOPE: GLOBALISM AND HUMAN-
RIGHTS UN VERSALISM ..................................................................... 103
B. THE 2oo8 DECISIONS ....................................................................... 105
C. THE INSULAR CASES ......................................................................... 107
D. THE 2 oo8 COURT MSCONSTRUES THE INSULAR CASES ..................... 110
E. OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT .......................................................... 116
II. THE WAR OF 1898 AND TERRITORIAL EXPANSION ................................ 118
III. THE GREAT DEBATE ABOUT IMPERIALISM ............................................. 122
A. THE CONSTITUTION DID NOT PROTECT MILITARY ENEMIES .............. 123
B. THE CONSTITUTION DID NOT PROTECT NONCmZENS'RIGHTS
OUTSIDE OF THE SOVEREIGN TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES ........ 123
1. Did the Constitution Follow the Flag? .................................. 127
2. The Ex Proprio Vigore Doctrine of Anti-Expansionists
Held That the First Moment at Which the Constitution
Could Apply Was Annexation by the United States ............ 130
IV. PUERTO RICO UNDER U.S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT ............................. 132
A. U.S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF PUERTO Rico BEFORE THE
TREATY OF PEA CE AND CESSION WENT INTO EFFECT .......................... 134
B. PEACETIME U.S. MLITARY GOVERNMENT IN PUERTO RICo: AFTER
THE TREATY OF PEA CE AND CESSION WENT INTO EFFECT BUT
BEFORE CONGRESS CREATED A CwiL GOVERNMENT ........................... 136
1. U.S. Provisional Court for the Department of Porto Rico.. 138
* Associate Professor, Fordham Law School. Marc Arkin, Christina Duffy Burnett, Jos6
A. Cabranes, Guyon Knight, Henry Monaghan and Julian Mortenson provided helpful
comments on earlier drafts, as did Bill Treanor, Tom Lee, Gr-Ainne de Bfirca, and the other
participants in the Fordham Faculty Scholarship Retreat, and Jeremy Rabkin, Ilya Somin, and
other participants at a George Mason Law School scholarship workshop.
102 IOWA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 97: 1o
2. T ariff C ases ............................................................................. 14 1
V. THE U.S. MILITARY IN AND AROUND CUBA, 1898-1902 ...................... 143
A. CASES INVOL VING SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR MILITARY OPERA TIONS... 143
1. Naval Seizure of Enemy Vessels as Prizes of War ................. 143
2. Other Military Measures Against Enemy Civilians ............... 144
B. THE NEGLECTED CASE OFNEELYV. HENKEL (I9or) ........................ 145
C. BOUMEDIENE 'S CONSPIRACY THEORY ABOUT THE ACQUISITION
AND LEGAL STATUS OF THE GUANTANAMO BASE ............................... 149
VI. THE LIMITED DOMAIN OF THE DOCTRINE OF TERRITORIAL
INCO RPO RATIO N .................................................................................... 155
A. DOWNESV. BIDWELL (I9o1) .......................................................... 155
B. DE LIMA V. BIDWELL (1901) AND OTHER EARLYINSULAR CASES ..... 159
C. RASMUSSEN MAKES "INCORPORATION" THE LAWOF THE LAND ......... 16o
D. BOUMEDIENE 'S MISREADING OFBALZAC V. PORTO RICO .......... 63
VII. NAVAL STATIONS, COALING STATIONS, AND OTHER MILITARY
O U TPO STS .............................................................................................. 164
A. MOST ANTI-EXPANSIONISS DID NOT THINK IT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL To INSTITUTE PERMANENT MILITARY
GOVERNMENT OVER NA VAL OUTPOSTS AND COALING STATIONS ......... 165
B. A CASE STUDY ON GUAM AND SAMOA: FORGOTTEN ISLANDS OF THE
UNITED STATES, GOVERNED BY MILITARY PO WER FOR DECADES ......... 167
C O N CLUSIO N ......................................................................................... 174
A PPEN D IX ............................................................................................... 177
TA BLEi ................................................................................................. 17 7
TABLE 2 ................................................................................................. 18 o
2011] BOUMEDIENE, MUNAF, AND THE INSULAR CASES 103
INTRODUCTION
In 2oo8, the Supreme Court embraced both global constitutionalism-
the view that the Constitution provides judicially enforceable rights to
noncitizens outside the sovereign territory of the United States-and what I
call human-rights universalism-the view that the Constitution protects
military enemies during armed conflict. Boumediene v. Bush found a
constitutional right to habeas corpus for noncitizens detained as enemy
combatants at the Guantanamo Bay naval base in Cuba,' while Munaf v.
Geren-decided the same day as Boumediene and involving U.S. citizens
detained in Iraq during the war there-hinted that the Due Process Clause
might be a limit on the U.S. military's ability to cooperate in a foreign nation
on security detention matters during an armed conflict.2 In both Boumediene
and Munaf the Court reached back for supportive precedents to an earlier
era of U.S. empire: the period of territorial expansion and military
interventions following the Spanish-American War of 1898. The Court then
decided important cases about the legality of U.S. military and civil activities
in the newly annexed islands of Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines,
and in Cuba, where the United States was conducting its first humanitarian
intervention. A handful of the most famous decisions are known as the
Insular Cases-"insular" because the cases concerned U.S. activities in these
islands. In 2oo8, the Court relied substantially on a few Insular Cases to
sketch a vision of a global Constitution protecting rights around the world,
even for military enemies. But in so relying on the Insular Cases, the Court
in 20o8 erred. Little that it wrote about the Insular Cases was correct-as to
law or fact. The Court in 2oo8 misunderstood that the Insular Cases were
highly relevant to contemporary legal disputes precisely because they reject
global constitutionalism and human-rights universalism. This occurred
because the Court misread the few Insular Cases it discussed, failed to
consider many more Insular Cases that were on point, and misconstrued key
historical facts regarding the U.S. intervention in Cuba and acquisition of
the Guantanamo Bay naval facility.
I. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF ARGUMENT
A. THE CONSTITUTION'S DISPUTED SCOPE: GLOBALISM AND HUMAN-RIGHTS
UNIVERSALISM
Boumediene v. Bush and Munaf v. Geren, decided the same day in 2oo8,
represent an enormously significant inflection point in U.S. constitutional
law. In these decisions, the Supreme Court embraced two related theories of
the scope of constitutional protections that represent profound departures
1. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (20o8).
2. Munafv. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2oo8).
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from prior law. The Supreme Court had never previously accepted one of
these theories and had only tentatively embraced the second, but in
different and less far-reaching contexts than what the Court confronted in
2008. The first theory is one I have described in prior work as globalism or
global constitutionalism,3 which is the view that the Constitution should be
interpreted to protect the rights of noncitizens in areas beyond the
sovereign territory of the United States.4 Since the Founding, the Supreme
Court, Congress, and the Executive have accepted that the Constitution does
not protect noncitizens outside U.S. sovereign territory. Nevertheless, in
recent years, noncitizens have continued to file suits challenging this
limitation, though generally without success.5
The second theory is that military enemies can invoke the Constitution
for protection in armed conflicts. I call this view of the Constitution's scope
human-rights universalism because it resembles a phenomenon in
international law. "Classic international public law recognized the separation
between the law of peace and the law of war."6 But in the modern era, there
has been a concerted effort to inject human-rights law-the law of
peacetime-into the realm of war in order to impose limits on states'
warmaking powers, in addition to those found in the less restrictive laws of
war.7 Similarly, for much of U.S. history, it was understood that "we have a
constitution of government for war and a constitution of government for
peace," and that the international laws of war-and not the Constitution-
3. See generally J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution,
95 GEO. L.J. 463 (2007).
4. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 99-
1oo (199o);Jules Lobel, The Constitution Abroad, 83 AM.J. INT'L L. 871, 879 (1989); Gerald L.
Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 LOY. L. REV. 1, 15 (2004).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (rejecting a Mexican
citizen's Fourth Amendment challenge, brought while he was on trial in the United States, to
the search of his house in Mexico by U.S. and Mexican law-enforcement officers); Atamirzayeva
v. United States, 524 F. 3 d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2oo8) (affirming dismissal of Uzbeki's suit alleging
that the United States violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment by causing the
destruction of her cafeteria in Tashkent); People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of
State, 182 F.3 d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (rejecting two foreign organizations' Due Process
challenges to the U.S. Secretary of State's designation of them as terrorist groups); Sanchez-
Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (affirming dismissal of a suit by Nicaraguan
residents and others alleging that U.S. military support for the Contras violated their Fourth
and Fifth Amendment rights). In each of these decisions, the Court held that the noncitizen's
lack of presence in the United States barred their assertion of constitutional rights.
6. Hans-Joachim Heintze, On the Relationship Between Human Rights Law Protection and
International Humanitarian Law, 86 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 789, 789 (2004).
7. See id. at 789-91; see also Rodney G. Allen, Martin Cherniack & George J.
Andreopoulos, Refining War: Civil Wars and Humanitarian Controls, 18 HUM. RTs. Q. 747, 751-53
(1996); Cordula Droege, Elective Affinities? Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 90 INT'L REv.
RED CROSS 501,501-05 (2008).
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protect military enemies in war.8 This rule was solidified in U.S.
constitutional law during and after the Civil War, when the President,
Congress, and Supreme Court united in holding that the residents of the
Confederacy, though all were U.S. citizens, could be treated during the war
as military enemies of the United States with no protection from the
Constitution.9 During subsequent wars with foreign powers, fought on
foreign soil, the rule that military enemies had no constitutional rights
overlapped with the rule that noncitizens outside the United States had no
constitutional rights. Thus, when the Court received a habeas corpus
petition from German soldiers convicted by the United States of war crimes
during World War II and imprisoned in Allied-controlled post-war Germany,
it dismissed out of hand the claim that those men had a right to access U.S.
courts and to invoke the protection of the Constitution.o In recent years,
courts have dismissed the cases brought by noncitizens outside the United
States claiming a right to constitutional protection from being targeted by
the U.S. military." But the Court has shown some receptivity to human-
rights universalism when military enemies who have been present on U.S.
soil have claimed constitutional protection. 2
B. THE 2008DECISIONS
In 2oo8, in Boumediene, the Court embraced global constitutionalism for
the first time and expanded its previously quite limited acceptance of
human-rights universalism. As part of the post-9/ i1 war on terror, the
Executive had chosen to detain noncitizens at Guantanamo because the
naval base, leased by the United States from Cuba since 1903, is not
8. J.W. Burgess, The Relation of the Constitution of the United States to Newly Acquired Territory,
15 POL. SCI Q. 381, 383-84 (1900) [hereinafter Burgess, Newly Acquired Territory]; John W.
Burgess, How May the United States Govern Its Extra-Continental Territory?, 14 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 15
(1899) [hereinafter Burgess, Extra-Continental Territory].
9. See generally Andrew Kent, The Constitution and the Laws of War During the Civil War, 85
NOTRE DAME L, REv. 1839 (2010).
10. SeeJohnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
11. See, e.g., EI-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3 d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(dismissing a Sudanese corporation's suit alleging that the U.S. Navy's cruise missile strike on its
factory in Sudan violated the Takings Clause), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1139 (2005); AI-Aulaqi v.
Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2oo) (dismissing a suit on behalf of U.S. citizen resident in
Yemen challenging on Due Process grounds the CIA and U.S. military's targeting of him for
death on account of his leadership of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula).
12. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (upholding military detention in the
United States of a U.S. citizen captured in Afghanistan fighting for the Taliban, but finding that
the Due Process Clause required more procedural protections than the military had granted to
date); In reYamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (reviewing the conviction of ajapanese general in a
U.S military commission held in the Philippines-then a territory of the United States-for
compliance with applicable statutes and international law); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)
(rejecting the U.S. government's contention that German soldiers had no right to access the
civilian courts via habeas corpus during World War II, but also rejecting the soldiers' Fifth and
Sixth Amendment challenges to their military commission trial).
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sovereign territory of the United States.'3 The U.S. government argued that
aliens could not assert constitutional rights because they were not present in
territory under the dejure sovereignty of the United States and because they
were enemy combatants in the custody of the U.S. military.,4 Boumediene
rejected this argument. The Court held five-to-four that the Guantanamo
detainees had an indefeasible constitutional right-a right that Congress
had unconstitutionally denied in a jurisdiction-stripping statute'5-to seek
relief from U.S federal courts using the writ of habeas corpus.' 6 The Court
seemed to assume that at least minimum Due Process protections would
protect the detainees in their subsequent habeas litigation.7 Thus, the
Court in Boumediene held for the first time that noncitizens outside the
sovereign territory of the United States could demand constitutional
protections;' this holding was especially novel and significant because the
noncitizens were alleged military enemies detained during an armed
conflict.19
13. In a 1903 agreement to lease the area for a naval base, "the United States
recognize[d] the continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over the
[leased areas]," while "the Republic of Cuba consent[ed] that during the period of the
occupation by the United States ... the United States shall exercise complete jurisdiction and
control over and within said areas." Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba,
art. III, Feb. 23, 1903, T.S. No. 418. A 1934 treaty provided that the lease would run "[s]o long
as the United States ... shall not abandon the ... naval station of Guantanamo," unless the
parties agree otherwise. Treaty Defining Relations with Cuba, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, May 29, 1934,
48 Stat. 1683.
Prior to 9/1 1, the Executive detained at Guantanamo some Haitians who were attempting
to enter the United States and argued to the federal courts that, as noncitizens held outside
U.S. sovereign territory, the Haitians lacked constitutional rights. See Brief for the Petitioners at
16 n.io, McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (No. 92-344), 1992 WL
541276 (case later renamed Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.).
14. See Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 9-1o, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
723 (2oo8) (Nos. o6-1195, o6-s 196), 2007 WL 2972541; Brief for Respondents at so-12, Rasul
v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), 2004 WL 425739.
15. See Military Commissions Act of 2oo6 (MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat.
26oo, 2635-36 ("No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear" a habeas petition
seeking the release "of an alien detained by the United States who has been determined.., to
have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.").
16. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771, 792. The writ of habeas corpus requires the government
to convince a judge of the legal and factual justification for an individual's detention. Of
ancient English common-law origins, the writ is protected by the Constitution. See U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.").
17. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 781-82, 785.
18. See id. at 770 ("It is true that before today the Court has never held that noncitizens
detained by our Government in territory over which another country maintains de jure
sovereignty have any rights under our Constitution.").
19. See David D. Cole, Rights over Borders: Transnational Constitutionalism and Guantanamo
Bay, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 47, 48 ("[F]or the first time, the Court [in Boumediene] extended
constitutional protections to noncitizens outside U.S. territory during wartime."); Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., Creating Legal Rights for Suspected Terrorists: Is the Court Being Courageous or Politically
[Vol. 97: 101
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Two other recent Supreme Court decisions support my conclusion that
Boumediene embraced both global constitutionalism and human-rights
universalism. On the same day as Boumediene, the Court, in Munaf decided
that the United States' federal courts had statutory jurisdiction over the
habeas petitions filed by U.S. citizens whom the U.S. military had detained
in Iraq on behalf of the Iraqi justice system during an ongoing military
conflict in that country.20 In addition to hinting that the Constitution
required habeas access to federal courts for these petitioners because they
were citizens,21 Munaf implied that the Due Process Clause might place
some limits on the U.S. military's ability to cooperate with foreign states on
security detention matters.2 2 A few months later, the Supreme Court
vacated, in light of Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit's decision in Rasul v. Myers,
another Guantanamo detainee case.23 The reversed circuit court opinion
had dismissed tort claims against U.S officials based on alleged torture on
the ground that, as "aliens without property or presence in the United
States," the detainees could not assert claims under the Fifth Amendment
(substantive due process) or Eighth Amendment.24
The Court in 2oo8 claimed that it was not breaking new ground;
instead, the Court in Boumediene asserted that its precedents stretching back
over ioo years showed that the Executive was wrong to assert that a bright-
line rule barred noncitizens outside U.S. sovereign territory from claiming
constitutional protections. In fact, in both Boumediene and Munaf the Court
reached back for supportive precedents to an earlier era of U.S. empire:
cases arising from the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the concurrent
territorial expansion of the United States.
C. THE INSULAR CASES
The United States annexed the Spanish colonies of the Philippines,
Puerto Rico, and Guam as a result of its victory in that war. The U.S. military
only temporarily occupied Cuba, another Spanish colony, while it conducted
its first humanitarian intervention there. In 1898, the United States also
annexed the independent nation of Hawaii, and in 1899, the United States
took control of part of Samoa. In the next few years, the Supreme Court
Pragmatic?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1975, 1976 (2009) ("[Boumediene] reached the
unprecedented conclusion ... that the Constitution's writ of habeas corpus may be invoked by
noncitizen enemy combatants who have been apprehended and detained outside of the United
States' sovereign territory.").
20. Munafv. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2o8).
21. Id. at 688.
22. Id. at 702 (disclaiming any intent to rule out a potential Due Process Clause claim
arising from "a more extreme case in which the [U.S.] Executive has determined that a
detainee is likely to be tortured [if transferred from U.S. to foreign custody] but decides to
transfer him anyway").
23. Rasul v. Myers, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2oo8), vacating51 2 F.3 d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
24. Rasul, 512 F.3 d at 663-65.
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decided a number of important cases about the legality of U.S. military and
civil activities in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and the Philippines.'5 A handful
of the most famous decisions are known as the Insular Cases-"insular"
because the cases concerned U.S. actions in the annexed islands.
The most well-known Insular Cases addressed not the wartime activities
of the U.S. government or the military occupation of Cuba but rather the
peacetime activities of civil governments in the newly annexed islands. These
Insular Cases asked whether constitutional and statutory provisions
concerning import and export tariffs and the use of juries in criminal cases
were applicable to the islands and their inhabitants.26 These somewhat
narrow legal issues were the occasion for the Supreme Court's involvement
in a "great national debate"27 around the turn of the twentieth century about
whether the Constitution allowed the United States to have an empire-that
is, whether the Constitution allowed the United States to annex
extracontinental territory unlikely ever to be admitted to statehood,
containing people considered to be unfit for self-government, and to govern
with fewer constitutional limitations than on the mainland. In the imprecise
but evocative phrasing of that era, the Court addressed in the Insular Cases
whether "the Constitution followed the flag" as it was planted in the newly
annexed islands. 28
By 1905, a previously splintered Supreme Court had agreed upon a
framework for deciding whether the Constitution followed the flag to the
newly annexed islands: the doctrine of territorial incorporation.29 Under this
doctrine, some, but not all, individual constitutional rights followed the
flag-that is, inhabitants of these territories were protected from the time
the territory was annexed to the United States. Certain constitutional rights
and guarantees-specifically those requiring tariff uniformity and the use of
petit and grand juries-were held to be applicable only if the territory had
been further "incorporated" into the United States--that is, deemed an
integral and permanent part of the Union by Congress.3o Puerto Rico and
the Philippines were held to be "unincorporated" and, therefore, their
25. For a timeline listing key historical events and decisions by the Court in important
Insular Cases, see the Appendix at the end of this Article.
26. See, e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138
(1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 19o U.S. 197 (1903); Fourteen Diamond Rings, 183 U.S. 176
(1901); Dooleyv. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (19o1); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901);
De Limav. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901).
27. JosE A. CABRANES, CITIZENSHIP AND AMERICAN EMPIRE 4 (0979).
28. See, e.g., OWEN M. FIss, 8 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910, at 228-29 (1993). For a
contemporaneous example of this trope, see Does the Constitution Follow the Flag?, 8 AM. LAWYER
548 (Dec. 19oo).
29. See infra Part IV.
30. See Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality After
Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 982-83, 987-94 (2009) (describing the doctrine).
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inhabitants were entitled to somewhat fewer constitutional rights than
others living in the United States and its incorporated territories, such as
Oklahoma, Hawaii, and Alaska.3'
In 2oo8, the Supreme Court relied substantially on a few of the Insular
Cases about "territorial incorporation" and the annexed islands to sketch a
vision of a global and universal Constitution. Boumediene applied the
"fundamental rights" doctrine of the Insular Cases to an entirely inapposite
context: where noncitizens are detained outside the sovereign territory of
the United States as military enemies during a congressionally authorized
armed conflict. Boumediene read the Insular Cases about territorial
incorporation and fundamental rights, as well as a few later Court
precedents,32 to reject a bright-line "formalistic, sovereignty-based test" for
the availability of constitutional rights.33 Instead, Boumediene held that the
Insular Cases and other precedents required "a functional approach to
questions of [the] extraterritoriality" of the Constitution's protection of
individual rights, under which constitutional protections for noncitizens
could be available even outside sovereign U.S. territory.34 Based on the
Insular Cases and what the Court called its other "extraterritoriality
opinions," Boumediene offered a six- or seven-factor, nonexclusive,
unweighted, totality-of-the-circumstances test, which evaluated "practical"
and "objective factors" and the "specific circumstances" of the United States'
"control" over the territory, the "status" of the detainee, and similar
generalities.35 As a practical matter, the U.S. military was, the Court found in
Boumediene and Munaf very much in control of Guantanamo and Iraq,
respectively, and so under what it understands to be the doctrine of the
Insular Cases, the Constitution is in force in those places.
31. As Christina Burnett has demonstrated, it is confusing and not fully accurate to
describe the Insular Cases as holding that "the 'entire' Constitution applies 'with full force"' in
incorporated territories while "only its fundamental provisions apply in the unincorporated
territories." Christina Duffy Burnett, Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial
Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 797, 82o (2005). "Numerous constitutional provisions (notably
those addressing representation in the federal government) never applied outside the states,
before or after 19ol [when the first Insular Cases were decided], whether a territory was
incorporated or not. Other parts (such as the Territory Clause itself) never applied in the
states." Id. at 821 (footnote omitted).
32. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
Boumediene construed these later cases in light of its (mis)understanding of the Insular Cases. See
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2oo8) ("[I]f the Government's reading of Eisentrager
were correct, the opinion would have marked not only a change in, but a complete repudiation
of, the Insular Cases' (and later Reids) functional approach to questions of extraterritoriality.").
33. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 762.
34. Id. at 764.
35. Id. at 766 ("[W]e conclude that at least three factors are relevant in determining the
reach of the Suspension Clause: (s) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy
of the process through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites
where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in
resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the writ."). This lists many more than "three factors."
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In Boumediene, the Insular Cases and their doctrine of territorial
incorporation emerged as unlikely heroes-unlikely because today the
Insular Cases are despised, dimly understood, or entirely unknown. Most
who peruse Boumediene have likely never heard of the Insular Cases.36 For
readers familiar with the Insular Cases, the cases' deplorable discussions of
the supposed racial and cultural inferiority of inhabitants of the newly
annexed island territories37-cited as a reason they were entitled to fewer
constitutional rights-likely make the cases seem a strange basis for
Boumediene's ringing affirmation of human rights irrespective of citizenship
or location.s8 What many critics view as the Insular Cases' overly deferential
accommodation of the Constitution to the geostrategic preferences of
Presidents McKinley and Roosevelt for empire39 makes them unlikely
precedents for Boumediene's judicial intervention into President Bush's
leading foreign affairs initiatives. Moreover, the critics of the Insular Cases,
who (erroneously) believe that the decisions allowed the United States to
govern the newly annexed island territories wholly free from any
constitutional rights limitations,4o must find them odd precedents for
Boumediene's holding that the Constitution's protection of habeas corpus in
federal courts "has full effect at Guantanamo Bay."4'
D. THE 2008 COURT MISCONSTRUES THE INSULAR CASES
The Court in 2oo8 erred in relying on the Insular Cases about
territorial incorporation and fundamental rights to reject a bright-line
sovereignty test for the availability of constitutional rights to noncitizens and
to extend constitutional protections to alleged military enemies held abroad.
Very little that the Court wrote about the Insular Cases was correct-as to
36. Cf Sanford Levinson, Installing the Insular Cases into the Canon of Constitutional Law, in
FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO Rico, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION
121, 122 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001) [hereinafter FOREIGN IN A
DOMESTIC SENSE] ("At the present time, few cases can be said to be less ... canonical than
Downes (or any of the other Insular Cases).").
37. Many authors have critiqued the racism found in the Insular Cases. See, e.g., T.
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY 29, 94 (2002);JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE
SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO 51,59 (1985).
38. See Cole, supra note 19, at 51 ("[Boumediene] reflects new understandings ... that
pierce the veil of sovereignty, reject formalist fictions of territoriality where the state exercises
authority beyond its borders, and insist on the need forjudicial review to safeguard the human
rights of citizens and noncitizens alike.").
39. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, "We Are the People": Alien Suffrage in German and American
Perspective, 13 MICH.J. INT'LL. 259, 323 n.38o (1992).
40. See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1O69, 1O95
(2004) (stating that the Insular Cases hold that "the Constitution does not apply in so-called
unincorporated territories"). See generally Burnett, supra note 31 (demonstrating the error of
the conventional understanding that no constitutional rights were available in unincorporated
territory).
41. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2oo8).
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law or fact.42 In particular, the Court in 2oo8 did not understand that the
Insular Cases reject global constitutionalism and human-rights universalism.
The few Insular Cases the 2oo8 Court relied upon cannot provide a
theory about "the Constitution's extraterritorial application" because they
concerned lands annexed to the United States. As the justices who
developed the territorial-incorporation doctrine understood it, the doctrine
had a very limited domain: peacetime in a territory that had been formally
annexed to the United States and that had a civil government organized by
Congress. The great national debate had been primarily about that very
specific issue-whether the Constitution followed as the flag of U.S.
sovereignty was planted in the newly annexed territories. Contemporary
lawyers, commentators, and government officials understood the Court's
decisions in the most famous Insular Cases as addressing that issue. But
today the "flag" has not been placed in Afghanistan or Iraq; the United
States has not and almost certainly will not formally annex these or other
foreign nations where its military or other executive agents are currently
operating. The specific questions raised in Boumediene and Munaf-whether
there was a constitutional or statutory right to Article III judicial review, by
way habeas corpus, of wartime detentions in the nonsovereign territories of
Guantanamo or Iraq-simply has very little relation, as a matter of U.S
constitutional law and history, to questions about the status of peacetime
governments of civilian populations of island territories like Hawaii, Puerto
Rico, or the Philippines, after they were formally annexed by the United
States.
But yet the Court in Boumediene and Munaf was correct to rely upon
legal precedents from the fascinating period of war and territorial expansion
in 1898 and afterward. Of course, there are great differences between the
classic colonial empire the United States acquired in 1898 and today's more
notional or figurative empire. There are, however, instructive parallels
between these periods of U.S. history. As part of its large corpus of work
growing out of the war of 1898 and territorial expansion, the Court did
decide numerous cases of great contemporary relevance. This Article
exhumes these forgotten decisions and shows how they, rather than the few
42. One example for now: Boumediene's discussion of the relevance of a particular insular
case for the rights of noncitizens at Guantanamo Bay seems to have proceeded on the
erroneous assumption that, in 1922, Puerto Ricans were not U.S. citizens. See id. at 758 ("[A]s
early as Balzac [v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922), a case concerning Puerto Rico] in 1922, the
Court took for granted that even in unincorporated Territories the Government of the United
States was bound to provide to noncitizen inhabitants 'guaranties of certain fundamental
personal rights declared in the Constitution."' (quoting Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312)). But, the very
case discussed in Boumediene states-correctly-that Congress's Act of March 2, 1917, known as
the Jones Act, provided that all Puerto Ricans, with unimportant exceptions, "are hereby
declared, and shall be deemed and held to be, citizens of the United States." Balzac, 258 U.S. at
307 n. 1 (quoting section 5 of the Jones Act of 1917, ch. 145 39 Stat. 951, 953).
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Insular Cases relied upon by Boumediene, are the relevant precedents for
analyzing issues of extraterritorial constitutionalism.
It was not the few "insular" decisions discussed in Boumediene
concerning the doctrine of territorial incorporation-precedents I call the
canonical Insular Cases43-which are the most important. The canonical
Insular Cases about territorial incorporation represent only a tiny fraction of
the Court's output of decisions concerning the 1898 war and territorial
expansion. One of the contributions of this Article is to interpret the
canonical Insular Cases and the doctrine of territorial incorporation in light
of the almost entirely overlooked noncanonica144 decisions. These cases are
highly relevant to contemporary legal disputes, but the Court in 2oo8 did
not rely upon them and may, in fact, have been unaware of their existence.
These important, noncanonical Insular Cases concerned the legality of
military operations against Spanish subjects during the War of 1898, the
constitutional status of the temporary U.S. military government of Cuba, and
the interim military governments of newly annexed Puerto Rico and the
Philippines, and whether persons detained in accordance with military-court
judgments have a right to Article III review.45
In these neglected Insular Cases, instead of twenty-first century
globalism and human-rights universalism, the Court applied a traditional
constitutional doctrine and theory that had been largely consistent since the
Founding. According to these earlier understandings, the Constitution and
laws of the United States did not provide protections to, or create
obligations for, most noncitizens, including any who remained outside the
sovereign territory of the United States, and any who were military enemies,
even if they were present in the United States.46 Generally speaking, the
United States' dejure sovereign authority over territory was the touchstone of
constitutional rights. And even in newly annexed sovereign U.S. territory,
the U.S. military could temporarily govern, free from constitutional
43. 1 use the term canonical Insular Cases to distinguish them from the many other cases
concerning the war of 1898 and territorial expansion that have received little attention and
generally have not been deemed "Insular Cases." For a partial list of canonical Insular Cases, see
the cases decided between 19Ol and 1922 and cited in supra note 26 and infra notes 26o &
272. On debates about which decisions should count as "Insular Cases," see Christina Duffy
Burnett, A Note on the Insular Cases, in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, Supra note 36, at 389.
44. I refer to the decisions about the constitutional status of military operations and
military government as noncanonical Insular Cases because for many decades they have not been
grouped and discussed with the canonical Insular Cases as part of the era's jurisprudence
concerning war, sovereignty, territorial governance, and foreign relations.
45. See, e.g., Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 26o (19o9) (concerning the legality of the
continuation of a military government in Puerto Rico after annexation by the United States);
Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 297 (19o9) (rejecting Takings Clause claim based
on U.S. military's destruction of property during the war in Cuba); Neely v. Henkel, 18o U.S.
Io9 (1901) (concerning the temporary U.S. military government in Cuba); In reVidal, 179 U.S.
126 (19oo) (concerning a criminal conviction in a U.S. military court in Puerto Rico).
46. See generally Kent, supra note 9.
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limitations, until Congress established civil government. Thus the
Constitution prevailed only when and where Congress governed and peace
existed. War, foreign relations, and the governance of U.S. territory before
Congress created civil government occurred under the legal regime of
international law.47 Of particular relevance today, the constitutional law of
the Insular Cases' era treated small, special-purpose Executive enclaves, such
as military bases and naval stations, as foreign and hence not under control
of the Constitution and municipal law, even if they were under the dejure or
long-term defacto control of the United States.
By showing the very limited domain of the canonical Insular Cases
about territorial incorporation-that they apply only during peacetime in a
territory that had been formally annexed to the United States and had a civil
government organized by Congress-and by showing that the overlooked
noncanonical Insular Cases reject constitutional rights for military enemies
and for noncitizen's outside sovereign U.S. territory, this Article
demonstrates that Boumediene misread the Insular Cases. The Insular Cases,
properly understood, mean literally the opposite of what Boumediene
claimed: they reject global constitutionalism and human-rights universalism.
Boumediene's claim that it rests on a solid foundation of Court precedent is
demonstrably incorrect.
One might ask how the Court could have gone so wrong. There are
probably several reasons. The military and political events of 1898 and
thereafter were varied and complicated and, more than loo years later, the
historical details are not fresh in many lawyers' minds.48 A second possible
47. On the relationship between international law and the U.S. constitutional order, see
generally INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (David L. Sloss et al. eds., 201 1);J.
Andrew Kent, Congress's Under-Appreciated Power To Define and Punish Offenses Against the Law of
Nations, 85 TEX. L. REV. 843 (2007).
48. See infra Part V.C, discussing Boumediene's apparent misunderstanding of certain facts
regarding the U.S. occupation of Cuba and acquisition of Guantanamo Bay. In Munaf the
Court also seemed to struggle with the historical facts about Cuba. The Court's opinion is
written as if unaware that the U.S. military had occupied Cuba in 1898-1902--the relevant
period for one of Munafs key precedents. Munaf rejected the detainees' claim that the U.S.
military would violate the Due Process Clause by transferring the detainees from U.S. military
detention to Iraqi custody where there was a risk of torture. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 692
(2oo8). The Court noted that it had twice previously applied "the principle that a nation state
reigns sovereign within its own territory ... to reject claims that the Constitution precludes the
Executive from transferring a prisoner to a foreign country for prosecution in an allegedly
unconstitutional trial." Id. at 695 (emphasis added). One of the precedents was Neely v. Henkel,
an insular case that held that the Bill of Rights did not bar the extradition of a U.S. citizen to be
criminally prosecuted in Cuba for crimes he committed there. 18o U.S. i09 (0O). In
discussing Neely, the MunafCourt repeatedly described Cuba, circa i 9oo-ol, as a "foreign" and
distinct "sovereign" in relation to the United States, Munaf 553 U.S. at 696-97, and advised
that Neely had demonstrated that "diplomacy," rather than judicial review, was the appropriate
mechanism to address concerns about extraditions from the United States to "foreign"
countries with allegedly unfair criminal justice systems, id. at 701. But at the time of Neely, a U.S.
Army general, who reported directly to the Secretary of War in Washington and through him to
IOWA LAWREVIEW
reason is that, by the second half of the twentieth-century, the Supreme
Court had begun to misinterpret the Insular Cases by applying their rules
for domestic governance of annexed, but unincorporated, U.S. territory to
U.S. actions in wholly foreign territory, such as England in 195349 and
Mexico in 1986.50 Taking their cues from the Supreme Court, lower courts,
litigants, and globalist commentators have treated the territorial-
incorporation doctrine of the canonical Insular Cases as a comprehensive
legal framework for deciding whether individuals-specifically noncitizens-
in foreign countries or other "extraterritorial" or nonsovereign places may
invoke the Constitution to restrain U.S. government actions.5' Prior to
Boumediene, scholars, detainees, and amici in war-on-terror cases had urged
the Supreme Court to look to the Insular Cases about territorial
incorporation to find that noncitizens outside the sovereign territory of the
United States could invoke constitutional protections.52 Guantanamo was
the President of the United States, headed the government of Cuba. See infra Part V.B. How
exactly did communications between the U.S. military in Cuba and its civilian superiors in
Washington constitute international "diplomacy" with a "foreign" government?
49. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan,J., concurring in the result) (relying
upon canonical Insular Cases about the doctrine of territorial incorporation to help decide
whether wives tried by courts-martial for killing their U.S. servicemember husbands on U.S.
military bases in England and Japan had a constitutional right to a jury trial). Though the
justices in Reid were apparently aware that the canonical Insular Cases concerned sovereign U.S.
territory, see id. at 13, 14 (plurality opinion of Black, J.); id. at 5o-54 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring), both the plurality opinion and Justice Harlan's concurrence used imprecise and
potentially misleading words like "abroad" to refer to the territory where the canonical Insular
Cases arose, id. at 9 & n. 1i (plurality opinion of Black, J.) (citing a canonical Insular Case); id.
at 12 & n.19 (citing canonical Insular Cases); id. at 74-75 (Harlan, J., concurring).
50. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268 (199 o ) (relying upon
canonical Insular Cases about the doctrine of territorial incorporation to help decide whether a
Mexican citizen tried in U.S. district court could invoke the Fourth Amendment to challenge
the U.S. and Mexican law enforcement's warrantless search of his residence in Mexico); id. at.
277 (Kennedy,J., concurring) (same).
51. See, e.g., In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 454 (D.D.C. 2005)
("The Supreme Court... recognized the potential for a more liberal view of the Constitution's
applicability outside of the United States in a line of precedent known as the 'Insular Cases."'),
vacated by Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3 d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev'd, 553 U.S. 723 (2oo8);
Baher Azmy, Rasul v. Bush and the Intraterritorial Constitution, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 369,
407 (2007) ("[The Insular Cases] establish a basic proposition that certain 'fundamental rights'
could not be denied to aliens inhabiting territories subject to the control of the United States
government, even where the United States is not technically sovereign.").
52. See, e.g., Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at i9 n.2o, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)
(No. 03-334), 2004 WL 96762 (noting that, in the Insular Cases, "the Court repeatedly
recognized that the Due Process Clause embodies a fundamental right that constrains the
Executive, even when it acts with respect to an alien outside the United States"); Brief of The
American Jewish Committee et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 25, Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184), 2oo6 WL 53977 ("In the Insular Cases, the Court
[c]orrectly [hleld that [b]asic [c]onstitutional [n]orms [aipply [e]xtraterritorially."); Neuman,
supra note 4, at 15 (drawing on the Insular Cases to advocate for "application of fundamental
constitutional rights to protect individuals in territories subject to U.S. governance, but where
the United States does not possess sovereignty"); Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73
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said to be similarly situated to Puerto Rico at the turn of the twentieth
century, when the Supreme Court found that residents of the newly
annexed island were entitled to fundamental constitutional protections. The
briefs and scholarly works advocating the application of the "fundamental
rights" doctrines of the canonical Insular Cases to the controversy at
Guantanamo have often ignored crucial noncanonical Insular Cases and
therefore fundamentally misunderstood the cases' doctrines and underlying
legal assumptions.53
Another possible reason for the 2oo8 Court's misunderstanding of the
Insular Cases is that the briefing the Court received in 2007 and 2oo8 and
much of the scholarship about the Insular Cases is marked by a failure to
look for legal precedents and interpretations outside the Supreme Court.
There are rich veins of precedent-including ones bearing on the specific
constitutional questions raised in Boumediene and Munaf--in the decisions of
territorial or "legislative" courts in the islands, statutes of Congress and
territorial legislative bodies, key congressional reports and debates,
presidential orders, military orders, and opinions of the Attorney General,
the Secretary of War, the Solicitor of the War Department and the Judge
Advocate-Generals of the Army and Navy. These sources often provide
crucially helpful context for understanding what was at issue in the Court's
Insular Cases.
After Boumediene, it is no longer necessary to demonstrate that the
Insular Cases are important. In addition to continuing to restrict the
constitutional rights of people living in the United States' various territories
and dependencies,54 the Insular Cases are now a key part of the doctrinal
support for the Court's decisions in Boumediene and Munaf which will have
deep and lasting effects in one of the most significant areas of foreign affairs
and national security law in this country's history. In Boumediene, the Court
disclaimed any intention to be extending constitutional protections to any
nonsovereign locations other than Guantanamo Bay; but the broad sweep of
FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2545 (2005) ("[M]y argument unequivocably supports Judge Green's
statement [in In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases] that 'Guantanamo Bay must be considered the
equivalent of a U.S. territory in which fundamental constitutional rights apply"' under the
doctrine of the Insular Cases).
53. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
54. These include the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and
American Samoa. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that
Boumediene has done a real disservice to the residents of U.S. territories and possessions-most
of them U.S. citizens or U.S. nationals-by assimilating their rights in everyday affairs to the
rights of noncitizen military prisoners held at a base outside U.S. sovereign territory as captives
in a congressionally authorized armed conflict. Boumediene threatens to demean and diminish
the already somewhat shaky constitutional basis of the rights of inhabitants of U.S. territories
and possessions.
IOWA LAWREVIEW
Boumediene's rhetoric and reasoning, the highly-malleable test,55 and the
Court's implicit vision of the federal judiciary as the primus inter pares branch
of government, charged with overseeing the extraterritorial national security
policies of the President and Congress, suggest that the Court embraced
global constitutionalism and human-rights universalism and might soon
extend the Constitution to new places and persons.5 6 Post-Boumediene, the
Insular Cases are being analyzed in litigation concerning whether military
detainees in overseas locations other than Guantanamo have judicially-
enforceable habeas corpus and other constitutional rights,s7 and in non-
habeas civil suits concerning the constitutional rights of war-on-terror
detainees.s5 In court filings in these and other cases, and in scholarship and
commentary concerned with the future trajectory of the Supreme Court's
judicial doctrine, the Insular Cases will of course be seen through the lens of
Boumediene's interpretation.59 That is perfectly appropriate, but this Article
has a different project. Here, Boumediene, Munaf and their inaccurate
understanding of the Insular Cases will not be treated as objective facts of
the current doctrinal landscape. This Article rather reaches back to the past
to supply an accurate account of the Insular Cases and their historical and
legal contexts.
E. OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT
The remainder of this Article is in six parts. The next part, Part II,
provides a factual overview of the War of 1898 and the United States'
concomitant territorial expansion. It also explores the constitutional
significance of the treaty ending the war and ceding territory to the United
States, the U.S military governments for captured Spanish islands, and later
congressional statutes creating civil governments. This is part of the Article's
attempts to give due weight to constitutional interpretation outside the
courts. Part III then describes the great debate about the constitutionality of
55. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Jules Lobel, The Supreme Court and Enemy Combatants, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 113 1,
1141 (2008) ("The Court's rejection of a test that focuses exclusively on the formal legal status
of a territory and its invocation of the concept of 'objective degree of control' that the United
States exercises, suggests that Boumediene might not be cabined to the particular status of
Guantanamo, and could possibly be a significant step in an expansion of habeas jurisdiction
and other constitutional rights to aliens abroad.").
57. See, e.g., Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 6o5 F.3 d 84, 93-94 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (considering the
Insular Cases in deciding whether Boumediene extends protection to detainees held by the U.S.
military in Afghanistan).
58. See, e.g., Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3 d 527, 532 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (considering the Insular
Cases in reference to Guantanamo detainees' claims about torture and other mistreatment),
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009).
59. See, e.g., Jos6 A. Cabranes, Our Imperial Criminal Procedure: Problems in the Extraterritorial
Application of U.S. Constitutional Law, 18 YALE LJ. 166o, 1697-1709 (2009) (using the Insular
Cases, Boumediene, and other recent Supreme Court precedent to adduce principles to govern
U.S. constitutional regulation of extraterritorial activities).
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imperialism that occurred in the United States from 1898 to 19oo. It shows
that participants in the debate agreed that the Constitution only supplied
rights in sovereign U.S. territory and that military enemies lacked rights.
Part IV analyzes the legality of the U.S. military government of Puerto Rico,
showing that the Supreme Court, Congress, and the Executive were united
in the view that constitutional rights did not run against the U.S. military
government of Puerto Rico (or the U.S. military government of any other
island) during the period before April i899 when Treaty of Paris became
effective, formally ending the state of war and transferring Puerto Rico, the
Philippines, and Guam to the United States, and ending Spanish rule of
Cuba. In addition, Part IV shows that, even after April 1899 when Puerto
Rico was indisputably under the de jure sovereignty of the United States, and
when it was peacetime, the fact that Congress had not yet created a civil
government for Puerto Rico meant that military government-unrestrained
by constitutional rights-had to continue. These decisions of the Supreme
Court show just how erroneous is Boumediene's reading of the Insular Cases.
Finally, Part IV shows that, in the insular era, the Supreme Court did not
perceive any constitutional problem with the U.S. military detaining
individuals under judgments of U.S. military courts in Puerto Rico, having
no access to Article III courts via habeas corpus or otherwise.
Part V concerns Cuba, the site of the 1898 war's most significant
military operations against Spanish ground forces and the United States'
first self-described "humanitarian intervention." Cases concerning U.S.
military actions against Spanish subjects show that military enemies lacked
constitutional protection during wartime. And an overlooked but crucially
important 19ol Supreme Court decision concerning the United States'
temporary military government of Cuba-Neely v. Henkel'-shows that
individual constitutional rights were not enforceable there, despite de facto
sovereignty and control by the United States. This is important evidence that
Boumediene misunderstood the true constitutional doctrines of the Insular
Cases. This Part also debunks the conspiracy theory Boumediene offered
about the United States allegedly trying to "manipulate" away constitutional
rights that otherwise would have existed at the Guantanamo Bay military
facility.
Part VI shows the limited domain of the doctrine of territorial
incorporation, as established by the very canonical Insular Cases relied upon
by Boumediene. The doctrine applied only after annexation to the United
States, during peacetime, and once Congress had created a civil
government. Boumediene clearly erred by treating the doctrine as applicable
to nonsovereign territory.
Finally, Part VII further confirms Boumediene's misunderstanding of the
Insular Cases' jurisprudence by demonstrating the nearly universal
6o. Neelyv. Henkel, 18o U.S. lo9 (1901).
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agreement that the United States could annex ports, harbors, or small
islands for military purposes, and govern them as military enclaves, free from
individual constitutional-rights restrictions. Guantanamo was, of course,
leased for precisely these purposes in 1903. This Part shows that Guam and
Samoa were governed for decades as naval outposts under military law-not
the Constitution.
The Appendix at the end of this Article contains a timeline of key
historical events and a chart categorizing the many canonical and
noncanonical Insular Cases discussed in the Article.
II. THE WAR OF 1898 AND TERRITORIAL EXPANSION
The overseas territorial expansion during and after the War of 1898 was
the United States' most consequential foreign-policy initiative between the
Civil War and World War 1.6, In the second half of the nineteenth century,
European powers gobbled up millions of square miles of colonies around
the world, while the United States watched from its "splendid isolation"
across the oceans. It was the most economically powerful country in the
world, but hardly a heavyweight in the arena of global politics. 6 2 But then in
1898, the United States overpowered and humiliated Spain in a short and
easy war,63 and took the Spanish colonies of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and
the Philippines. By the Treaty of Paris of December 1898, Spain ceded the
latter three territories to the United States. 64 But Cuba was a special case. In
authorizing President McKinley to intervene in the rebellion against Spain,
Congress had imposed a crucial condition in the so-called Teller
Amendment: the Cuban people, declared Congress, "of right ought to be,
free and independent," and "the United States hereby disclaims any
disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over
[Cuba] except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination,
when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the
Island to its people."65 As a result of this policy, the Treaty of Paris provided
that Spain would withdraw from Cuba and the United States would not
61. cf.JOHNJ. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS 234-35 (paperback
ed. 2003) (noting that it is conventional to date the United States' emergence as a world power
to the War of 1898 and subsequent territorial expansion).
62. See FAREED ZAKARIA, FROM WEALTH TO POWER 45-48 (1998).
63. The War of 1898 began over Cuba. Spain's uncertain grip on Cuba had long
concerned American policymakers and enticed American expansionists. A bloody revolutionary
struggle lasted from 1868-78 and restarted in 1895. See LESTER D. LANGLEY, THE CUBAN POLICY
OF THE UNITED STATES 55-58, 8o (1968). Widespread American sympathy for the Cuban rebels
and concerns about American trade and investment in Cuba gradually grew into conviction that
the United States should intervene militarily to end the conflict.
64. Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain
(Treaty of Paris), U.S.-Spain, arts. II & III, Dec. io, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754, at 1755-56.
65. J. Res. 24, 5 5 th Cong., 30 Stat. 738, 739 (2d Sess. 1898).
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annex, but instead merely temporarily occupy it on behalf of the Cuban
people. 66
Although some expansionists still hoped that Cuba would become part
of the United States, the island was generally considered to be on a fast track
to independence, as stipulated by Congress. Puerto Rico, where the United
States had been greeted warmly-or at least without much complaint-by a
majority of the population, was treated as a permanent U.S. possession from
the beginning.67 Guam was designated a U.S. naval station to be ruled by
military law. None of this was controversial. Substantial segments of the
American public, however, opposed annexation of the Philippines-an
enormous archipelago of over 3,000 islands, located over 7,ooo nautical
miles from Washington, with a population of somewhere between seven and
ten million people.68 Public and congressional resistance to acquiring the
Philippines only increased when the Filipino insurgents, who had earlier
fought Spain, attacked U.S. forces at Manila in February 1899, just as the
U.S. Senate was set to vote on the Treaty of Paris.6 9
Only after intense debates and by a slim margin, the Senate gave its
advice and consent to ratification of the treaty on February 6, 1899.70 But
the Senate also passed a resolution purporting to clarify the meaning of the
treaty vote and to state future U.S. policy toward the Philippines: no
"incorporation" of Filipinos into the American body politic and no
"permanent annex[ation]" of the islands.7' Spain and the United States
exchanged ratifications and the treaty entered into force on April Ii1,
1899.72 This day in April 1899, marking the formal end of the state of war
and the United States' formal annexation of Puerto Rico, the Philippines,
66. Treaty of Paris, supra note 64, art. III.
67. VEDASTO JOSE SAMONTE, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION 98-99
(1925).
68. SeeJOHN MORGAN GATES, SCHOOLBOOKS AND KRAGS: THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE
PHILIPPINES, 1898-1902, at 7 (1973); ROBERT D. RAMSEY III, SAVAGE WARS OF PEACE: CASE
STUDIES OF PACIFICATION IN THE PHILIPPINES, 1898-1902, at 2-3 (2007).
In part, racism motivated the opposition. For example, George Vest, a Democratic Senator
from Missouri and leading anti-expansionist, wrote just prior to the vote on treaty ratification
that "[t]he idea of conferring American citizenship upon the half-civilized, piratical, muck-
running inhabitants of [the Philippines] ... and creating a State of the Union from such
materials, is... absurd and indefensible." G.G. Vest, Objections to Annexing the Philippines, 168 N.
AM. REV. 112, 112 (1899).
69. See GATES, supra note 68, at 40-42, 76-77; WALTER LAFEBER, 2 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS: THE AMERICAN SEARCH FOR OPPORTUNITY, 1865-1913, at 163 (Warren I.
Cohen ed., 1993).
70. See S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 5 5 th Cong., 3 d. Sess. 1284 (1899). The full Congress impliedly
approved the Treaty of Paris by appropriating $20 million to pay Spain for the Philippines. See
Act of March 2, 1899, ch. 376, 30 Stat. 993.
71. See 32 CONG. REC. 1846 (19oo) (floor vote). On the origins of this, the so-called
McEnery Resolution, see LAFEBER, supra note 69, at 164.
72. See Treaty of Paris, supra note 64, at 1762.
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and Guam,73 would have great significance in later litigation about the
islands.
Differences between how the treaty handled Cuba, on the one hand,
and the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico, on the other, show the United
States' tacit assumption that international law would continue to govern the
U.S. military's occupation of Cuba, a territory that would remain foreign to
the United States, while U.S. domestic or "municipal" law would govern the
United States' relations with the other islands once they had been formally
annexed to the United States by the President's and Senate's acceptance of
the treaty. With regard to Cuba, the treaty provided that:
Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.
And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied
by the United States, the United States will, so long as such
occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations that
may under international law result from the fact of its occupation,
for the protection of life and property.74
Mere military conquest and "occupation" of a foreign country did not,
under American public law previously expounded by the Supreme Court,
constitute annexation by the United States,75 so it was clear from the treaty
that the United States was not annexing Cuba.
By contrast to the provision regarding Cuba, the treaty stated that
Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippine Islands were "ceded" to the United
States and that "[t] he civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants
of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by
the Congress"76-not by public international law-the law that governed
relations between different nations and peoples.
In July 1898, during, but unrelated to the war, the United States
annexed the independent nation of Hawaii with the consent of its
government.77 Just after the war with Spain ended, the United States claimed
sovereignty over Wake and imposed a protectorate over Samoa, both island
73. Cf MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 434 (1913) (stating that "the treaty
became effective" on April 11, 1899); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 230 (1901)
(stating that April 1 1, 1899 was "the date of the ratification of the treaty and the cession of the
island [Puerto Rico] to the United States").
74. Treaty of Paris, supra note 64, art. I.
75. See Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 614-15 (185o).
76. Treaty of Paris, supra note 64, art. IX.
77. See Joint Resolution To Provide for Annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United
States,J. Res. 55, 5 5 th Cong., 30 Stat. 750 (2d Sess. 1898). A treaty had been signed but was not
approved by the U.S. Senate. See Report from Secretary Sherman: Review of Conditions Leading Toward
Annexation Accompanies President's Message, CHI. DAILY TRIBUNE, June 18, 1897, at 9 (reviewing
the treaty and the President and Secretary of State's statements about it).
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groups in the Pacific.78 In the latter part of 1898, President McKinley
created military governments for the captured Spanish islands of Cuba,
Puerto Rico, and the Philippines.79 The military order announced a key
legal principle: "the absolute domain of military authority" over the
conquered Spanish islands "is and must remain supreme in the ceded
territory until the legislation of the United States shall otherwise provide." 8o
Both Congress and the federal courts later approved this legal proposition-
though it is utterly inconsistent with Boumediene's understanding of the
Insular Cases.
The U.S. military government of Cuba lasted until May 19o2, when the
United States turned over control to a newly created Cuban government.8'
Congress and the Executive understood, and the Supreme Court confirmed
that individual constitutional rights did not run against the U.S. military
government because Cuba was foreign to the United States notwithstanding
the United States' total control over the island.
In Puerto Rico, the U.S. military government lasted beyond the
ratification of the treaty of peace and cession in April 1899 until Congress
approved civil government for the islands in May i 900 in the Foraker Act,
named after its sponsor, a Republican Senator from Ohio. In the Foraker
Act, Congress chose not to make the residents U.S. citizens or to indicate
that the Constitution applied in Puerto Rico.12 The Foraker Act also treated
Puerto Rico as if it were not part of the United States for purposes of certain
78. See CHARLES S. CAMPBELL, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS
297-99, 311-13 (1976); RICHARD W. LEOPOLD, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
191-92 (1962); ZAKARIA, supra note 62, at 16o-61.
79. As the Spanish were ousted from the Philippines, Cuba and Puerto Rico, President
McKinley issued instructions to the Army to govern the military occupation of the captured
islands; the instructions were published to the Army by the Adjutant General's Office in
Washington as General Orders No. 1o ("GO o1"). The version of GO 1o tailored to Cuba is
most easily found in Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U.S. 139, 155 n.t (1913), or 10 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 214-16 (James D. Richardson
ed., 1899) [hereinafter GO 1]. The War Department did not separately issue these orders to
the Army in Puerto Rico, but it was understood to be binding there as well. See Ochoa, 230 U.S.
at 254. In his first general order, directed to both the people of Puerto Rico and U.S. forces
there, the U.S. military governor paraphrased much of the substance of GO lol. See General
Orders No. 1, Department of Puerto Rico (Oct. 18, 1898), reprinted in BRIG. GEN. GEORGE W.
DAVIS, U.S.V., CIVIL AFFAIRS IN PUERTO RICO, 1899, at 89-90 (1900) [hereinafter DAVIS 1899
REPORT]. Note that in the U.S congressional serial set, the Davis report is in volume s, part 6,
page 477 et seq. of the War Department reports for the fiscal year ending June 1899; the Davis
report cited in the previous sentence is a stand-alone version issued by the Government Printing
Office.
8o. GO o1, supra note 79.
81. See infra Part V.C.
82. Foraker Act, ch. 191, §§ 7-8, 31 Stat. 77, 79 (i9oo). These were conscious legislative
choices. See SENATE COMM. ON PAC. ISLANDS & P.R., TEMPORARY CIVIL GOVERNMENT FOR PORTO
RICO, S. REP. No. 56-249 passim (1st Sess. 19oo) (discussing these issues); HOUSE COMM. ON
WAYS & MEANS, TO REGULATE THE TRADE OF PUERTO RICO, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, H.R. REP.
No. 56-249 passim (lst Sess. 19oo) (same).
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tariff regulations. The Constitution limits Congress' Article I taxing power
with the requirement that "all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States."83 But Congress created a special, non-
uniform tariff for Puerto Rico: merchandise entering the United States from
Puerto Rico, or vice versa, would be taxed at the rate of fifteen percent of
the tariff on goods from "foreign countries" entering the United States.S4
The Executive branch enforced this special tariff at ports in Puerto Rico and
the mainland United States. The Foraker Act's non-uniform duty gave rise to
the litigation that ultimately resulted in the Supreme Court's 19o decision
in Downes v. Bidwell--the origin of the doctrine of territorial incorporation.
The conflict with the Filipino revolutionary army greatly complicated
American government of the Philippines. Executive control of the
archipelago was not transferred from the U.S. commanding general to a
civilian administrator appointed by the President until mid-19o, more than
two years after the Treaty of Paris was ratified. Congress had waited until
spring 19o to legislate about the government of the Philippines, and then
it essentially rubber-stamped the Executive's military government.85
Although Congress had approved the Philippine government, it was not a
civil government. The entire archipelago was still considered a military zone
due to the insurrection. It would be another year until Congress, in July
19o2, finally enacted a more detailed law regarding the government for the
Philippines and the President proclaimed that the insurrection had been
suppressed.8 6 Though the confluence of peace and civil government
organized by Congress was generally thought to mark the beginning of
individual constitutional rights for inhabitants of U.S. territories, in its 1902
Philippine Bill, Congress specified that the Constitution did not apply in the
Philippines and so provided a statutory Bill of Rights instead.87
III. THE GREAT DEBATE ABOUT IMPERIALISM
Starting during the War of 1898, a "great national debate on
imperialism"88 occurred in the United States. Because several opinions in
Downes v. Bidwel3 9 and other important canonical Insular Cases responded
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
84. Foraker Act § 3.
85. SeeAct of March 2, 19o (SpoonerAmendment), ch. 803, 31 Stat. 895, 910.
86. SeeAct ofJuly 1, 1902 (Philippine Bill), ch. 1369, 32 Stat. 691.
87. See Philippine Bill § 1 ("The provisions of section eighteen hundred and ninety-one of
the Revised Statutes of eighteen hundred and seventy-eight shall not apply to the Philippine
Islands."); id. § 5 (statutory bill of rights); see also Provisions Common to all the Territories, tit.
13, ch. 1, § 1891, 1 Rev. Stat. 325, 333 (1878) ("The Constitution and all laws of the United
States which are not locally inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within all the
organized Territories, and in every Territory hereafter organized as elsewhere within the
United States.").
88. CABRANES, supra note 27, at4.
89. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
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to themes and arguments of the great debate on imperialism, it is important
to understand what was at issue in the country at large. Moreover, the
extensive debate allows one to reconstruct the range of opinions about the
constitutional questions of the day and identify areas of consensus and
disagreement. Although a great variety of views about the Constitution were
advanced during the great debate, Boumediene's understanding of a global
and universal Constitution was not among them.
A. THE CONSTITUTIONDID NOT PROTECT MILITARY ENEMIES
The Civil War confirmed that under U.S. law the Constitution did not
protect military enemies during war. During wartime, both civilian residents
of the enemy nation and enemy combatants-wherever located-were
barred from using U.S. courts to assert legal rights.9o And the Constitution
provided them with no protections, even when suits were brought after the
war, when courts had reopened to them.9 These understandings were black
letter law for many decades after the Civil War, including during the insular
era. For instance, Professor John Burgess of Columbia wrote that "the
government is the creature of the constitution ... [and] draws its life and
legitimacy at every instant from the constitution," but, he continued, "we
have a constitution of government for war and a constitution of government
for peace,"92 and this Constitution for war or "situations requiring the
exercise of military power.., places no limitations on the powers of the
government."93
B. THE CONSTITUTION DID NOT PROTECT NONcITZENS 'RIGHTS OuTDE OF THE
SOVEREIGN TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES
At the Founding, in the antebellum period, and through the Civil War
and later nineteenth century, it was generally agreed that the Constitution
did not protect noncitizens outside the United States.94 The lack of
9o. See Kent, supra note 9, at 1857-58, 1905-07.
9i. See id. at 1856-59, 1899-i9o2, 1913-17. For a succinct statement of this view during
the Civil War, see Leonard Bacon, Reply to Professor Parker, 22 NEW ENGLANDER 191, 220 (1863)
("Enemies at war with the United States have no fights other than those which are theirs by the
law of nations and the laws of war. The Constitution has no occasion to provide for enemies at
war with the Union anything else than a speedy and effectual destruction. The idea that
declared enemies, waging war upon the Union, have rights under the Constitution, is too
preposterous to be entertained.").
92. Burgess, Newly Acquired Territory, supra note 8, at 383-84. Burgess was an influential
constitutional lawyer and political scientist at Columbia University.
93. Burgess, Extra-Continental Territory?, supra note 8, at 15; see also, e.g., JOHN NORTON
POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 379
(Edmund H. Bennett ed., loth ed. 1888); William A. Dunning, The Constitution of the United
States in Civil War, 1 POL. SCI. Q. 2, 17 (1886).
94. See generally Kent, supra note 3 (Founding and early antebellum); Kent, supra note 9
(antebellum, Civil War, later nineteenth century).
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constitutional protection for noncitizens outside the sovereign territory of
the United States remained basic, black-letter law during the insular era.95 It
is sometimes said that, until the mid-twentieth century, a dogma of "strict
territoriality"-that is, the view that domestic law, including the
Constitution, can have no force abroad-prevented American legal thought
from conceiving that either citizens or noncitizens could possibly have
extraterritorial constitutional rights.96  This is somewhat overstated.
Territoriality undoubtedly did play a role in how extraterritorial
constitutional protections were thought about. For instance, in a
noncanonical Insular Case about the temporary U.S. military occupation of
Cuba, the United States' brief to the Supreme Court stated that "the
Constitution and laws of the United States... have no effect for a foreign
95. See, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 694 (1898) ("Chinese persons,
born out of the United States, remaining subjects of the emperor of China, and not having
become citizens of the United States, are entitled to the protection of and owe allegiance to the
United States, so long as they are permitted by the United States to reside here; and are 'subject
to the jurisdiction thereof,' in the same sense as all other aliens residing in the United States.");
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 242 (1896) (Field, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("The term 'person,' used in the fifth amendment, is broad enough to
include any and every human being within the jurisdiction of the republic. A resident, alien
born, is entitled to the same protection under the laws that a citizen is entitled to. He owes
obedience to the laws of the country in which he is domiciled, and, as a consequence, he is
entitled to the equal protection of those laws."); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,
724 (1893) ("Chinese laborers, therefore, like all other aliens residing in the United States for
a shorter or longer time, are entitled, so long as they are permitted by the government of the
United States to remain in the country, to the safeguards of the constitution, and to the
protection of the laws, in regard to their rights of person and of property, and to their civil and
criminal responsibility."); Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 147, 154 (1872) ("All
strangers are under the protection of the sovereign while they are within his territories, and owe
a temporary allegiance in return for that protection." (internal quotation mark omitted)). For
later statements about the unavailability of individual constitutional protections for noncitizens
outside the sovereign territory, see, for example, United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 332
(1937) ("[O]ur Constitution, laws, and policies have no extraterritorial operation, unless in
respect of our own citizens."), and United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318
(1936) ("Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in
foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens.").
96. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1996) ("Under a strictly
territorial model, the Constitution constrains the United States government only when it acts
within the borders of the United States. Strict territoriality prevailed as dogma for most of
American constitutional history, until the Supreme Court overturned it in 1957 in Reid v.
Covert."); Neuman, supra note 4, at 45 (noting that "[p]re-modern case law assists little in
deciding how the Bill of Rights should apply to aliens abroad" because it reflects "the rigidly
territorial methodology of turn-of-the-century conflict of laws," which "assumed that
constitutional rights were unavailable--to both citizens and aliens--outside the borders of the
United States"); Kal Raustiala, The Evolution of Territoriality: International Relations and American
Law, in TERRITORIALITY AND CONFLICT IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION 219, 219 (Miles Kahler &
Barbara F. Walter eds., 2006) ("In the nineteenth century the dominant rule of legal spatiality
was strict territoriality: law and land were understood to be tightly and fundamentally linked.").
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country."97 In another U.S. brief to the Court, the Solicitor General wrote
that "[o]ur Constitution has no effect outside the United States, or of [sic]
territory subject to its jurisdiction, and therefore can have no operation in
China .... [which] is an independent nation."98 Moreover, the practice of
the U.S. political branches and decisions of the Supreme Court confirmed
that, in certain circumstances, the government could exercise power
extraterritorially without constitutional protections even for U.S. citizens.
For example, the government could exercise power overseas in special-
purpose enclaves like consular courts in foreign countries free from
individual, constitutional-rights restrictions.99 But so-called "strict
territoriality" was not a universally shared theory about the Constitution's
scope. Another strand of thought viewed constitutional protections as
potentially worldwide for U.S. citizens, but as strictly territorially limited-
only available in sovereign U.S. territory-for noncitizens. The theory
underlying this approach to the Constitution's scope was that allegiance to
the United States and protection from its Constitution were correlative. For
U.S. citizens, allegiance was owed no matter where on earth the person was
located, and so the protections of the Constitution were similarly universal.
By contrast, noncitizens only owed allegiance to the United States
temporarily-only for so long as they were present within its borders-and
so only had the protection of the Constitution within the United States. l° °
No matter which constitutional-theoretical framework was deployed,
97. Brief for Defendant in Error at 18, O'Reilly de Camara v. Brooke, 209 U.S. 45 (1908)
(No. 104).
98. Brief Opposing the Petition for Certiorari at i , Ah Sou v. United States, 200 U.S. 611
(1905) (No. 339) (citation omitted); see also Brief for the United States, Goetze v. United States,
182 U.S. 221 (19o) (No. 340) (noting the "maxim" that laws "have no extraterritorial effect or
jurisdiction. So also of constitutional provisions"), reprinted in THE INSULAR CASES, COMPRISING
THE RECORDS, BRIEFS, AND ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL IN THE INSULAR CASES OF THE OCTOBER
TERM, 1900, IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, INCLUDING THE APPENDIXES
THERETO 137, 173 (Albert H. Howe ed., 1901) [hereinafter INSULAR CASES]; Richards on
Expansion, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 19oo, at 6 (reporting that in a speech the Solicitor General
"contended that the limitations of the Constitution apply only within the States united under
it"); Constitution in Puerto Rico, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1900, at 6 ("[O] n the question of whether the
Constitution extends to the new possessions of the United States[, t]he Department of Justice
says it does not without act of Congress.").
99. Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891) ("By the constitution a government is
ordained and established 'for the United States of America,' and not for countries outside of
their limits. The guaranties it affords ... apply only to citizens and others within the United
States, or who are brought there for trial for alleged offenses committed elsewhere, and not to
residents or temporary sojourners abroad. The constitution can have no operation in another
country." (citation omitted)).
ioo. See generally Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 1O9 COLUM. L. REV. 1823 (2009)
(analyzing the allegiance-protection framework during the colonial period in the United States
and England and the American Founding era); Kent, supra note 9 (showing that this allegiance-
protection framework persisted during the antebellum, Civil War and post-Civil War periods).
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Americans during the insular era agreed that the Constitution did not
protect noncitizens outside the sovereign territory of the United States.
Before the Insular Cases were decided, it was repeatedly expressed in
political debates and internal government deliberations about imperial
policies that noncitizens outside the United States lacked constitutional
protections. Attorney General John Griggs issued an important legal opinion
to that effect in 1898:
Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Manila have not, as yet, been formally
ceded to the United States. So far as they are subject to the control
and government of this country, they are ruled under the principle
of belligerent right. They have not become entided to the rights
and privileges of citizens of the United States.1oI
During the debate about whether to ratify the Treaty of Paris and thereby to
formally end the war with Spain and annex Puerto Rico, Guam, and the
Philippines, Senator William Allen of Nebraska stated:
If we have acquired the archipelago [Philippines], if it is now a part
and parcel of the territory of the United States, then the
Constitution of the United States extends to every one of those
islands and protects every one of the inhabitants. If we have not
acquired that territory, if our possession is simply tentative as a
possession of war.., then the provisions of the Constitution do not
apply to the territory and the inhabitants ....-o
Administration lawyers, Congressmen, and others made these legal points
many times. There are dozens of examples of express statements that
individual constitutional rights were unavailable outside the sovereign
territory of the United States.103
Even committed opponents of the imperialists' constitutional views
believed that constitutional protections were unavailable in nonsovereign
territory. One of the most prolific anti-imperialist authors, Carman
Randolph, argued that the newly annexed insular possessions had come
under the protections of the Constitution, but noted that constitutional
protections did not apply outside the sovereign territory of the United
lol. Copyrights-Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippine Islands, 22 Op. Att'y Gen. 268, 269
(1898).
102. 32 CONG. REC. 573 (1899).
103. See, e.g.,John T. Morgan, What Shall WeDo with the Conquered Islands?, 166 N. AM. REv.
641, 645 (1898) ("The limitations on the powers of our departments of government are
intended to protect our people and the States against domestic usurpation or wrong, rather
than to limit the national government in its dealings with foreign states or countries."); A
Question of Constitutional Law, 88 OUTLOOK 64, 65 (1908) ("The limitations on the power of the
Federal Government are solely for the protection of the people of the United States. In dealing
with those who are not citizens of the United States, its powers are not limited by the
Constitution.... People living in a territory which belongs to the United States, but is not a part
of the United States, cannot claim the protection of the Constitution.").
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States.°4 Edward Perkins, an attorney for importers in the first Insular Cases,
argued to the Supreme Court that the Constitution protected "all people
who might inhabit within the dominion of the Nation."'°5 William Jennings
Bryan declared that the privileges and immunities found in the Constitution
protect "all the people of the United States" in any "section subject to
United States sovereignty.",o
6
There were two main tropes that organized the constitutional discourse
during the great debate about imperialism. The first was the question
whether "the Constitution followed the flag." The second was the question
whether the Constitution extended "ex proprio vigor'-of its own force-over
annexed territory by the act of annexation. Examining debates involving
both tropes shows that there was deep agreement during the insular era that
the Constitution was not the global and universal one envisaged by the
Court in 2oo8.
1. Did the Constitution Follow the Flag?
To the question "does the Constitution follow the flag?" in annexed
territories, expansionists or imperialists-often Republicans, members of
President McKinley's partyo7-answered with a qualified "no," maintaining
104. See CARMAN F. RANDOLPH, THE LAW AND POLICY OF ANNEXATION 74 (1901) ("The Bill
of Rights is not an essay on liberty. It is a law forbidding acts which, for the most part, are
political crimes, and the illegality of these acts does not depend on the place of their
commission or the color of their victims, if they are committed within the territorial jurisdiction
of Congress."); id. at 1O2 (stating that the Constitution "confers rights" "[i]n the Philippine
Archipelago, as in all United States territory"); id. (suggesting that individual constitutional
rights exist in "all land under the sovereignty of Congress"); id. at 1o6 ("The inclusion of the
Philippines within the boundaries of the United States, and the aegis of the Constitution, are
results of acquiring territorial sovereignty .... ").
105. Rights of Ceded Islands, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 19oo, at 5; see also Fourteen Diamond
Rings, 46 L. Ed. 138, 140 (1901) (argument of Charles H. Aldrich, for importer) ("The
application of the Constitution in its operation is coextensive with our political jurisdiction.").
Aldrich, then a prominent private lawyer in Chicago, had been Solicitor General of the United
States from 1892-1893.
io6. Mr. Bryan Discusses theInsular Cases, N.Y. TIMES,June 2, 19ol, at i.
107. Though there was a clear partisan divide on the issue, views about expansion did vary
within political parties as well. This is illustrated by the views of leading Republican senators.
For example, Senator Hanna of Ohio supported the peaceful annexation of Hawaii, was
opposed to war for expansion or otherwise, and seems to have been little motivated by
arguments based on the Constitution. See HORACE SAMUEL MERRILL & MARION GALBRAITH
MERRILL, THE REPUBLICAN COMMAND 50 (197 1); JULIUS W. PRATT, EXPANSIONISTS OF 1898, at
217, 233-34 (1936). Senator Hoar of Massachusetts was a long-time proponent of annexing
Hawaii but one of the fiercest and most effective opponents-for reasons of constitutional
principle-of acquiring Puerto Rico and the Philippines. See 2 GEORGE F. HOAR,
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SEVENTY YEARS 315-318 (1903); PRATT, supra, at 324-25, 347-51, 357-58.
Senator Spooner of Wisconsin opposed annexation of Hawaii and only reluctantly supported
acquisition of Puerto Rico and the Philippines, though he thought annexation was
constitutional and afterwards worked to secure American control over the colonies. See 32
CONG. REC. 1377-79 (1899) (remarks of Senator Spooner); MARGARET LEECH, IN THE DAYS OF
IOWA LA W REVIEW
that the United States had authority to govern and hold the islands
permanently as a property or possession, outside of the mainland
constitutional community of citizenship, robust individual rights, tariff
nondiscrimination, and future Statehood. Notably, many expansionists also
maintained that, once the war ended, the islands were annexed, and
Congress began to govern them, individual constitutional rights would
protect the island populations. Others suggested that, though specific
constitutional rights would not be applicable, other limits on U.S. action
would protect the islanders, including morality, natural rights, the United
States' duty to uplift and safeguard uncivilized peoples, or principles
inherent in the U.S. system of government.
To the question "does the Constitution follow the flag?" in annexed
territories, anti-expansionists or anti-imperialists-typically Democrats,
members of smaller left-wing parties, or New Englanders with old-time Whig-
ish or Mugwump sensibilities-answered a qualified "yes." They maintained
that, except for these slight deviations that were justified by the fact that
temporary territorial status would soon mature into full Statehood,-'o the
Constitution followed the flag ex propiore vigore--immediately and by its own
force-as a result of annexation. As former president Benjamin Harrison
put it in a widely covered speech, "the Constitution goes to annexed
territory.",o9 For many anti-expansionists, it was unconstitutional for the
republican government of the United States to act as an imperialist power
governing subject peoples who would be denied full rights of citizenship.
Though there are reasons to question the sincerity of the constitutional
objections of some anti-expansionists,,,o many others clearly did have
principled objections to imperial rule over Puerto Rico and the Philippines.
MCKINLEY 357 (1959); MERRILL & MERRILL, supra, at 54-55. Senator Foraker of Ohio strongly
supported everything-war against Spain, acquisition of Puerto Rico and the Philippines, and
annexation of Hawaii. See EVERETr WALTERS, JOSEPH BENSON FORAKER: AN UNCOMPROMISING
REPUBLICAN 144-55 (1948).
1o8. For instance, most anti-expansionists with constitutional objections to empire would
not have questioned the use of non-Article III courts in U.S. territories, because the
Constitution's life-tenure provision (tenure during "good behavior") was obviously ill-suited to a
temporary territorial office soon to give way to State institutions.
109. See Current Events, 57 FRIENDS' INTELLIGENCER 935, 935 (190o) (quoting the speech);
see also A Conscience Republican, 7 NATION 480, 480 (19oo) ("[Harrison] holds that the
Constitution follows the flag; that as Porto Rico and the Philippines are parts of the United
States, the fundamental law of the republic applies to them as much as to any other parts of the
United States.").
11 0. As noted above, many anti-expansionists objected to territorial expansion because of
the race or alleged "barbarism" of the inhabitants of the Philippines. See supra note 68. They too
made the constitutional argument that the Constitution followed the flag ex propiore vigore, but
as part of a parade-of-horribles argument aimed at the many Americans who shared their view-
also expressed in the Democratic Party platform of i9 oo-that "[t]he Filipinos cannot be
citizens without endangering our civilization." THE NATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND PLATFORMS OF
ALL POLITICAL PARTIES, 1789 TO 190, at 333 (3 d rev. ed. 19oo).
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The constitutional vision underlying the anti-expansionist arguments
was not the flexible, global view of a Constitution available to noncitizens
outside the United States, as presented in Boumediene. The constitutional
vision underlying the anti-expansionist arguments was rather a view of a
territorially based community of liberty and republican self-government,
founded and governed by the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution. Imperialism was a dangerous innovation because it introduced
into the U.S. system the possibility of government without popular
participation or even consent, and undermined the equality of rights
between members of the political community that was thought essential to
republican government.' As Charles Francis Adams said in an influential
address to the Lexington Historical Society in December 1898, imperialism
undermines "our fundamental principles of equality of human rights" that
"the consent of the governed [is] the only just basis of all government" and
"that representation is a necessary adjunct to taxation."' The Democratic
Party platform in i 9o0 held that, because "all governments instituted among
men derive their just powers from the consent of the governed [and] that
any government not based upon the consent of the governed is a tyranny,"
the Constitution must "follow[] the flag."',3 Rule over far-away subject
peoples rent asunder the constitutional community. As the 19oo Democratic
platform put it, "[t]he Filipinos... cannot be subjects without imperiling
our form of government."' '4
1 11. This is how historians and other thoughtful commentators have understood the
constitutional principles at issue in the great debate. See, e.g., THOMAS BENDER, A NATION
AMONG NATIONS 222 (2006) (describing the "constitutional" objection to annexing the
Philippines as concern that taking "a territory without the intention of eventually making it a
state equal to existing states" would "compromise republican principles"); HAROLD U.
FAULKNER, POLITICS, REFORM AND EXPANSION 189o-19oo, at 255 (1959) ("The anti-imperialist
argument was simply: for the United States to govern a people without their consent violated
the cardinal principle of American democracy."); FISS, supra note 28, at 41 ("Anti-imperialists
objected that by creating a subject class, colonization of foreign lands violated the democratic
principles of self-determination and consent of the governed that America embodied."); LEECH,
supra note 107, at 324-25 (relating that, according to anti-imperialists, "[tihe venerated
concept of government by consent of the governed was violated by the seizure of distant
colonies" and the "subjugation of alien peoples was odious to the ideals of the republic,
subversive of the Constitution, degrading to the flag that was the symbol of freedom"); Jos6 A.
Cabranes, Puerto Rico: Colonialism as Constitutional Doctrine, ioo HARV. L. REV. 450, 454 (1986)
(reviewing JuAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO: THE DOCTRINE OF
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL (1985)) ("The issue was imperialism or, more precisely, colonialism-
the holding of other peoples in a subordinate political position.").
112. CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, "IMPERIALISM" AND "THE TRACKS OF OUR FOREFATHERS" 18-
19 (1899). On the influence of this speech, see E. BERKELEY TOMPKINS, ANTI-IMPERIALISM IN
THE UNITED STATES 181-82 (1970). Adams was great-grandson of the first President Adams and
grandson of the second. He served with distinction in the Union Army during the Civil War,
amassed a fortune as a railroad executive, and then retired to be a historian.
113. See THE NATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND PLATFORMS OF ALL POLITICAL PARTIES, 1789 TO
19oo, supranote lio, at 333.
114. Id.
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2. The Ex Proprio Vigore Doctrine of Anti-Expansionists Held That the First
Moment at Which the Constitution Could Apply Was Annexation by the
United States
Examination of the terms of the great debate about the constitutionality
of imperialism reveals that even the most vigorous anti-imperialists did not
assert doctrines like those that Boumediene wrongly attributed to the
canonical Insular Cases. None of the leading anti-imperialists appear to have
believed that the Constitution could extend outside formally annexed
sovereign U.S. territory. Here is a typical expression of their doctrine that
the Constitution was applicable ex proprio vigore to newly annexed territory:
The cession of the Philippines by Spain to the United States was
accomplished by the execution, delivery and acceptance of an
international deed of transfer known as a treaty. The transfer
became complete upon the exchange of ratifications of the treaty.
Thereupon, the territory transferred became an integral part of the
United States. As such, it became subject to the Constitution,
bound by its restrictions and entitled to its privileges."5
Representative Francis Newlands, Democrat of Nevada, understood
Supreme Court precedent to dictate that "when territory is ceded to the
United States by treaty it then becomes domestic, not foreign" and "the
Constitution of the United States applies to it."116 Countless other examples
can be given of anti-expansionists stating or assuming that the first moment
at which the Constitution could possibly protect individual rights of insular
inhabitants was the formal transfer of sovereignty over the territory to the
United States." 7
The lawyers challenging the U.S. government in the Supreme Court in
the first set of Insular Cases had the same constitutional views as the anti-
expansionist politicians and commentators. They agreed that the first
moment at which individual constitutional rights could possibly be available
against the U.S. government was the April i i, 1899 formalization of the
peace and cession. Although many firms and individual lawyers were
115. Frank D. Pavey, The "Open Door" Policy in the Philippines, 169 N. Am. REV. 661, 663
(1899).
116. 33 CONG. REC. 1997 (19OO); see also id. at 1998 (statement of Rep. Newlands)
(agreeing with the holding of Cross v. Harrison "that immediately upon cession, and without the
action of Congress at all, the Constitution and the laws applied to the ceded territory").
Newlands referred to himself as an "anti-imperialist," id. at 1996, but he did favor the
annexation and incorporation into the Union of Hawaii and Puerto Rico, see id. at 1994; 32
CONG. REC. 254 (1898).
117. See, e.g., 32 CONG. REC. 434 (1899) (statement of Senator Caffery) (maintaining that
"[pleople inhabiting a territory ceded to us" become entitled to constitutional rights); The
Puerto Rico Question, 61 ALB. L.J. 245, 247-49 (1900) (contending that the Constitution
extended over Puerto Rico ex proprio vigore immediately upon the effectiveness of the cession to
the United States).
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involved in briefing and arguing the first round of insular tariff cases against
the government, probably the most influential was Frederic Coudert, Jr., of
the Coudert brothers' firm in New York.,"8 At oral argument before the
Supreme Court in January 19O1, he had discussed the point at which
"foreign" territory becomes "domestic" and "military control" must give way
to "civil government" under the Constitution.' '9 According to the New York
Times' account, "Mr. Coudert contended that in a case of acquisition the
dividing line is passed when a treaty of acquisition is signed and ratified.
When, he said, the United States sanctions acquisition by the ratification of a
treaty, it thus signalizes control of and sovereignty over new territory."' 12
Paul Fuller, Coudert's law partner, who also appeared in the Supreme Court
dozens of times as counsel challenging the U.S. government in canonical
and noncanonical Insular Cases,""2 wrote in early 19ol that the Constitution
came into force in the "newly acquired territory" when the treaty of peace
and "the cession of sovereignty" became effective.,'"
Other counsel opposing the government in the first set of Insular Cases
reiterated the view that the Constitution began to protect individual rights in
the new insular possessions only when the cession to the United States
became complete on April 1 1, 1899. For instance, the brief of counsel
challenging the government's tariff in Fourteen Diamond Rings stated that
"our proposition is that from the date of the ratification of the Treaty of
Paris this territory [the Philippines] became a part of the United States;
Congress and the Executive in dealing therewith are subject to the
provisions of the Constitution."' 3 As a corollary, anti-imperialist legal
1 18. Coudert was a lead lawyer in both Downes and De Lima. See Senator Foraker's View, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 19o, at 3. On the history of the storied firm, see VIRGINIA KAYS VEENSWIJK,
COUDERT BROTHERS: THE HISTORY OF AMERICA'S FIRST INTERNATIONAL LAW FIRM 1853-1993
(1994).
119. Arguments Continued in Porto Rican Cases, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 1o, 19o1, at 5.
12o. Id. Looking back in 1926 at the development of the doctrine of territorial
incorporation, Coudert wrote that "[ulp to the ratification of the Treaty of Paris (April 11,
1899), the new territories had been governed as conquered territory over which military and
executive fiat were law. After the treaty and with the cessation of military authority, the
question of their status in American constitutional law became acute." Frederic R. Coudert, The
Evolution of the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, 26 COLUM. L. REV. 823, 823 (1926).
121. From 1905 to 1915, Fuller served as the first dean of Fordham Law School.
122. Paul Fuller, Some Constitutional Questions Suggested by Recent Acquisitions, 1 COLUM. L.
REV. io8, io8, 11o (19Ol); id. at Il (identifying "the absolute cession of territory" to be the
moment when the Constitution began to apply).
123. Brief of Claimant and Plaintiff in Error Emil J. Pepke, Fourteen Diamond Rings, 183
U.S. 176 (19o) (No. 153), reprinted in INSULAR CASES, supra note 98, at 393. At oral argument,
counsel for another importer in the Armstrong case
contended that the Constitution of the United States extends over every portion of
the National domain, whether State, Territory, or District, and that as Porto Rico
was ceded to the United States by the Paris treaty, there was an absolute change of
sovereignty and of title.... He held that since the ratification of the peace treaty
the title to Porto Rico is as complete as the title to Ohio or New York.
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thinkers agreed that U.S military governments of occupied Spanish territory
were not subject to constitutional limitations. 24
In the great debate about the constitutionality of imperialism, the most
rights-protecting position staked out-the legal position of the anti-
imperialists who stood on constitutional principle-was that the first
moment the Constitution could possibly provide protections was when the
war was over and territory had come under the de jure sovereignty of the
United States. The least rights-protecting view, dominant in Congress and
the Executive branch was that, even after peace and formal annexation of
the United States, the Constitution did not fully protect civilian residents of
the new U.S. territories. These were the poles of the debate. Boumediene's
flexible, global view of the scope of the Constitution was not heard.
IV. PUERTO RICO UNDER U.S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT
Supreme Court decisions, legal opinions of Executive officers, and the
arguments of lawyers and commentators concerning the constitutional
status of the U.S. military occupation of Puerto Rico all show that Boumediene
fundamentally misunderstood the legal doctrines of the insular era. These
sources unanimously confirmed that, during the U.S. military occupation
prior to cession of the territory from Spain, the Constitution did not protect
inhabitants of Puerto Rico because it was foreign to the United States-not
under its de jure sovereignty. This is despite the fact that, as at Guantanamo
in the twenty-first century, the United States had complete de facto control
and its military jurisdiction was supreme and unchallenged. Even after the
United States had formally annexed Puerto Rico, the temporary U.S.
military government there was not bound by constitutional-rights
Arguments Continued in Porto Rican Cases, supra note i 19, at 5; see also Rights of Ceded Islands, supra
note 1o5, at 5 (quoting Lawrence Harmon, counsel for an importer opposing the government
in the initial Insular Cases, arguing to the Supreme Court that "immediately upon the exchange
of ratifications of the treaty of peace with Spain the Philippine Islands became a part of the
United States, and became instantly bound and privileged by the Constitution." (internal
quotation marks and citation onitted)).
124. See, e.g., Simeon E. Baldwin, The Constitutional Questions Incident to the Acquisition and
Government by the United States of Island Territory, 12 HARV. L. REv. 393, 411 (1898) ("There is no
constitutional objection to the acquisition of any or all of our new possessions, or to subjecting
them to a temporary government of military or colonial form."); Carman F. Randolph, Some
Observations on the Status of Cuba, 9 YALE L.J. 353, 353 (1900) ("[Cuba was] occupied, although
not annexed, by the United States. In these circumstances Cuba remains as foreign to our
domestic system as it was when under the dominion of Spain. It is not within the purview of the
Constitution nor any law of the United States."); L.S. Rowe, The Political and Legal Aspects of
Change of Sovereignty, 50 AM. L. REG. 466, 467 (1902) ("The overthrow of the Spanish
government by the invading army of the United States, placed the island in possession of the
military authorities. In the exercise of the right accorded by international law to every
belligerent, a provisional government was established .... In administering civil affairs, as an
obligation incident to belligerent occupation, the power of the military commanders is free
from constitutional limitations on executive, legislative and judicial power.").
[Vol. 97:101
2011] BOUMEDIENE, MUNAF, AND THE INSULAR CASES 133
restrictions, according to the U.S. Executive branch and later the Supreme
Court-it was only when Congress created a civil government for Puerto
Rico that the Constitution enveloped the island in its protections. Boumediene
cannot explain this.
Unlike the Cubans and Filipinos, Puerto Ricans had not revolted
against Spain and the United States' pre-war planning did not contemplate
an invasion of their small island. But to achieve total victory over Spain and
secure a Caribbean naval base, McKinley decided to send the Army to take
Puerto Rico, which it did in late July and early August 1898, with few
casualties and minimal fuss..25 Spanish troops completed their withdrawal
from Puerto Rico in October 1898, and a U.S. general became military
governor.12 6 Two months earlier, the armistice and peace protocol had
already announced the United States' intention to annex Puerto Rico. So
from the outset the U.S. military knew its government there would be a
temporary stop on the road to a new civilian government of the island under
de jure U.S. sovereignty. Because of this, and because of Puerto Ricans'
general receptivity to U.S. annexation,127 the initial U.S. military occupation
orders called for local administrative and judicial functions to continue
largely as before, once current or newly appointed officials swore loyalty to
the United States.' 8 The U.S. military governor also created temporary
"military commissions" to try certain types of crimes, among them were
offenses against the laws of war committed against American or Spanish
soldiers, and serious crimes related to the brigandage that plagued certain
regions. I29
The U.S. military government controlled Puerto Rico from August
1898, when Spain surrendered, until May 1, 19oo, when Congress's Foraker
Act created a civilian government to take control from the military. In
between these events, the treaty formalizing the peace and ceding Puerto
Rico to the United States was signed, approved by the U.S. Senate, and then
125. See ARTURO MORALES CARRI6N, PUERTO RICO: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY
133-35 (1983) (discussing U.S. war planning and motives for deciding to seize Puerto Rico).
126. See DAVIS 1899 REPORT, supra note 79, at 12; EDWARDJ. BERBUSSE, THE UNITED STATES
IN PUERTO RICO, 1898-1900, at 78 (1966).
127. Cf BERBUSSE, supra note 126, at 65-67 (discussing the range of sentiments that
American occupation provoked among Puerto Ricans).
128. General Orders No. i (Oct. 18, 1898), reprinted in DAVIS 1899 REPORT, supra note 79,
at 89-90; see also GUILLERMO A. BARALT, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURT IN PUERTO RICO:
1899-1999, at 83-84 (Janis Palma trans., 2004).
129. See Letter from J.C. Gilmore, Brig.-Gen., U.S. Army, to Russell A. Alger, Sec'y of War
(July 29, 1898), in RUSSELL A. ALGER, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR (1898), in I ANNUAL
REPORTS OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1898, at 1, 41-42
(1898); General Orders No. 27 (Dec. 8, 1899), reprinted in DAVIS 1899 REPORT, supra note 79,
at 93. On the lawlessness in certain parts of Puerto Rico, leading to the appointment of U.S.
military commissions, see BARALT, supra note 128, at 84-87.
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entered into force on April i1, 1899.131 Several Supreme Court decisions
hold that, during both of these time periods-the eight months from
surrender to the effective date of the treaty of peace and cession, and the
one year from the effective date of the treaty until Congress civilian
government assumed control-Puerto Rican inhabitants could not assert
individual constitutional rights against the U.S. military government. These
decisions are wholly inconsistent with Boumediene's reading of the Insular
Cases.
A. U.S. MJLITARY GOVERNMENT OF PUERTO Rico BEFORE THE TREATY OF PEA CE
AND CESSION WENT INTO EFFECT
The legal views of the Executive and Congress provide helpful context
for understanding the Court's later decisions about the legal status of the
United States' presence in Puerto Rico. The Attorney General and Army
took the position that, prior to the effective date of the treaty of peace and
cession, Puerto Rico and the other occupied islands were foreign, enemy
territory and therefore constitutional rights did not limit the U.S. military
government.I'3 This was clearly correct-it had been firmly established in
multiple Supreme Court cases arising from the Mexican and Civil Wars
involving, respectively, U.S. occupation of Mexican territory before formal
annexation by the United States and Confederate territory that was treated
as foreign pending the surrender of the rebels.1sz Even the importers
challenging government policies in the early Insular Cases accepted that no
constitutional rights ran against the U.S. military government prior to the
treaty coming into effect. According to the Supreme Court arguments of
one importer, the U.S. government only became "subject to the
constitutional requirements," when the treaty of peace and cession is ratified
and the territory "hence com[es] under the sovereign jurisdiction of the
United States."133 Anti-expansionist commentators likewise conceded the
130. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note o1 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Kent, supra note 9, at 1925-27.
133. Brief for Plaintiffs in Error, De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (19o) (No. 966), reprinted
in INSULAR CASES, supra note 98, at 522-23; see also id. (conceding that the power of the
President as commander-in-chief to govern hostile occupied territory is free from all legal
restraints, including individual constitutional rights, and limited only by an implied duty to
"wage only civilized warfare," and then stating that "the freedom from limitation does not arise
from the inapplicability of the restraints of the Constitution; on the contrary, it is a freedom
granted by the Constitution, which gives [the President], in case of war, the usual powers of
military commanders recognized by international law"); Supreme Court Hears the Porto Rico Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 19oo, at 5 (quoting counsel for the importer in the Goetze case
"conced[ing] that the Constitution allowed the United States "to govern [Puerto Rico] and its
inhabitants while it remains foreign territory, subject only to the rules and usages of civilized
warfare under international laws").
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legality of the U.S. military government, which was restricted only by the
customary laws of war and not individual constitutional rights.'34
In Ex parte Ortiz, a federal circuit court upheld the constitutionality of
trying a Puerto Rican in a U.S. military commission in March 1899-before
the treaty established peace and annexed Puerto Rico to the United States-
for the murder of an American soldier.'35 At trial, Ortiz had asserted that,
because he was a civilian and that no war was then occurring, a trial before a
military commission infringed his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to a
grand and petit jury.136 The circuit court held that only "upon the cession by
Spain to the United States of the Island of Porto Rico," marked by the entry
into force of the treaty on April 11, 1899, would "that island bec[o]me a
part of the dominion of the United States... and that the constitution of
the United States, ex proprio vigore, at once extend[] over that island.",37
Ortiz's military trial occurred too early for him to claim constitutional rights;
he was tried while "the military forces of the United States held and
occupied the Island of Porto Rico by force of arms, as conquered territory,
forming a military department, governed by military law, administered
through military tribunals, according to the usages of war and the orders in
force."' s3
Though not in a habeas corpus case involving personal liberty, the
Supreme Court in an early Insular Case held that the laws of war-instead of
constitutional rights-limited the U.S. military government in Puerto Rico
before annexation to the United States became effective. In Dooley v. United
States,'39 the Court described in detail the legal regime that existed in Puerto
Rico under U.S. occupation after hostilities ended, but prior to the entry
into force of the Treaty of Paris:
We... do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of
the conqueror for authority to establish a government for the
territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military
occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such
government are regulated and limited. Such authority and such
rules are derived directly from the laws of war .... There is no limit
134. See supra note 124.
135. See Ex parte Ortiz, 1oo F. 955 (C.C.D. Minn. 19oo). After the military commission
convicted Ortiz and sentenced him to death, President McKinley commuted the sentence to life
in prison and Ortiz was sent to a penitentiary in Minnesota, from which he filed his habeas
petition. See id. at 955. Thus the Ortiz case raised no questions about the availability of habeas to
prisoners detained outside the United States.
136. See id. at 955.
137. Id. at 962.
138. Id.
139. Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901).
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to the powers that may be exerted in such cases, save those which
are found in the laws and usages of war. 40
Note that before the effective date of the treaty of peace and cession, the
Court considered Puerto Rico to be "foreign" territory-and "the territory of
the enemy"-even though the United States had agreed to annex it, it had
been under undisputed control for months and there was no ongoing
combat operations of any kind.141 This legal analysis in Dooley shows the
implicit legal understanding that individual constitutional rights did not
protect foreigners in foreign countries from the U.S. government. The
dissenting justices in Dooley agreed with the majority about the unavailability
of individual constitutional rights during a wartime military occupation.142
Likewise in De Lima v. Bidwell, another one of the early, canonical
Insular Cases about tariffs, the majority and dissenting justices agreed that
the laws of war governed the U.S. military occupation of foreign and hostile
territory-here, Puerto Rico-during wartime.43 Finally, in Ochoa v.
Hernandez y Morales, the Court described Puerto Rico during this period-
"before the exchange of ratifications," that is, before the annexation was
formally complete on April 11, 1899-as "foreign territory" for
constitutional purposes, governed solely under military authority. 44
B. PEACETIME U.S. MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN PUERTO RICO: AFER THE TREATY
OF PEACE AD CESSION WENT INTO EFFECT BUT BEFORE CONGRESS CREATED A CIVIL
GOVERNMENT
After peace and annexation to the United States were formalized in
April 1899, the U.S. military continued to govern Puerto Rico because
Congress waited a year before creating a civil government. According to
Boumediene, during this time the Constitution should have protected
individual rights in Puerto Rico because the territory was under the de jure
sovereignty of the United States, as well as its total defacto control. But, as it
happened, during the insular era the Supreme Court and the Executive
agreed that, until a congressional government replaced the military
government, the President, as Commander in Chief, governed Puerto Rico
140. Id. at 230-31 (emphases added) (internal quotations omitted).
141. Id. at 230. The Court later stated plainly that "[t]he United States and Porto Rico were
still foreign countries with respect to each other." Id. at 233.
142. Id. at 237 (White,J, dissenting).
143. See De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 186 (19ol) (suggesting that prior to formal cession
to the United States, the military may govern conquered territory "under the war power"); id. at
2o8 (McKenna, J., dissenting) (same, "as a belligerent right"). A later, noncanonical Insular
Case arising in the Philippines cited approvingly a host of precedents from the Mexican War
and Civil War in which the Court had indicated that military governments of occupied foreign
territory are not subject to constitutional-rights limitations. See MacLeod v. United States, 229
U.S. 416,425 (1913) (citations omitted).
144. Ochoav. HernandezyMorales, 230 U.S. 139, 154, 159 (1913).
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under the international law of belligerent occupation, executive orders, and
applicable statutes and provisions of the Treaty of Paris. Any rights possessed
by the inhabitants of the islands derived from these sources-not the U.S.
Constitution. The military governor of Puerto Rico explained this to the
inhabitants in an August 1899 circular:
While an arbitrary government over any territory included within
the United States is not contemplated by the American
Constitution and laws, under those laws it is impossible to supply
any other form of governmental control than the military over
territory conquered by the arms of the Union until Congress shall,
by suitable enactment, determine and fix a form of civil
government for such conquered territory.145
This is merely a gentler way of stating what the President had communicated
in General Orders iol, issued in mid-1898 to establish the legal frameworks
for governing Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines: "the absolute domain
of military authority" over the conquered Spanish islands "is and must
remain supreme in the ceded territory until the legislation of the United
States shall otherwise provide."4 6
The theoretical reason why military government-limited by the laws of
war but not constitutional rights-was understood to continue might sound
odd to modern ears. Until Congress acted to create a government, the
President had to continue to legislate and govern Puerto Rico lest there be
anarchy. The only constitutional power he could invoke to govern an area
for which Congress had not created civil government was his war power as
Commander in Chief, a power which was not subject to constitutional
limitations. When acting as peacetime chief executive subject to ordinary
constitutional limitations, the President could not make law and create
institutions-that was Congress's sphere. As a result of this understanding,
constitutional limitations on the Executive could only apply in places where
Congress created a civil government.47
A legal opinion of the Judge-Advocate General of the Army, approved
by President McKinley, held that use of military commissions could continue
in Puerto Rico, even after peace and cession to the United States, until
145. Circular of General Davis (Aug. 15, 1899), reprinted in BRIG. GEN. GEORGE W. DAVIS,
U.S.V., REPORT OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR OF PORTO RICO ON CIVIL AFFAIRS FOR THE FISCAL
YEAR ENDEDJUNE 30, 19oo, at 27, 28 (1902) [hereinafter DAVIS 19oo REPORT]; see also id. ("As
Congress has as yet taken no measures or action respecting Porto Rico, the supreme
government is, under the Constitution, vested in the President of the United States, as
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. He has designated a general officer to represent
him and to perform the functions of civil governor.").
146. GO 1os, supra note 79.
147. For an explication of this view, see Alexander Porter Morse, The Civil and Political
Status of Inhabitants of Ceded Territories, 14 HARV. L. REV. 262, 264 (19oo), or Santiago v.
Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260, 265 (1909) (quoted infra text accompanying note 156).
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Congress created a civil government, but cautioned that military
commissions should only be used if "absolutely necessary."'4 Otherwise, it
was "much more desirable to resort to some other measures, such as the
provisional courts which were instituted during and immediately after the
rebellion [the U.S. Civil War] .",49 The Judge-Advocate's view was consistent
with Supreme Court precedent from the Civil War. In cases concerning the
occupation of seceded states by Union armies, the Supreme Court held that
the war powers of the President authorized him to create military courts
even after the close of hostilities-his authority lasted until Congress could
by law make "proper provision for the business before it [the continuing
wartime court], as well as that which had been disposed of."150 The Supreme
Court would soon confirm the Judge-Advocate's view about the legality of
continuing military government in peacetime in cases arising out of a new
military court the U.S. military governor of Puerto Rico created in 1899,
after the treaty had been ratified. Denominated the "United States
Provisional Court for the Department of Porto Rico," the military governor
gave it jurisdiction to try serious crimes and hear a variety of civil suits.,51
Despite its different name, this court was essentially a "military tribunal or
commission."15-
1. U.S. Provisional Court for the Department of Porto Rico
The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the Provisional
Court in Santiago v. Nogueras.,53 The Provisional Court's validity was
collaterally attacked by a party to a civil suit in the later-created District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico, a court instituted by the Foraker Act,
148. DAVIS 19oo REPORT, supra note 145, at 75. Initially, the U.S. military governor of
Puerto Rico and some Army lawyers did not fully accept that the laws of war, and not the
Constitution, continued to provide applicable limitations after peace and cession to the United
States had been completed. They believed that the United States could no longer invoke the
full legal rights of a belligerent now that it was dealing with a civilian population in U.S.
territory during peacetime. See DAVIS 1899 REPORT, supra note 79, at 28. These views were
overruled by the Judge Advocate General of the Army and the President.
149. DAVIS 19oo REPORT, supra note 145, at 75 (quoting a draft "order for the institution of
a United States provisional court") (internal quotations omitted).
15o. Burke v. Miltenberger, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 519, 525 (1873).
151. DAVIS 1899 REPORT, supra note 79, at 28-29. On the creation, composition, and
jurisdiction of the court, see BARALT, supra note 128, at 90-95. The primary model for this
court was the United States Provisional Court for Louisiana, located in occupied New Orleans,
created by President Lincoln in late 1862 to hear civil and criminal cases arising under federal
and state law in the rebel State held under Union military government. See id. at 74. The
Supreme Court repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of the Louisiana court. See Kent, supra
note 9, at 1926 n.348.
152. Brief for the United States at 3, Ex parte Baez, 177 U.S. 378 (19oo) (No. -). The
Provisional Court was "composed of a law judge, an American lawyer, and two associate judges,
officers of the Fifth Cavalry, with an officer as clerk and a trooper as marshal." Id.
153. Santiagov. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 26o (19o9).
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Congress's April 19oo organic act for the island.54 In Santiago, the Supreme
Court cited precedent upholding the constitutionality of the military
governments of New Mexico and California, which had continued after the
treaty of peace between the United States and Mexico and formal
annexation by the United States, because Congress had not yet created civil
governmental institutions.55 On the basis of this precedent, the Supreme
Court unanimously upheld the Provisional Court:
By the ratifications of the treaty of peace, Porto Rico ceased to be
subject to the Crown of Spain, and became subject to the legislative
power of Congress. But the civil government of the United States
cannot extend immediately and of its own force over conquered
and ceded territory. Theoretically, Congress might prepare and
enact a scheme of civil government to take effect immediately upon
the cession, but, practically, there always have been delays and
always will be.... In the meantime, pending the action of
Congress, there is no civil power under our system of government,
not even that of the President as civil executive, which can take the
place of the government which has ceased to exist by the cession. Is
it possible that, under such circumstances, there must be an
interregnum? We think clearly not. The authority to govern such
ceded territory is found in the laws applicable to conquest and
cession. That authority is the military power, under the control of
the President as Commander in Chief.156
In 19oo, the Supreme Court decided two personal-liberty cases
concerning the legality of the Provisional Court during the post-annexation,
pre-Foraker Act military government of Puerto Rico. In neither case did the
Court hear the merits. The two cases involved the Supreme Court denying
original petitions for writs of certiorari and habeas corpus.,57 Especially with
154. ForakerAct, ch. 191, § 34, 31 Stat. 77, 84-85 (1900).
155. See Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 61 U.S. (2o How.) 176, 178 (1857) (upholding peacetime
military government of New Mexico); Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164, 193-94 (1853)
(same, California).
156. Santiago, 214 U.S. at 265.
157. In Ex parte Baez, 177 U.S. 378 (19oo), the Court denied an application for leave to file
a habeas corpus petition and for a writ of certiorari to bring up the record of Ramon Baez's
conviction in the Provisional Court of Puerto Rico. Baez was arrested in November 1899 and
charged with illegally voting in a municipal election held under the auspices of the U.S. military
government. See General Orders No. 145 (Sept. 21, 1899), reprinted in DAVIs 1899 Report, supra
note 79 at 15o-52; General Orders No. 16o (Oct. 12, 1899), as reprinted in DAVIS 1900 REPORT,
supra note 145, at 110-12. Baez alleged in his filing with the Supreme Court that he had
requested a grand jury indictment and petit jury trial, but both had been refused by the
Provisional Court. Baez, 177 U.S. at 385. This refusal and his subsequent conviction were
unconstitutional, he maintained, because there had been no state of war in Puerto Rico since
April 1i, 1899, and because the civilian courts had been open and functioning there since the
U.S. military occupation began in October 1898. Id. at 381, 385-86. The Solicitor General's
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denials of certiorari, in the ordinary course these actions by the Court do
brief maintained that the Supreme Court lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the military
actions of military commissions because they are "mere agencies of the military power" and as
such "are subject to review and correction by military authority alone." Brief for the United
States, supra note 152, at 5. Moreover, the brief continued, Congress had made "[n]o provision
whatever ... for extending the judicial power of the United States over Puerto Rico," and so
people and institutions in Puerto Rico were outside the courts were not "within the territorial
jurisdiction" of the Supreme Court. Id. at 4. Faced with these novel and difficult issues, the
Supreme Court punted and denied leave to file on technical grounds. See Puerto Rico Case
Decided, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 19oo, at 2 ("The Court [in Baez] did not ... decide any of the
more important points raised by the petitions."). In its April 12, 19oo decision, the Court
chided Baez for waiting until March 26 to file. Baez, 177 U.S. at 387-88. After all, the Court
noted, it had been scheduled to recess for the term on April 9 and Baez's imprisonment would
end on April 15. Id. Since, by statute, the custodian is given twenty days after the filing of a
habeas petition to make a return, this case, involving "grave questions of public and
constitutional law," would be moot by the time it was ready for decision. Id. at 388-90.
The second 19oo case concerning the Provisional Court was In re VidaL 179 U.S. 126
(19oo). Like Baez, it concerned fraud in the fall 1899 municipal elections held under U.S.
military auspices. See generally BARALT, supra note 128, at 98-102 (discussing the prosecutions
for election-related fraud in the Provisional Court). Petitioner Juan Jos6 Vidal and several
others were ousted from fraudulently obtained municipal offices in the Town of Guayama,
Puerto Rico, by a suit "in the nature of a quo warranto" filed in December 1899 in the
Provisional Court on behalf of the people of "the Department of Porto Rico"-essentially the
U.S. military government with newly adopted civilian stylings assumed once the treaty of peace
and cession had been ratified. Vidal, 179 U.S. at 126. The Petitioners sought reinstatement in
office. Thirty-three other individuals-who filed papers in the Supreme Court under the
caption Ex parte Vasquez which were consolidated with Vidal's filing-had, like Baez, been
convicted of the crime of election fraud in the Provisional Court. See Suggestion by the United
States at 5, In re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126 (No. -). They argued that their convictions were illegal.
Although most of the petitioners consolidated in Vidal had been sentenced on criminal
charges, their counsel did not seek a writ of habeas corpus; only a writ of certiorari was
requested to allow the Supreme Court to review the civil and criminal decisions. The Supreme
Court denied the petition. Vidal, 176 U.S. at 127. Vidal's motion argued, like Baez's, that the
lack of a jury trial in the Provisional Court violated the Constitution and that a military court
could not lawfully sit in Puerto Rico because there had been no state of war since at least April
1899, when the treaty became effective, if not from the August 1898 agreement to cease
hostilities. See Motion for Leave to File Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, In re Vidal, 179 U.S.
126 (No. -); Brief for Petitioners at 2, 4-5, 8, 12, In re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126 (No. -). The
Executive's brief to the Court made essentially the same arguments as the Baez filing. See Brief
for the United States at 6-7, 8-so, 15-16, In re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126 (No. -). In a terse,
unanimous opinion, the Court denied the petition because by statute: "This court is not ...
empowered to review the proceedings of military tribunals by certiorari. Nor are such tribunals
courts with jurisdiction in law or equity, within the meaning of those terms as used in the 3 d
article of the Constitution, and the question of the issue of the writ of certiorari in the exercise
of inherent general power cannot arise in respect of them." Vidal, 179 U.S. at 127. There was
no mention of any constitutional problems under the Suspension Clause or other provisions.
Federal district and circuit courts also lacked statutory jurisdiction over Puerto Rico; in other
words, it was clear that Vidal had no access to an Article III court to review his conviction and
detention by the military court. This unconcern is inexplicable if Boumediene is correct that the
Constitution positively requires habeas corpus to be available in Article III courts for
noncitizens under the total de facto jurisdiction and control of the United States---given that at
the time Puerto Rico was de jure U.S. territory governed by a peacetime U.S. military
government.
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not have any precedential effect. But these resolutions are nonetheless
noteworthy because the Court gave no hint that the petitioners' lack of
access to an Article III court to challenge a military detention in peacetime
in U.S. territory could itself be a violation of the Constitution-the
Suspension Clause or any other provision. Instead, military detention with
no access to Article III courts was viewed with equanimity.58
2. Tariff Cases
In three 190 1 tariff cases, including Dooley and De Lima, discussed above
in reference to Puerto Rico's status prior to the effective date of the treaty of
peace and cession, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Executive military government of Puerto Rico that continued after the
arrival of peace and formal cession of territory in April 1899. In De Lima, an
importer of Puerto Rican sugar challenged taxes levied in New York in
autumn 1899 under Congress's generally applicable levy of duties "upon all
articles imported from foreign countries."'59 Goetze v. United States challenged
taxation under the Dingley tariff of Puerto Rican tobacco imported into the
United States in June 1899, during the period after the effectiveness of the
treaty, but before the Foraker Act., 6o And the trading firm in Dooley
challenged an Executive tariff imposed in Puerto Rico on merchandise from
New York during this period. In these three cases, the importers argued that,
at least since the effective date of the treaty of peace and cession, Puerto
Rico had become U.S. territory and (i) could no longer be considered a
"foreign countr[y]" under the Dingley tariff statute, even if Congress had
not yet created a civil government in Puerto Rico, and (2) could not have its
taxes and tariffs of imports into Puerto Rico set by Executive fiat instead of
congressional legislation.
In Dooley, De Lima, and Goetze, the Court rejected the Executive's tariffs
during the period after ratification of the treaty and before congressional
government of Puerto Rico under the Foraker Act.' 6' By that time, the Court
said, Puerto Rico had become "a country which had been ceded to us, the
cession accepted, possession delivered and the island occupied and
administered without interference by Spain or any other power."162 It was no
longer foreign territory. But the Court held in De Lima that, even after the
effectiveness of the treaty of peace and cession, the President could continue
158. For a discussion of the Court's two cases, see supra note 157. In a later case, the
Supreme Court referred in dicta to the Provisional Court as "legally constituted." Basso v.
United States, 239 U.S. 602, 607 (1916).
159. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 18o (19O1); see also Dingley Act, ch. 11, 30 Stat. 151
(1897).
i6o. Goetze v. United States, 103 F. 72 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 19oo), rev'd, 182 U.S. 221 (1901).
161. Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 234-35 (19O1); DeLima, 182 U.S. at 194. Goetze
was decided in a summary opinion citing onlyDe Lima. Goetze, 182 U.S. at 222.
162. DeLima, 182 U.S. at 18o-8i.
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to govern "under the war power... from the necessities of the case, until
Congress provide[s] a territorial government."' 63 The entire Court was
unanimous on this point.' 64 Similarly, in Dooley the Court stated that "[wIe
have no doubt, however, that, from the necessities of the case, the right to
administer the government of Porto Rico continued in the military
commander after the ratification of the treaty and until further action by
Congress."' 65 According to Dooley, the U.S. military continued to have
"despotic" and "absolute" "power to administer" the government of Puerto
Rico until Congress created a new government.'6 6 The Court cited the same
controlling precedents from the Mexican War that Santiago relied upon.167
But the majority and dissenting justices in Dooley differed about the military's
power to "legislate," specifically whether a generally applicable congressional
statute-here, the Dingley tariff statute-bound the military government of
Puerto Rico "after the ratification of the treaty and the cession of the island
to the United States."' 68 Explaining why it considered the military bound by
Congress' statute, the majority noted that "Porto Rico then ceased to be a
foreign country," and "where the rights of the citizen are concerned," and
when operating in "his own country," a military commander's power to
legislate does "not extend beyond the necessities of the case."69 There was
no need, in the Court's view, for the Executive to administer a tariff
different from Congress' once Puerto Rico became part of the United States
and Congress therefore assumed primacy as the domestic lawgiver.
Between 190 and 1913 the Supreme Court repeatedly affirmed the
legality of the U.S. military government of Puerto Rico and the lack of
constitutional-rights limitations on that government.70 Prior to the effective
date of the treaty of peace and cession, the Court treated it as obvious that
163. Id. at 186.
164. Id. at 208-09, 212-14 (McKenna, J., dissenting).
165. Dooley, 182 U.S. at 234.
166. Id.
167. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
168. Dooley, 182 U.S. at 236 (White, J., dissenting). The majority held that general statutes
applying to the entire United States bound the military government after ratification of the
Treaty of Paris. Id. at 235-36 (majority opinion). For the dissenting justices, it did not make
sense to think that Congress would intend that its general revenue laws, enacted well before
anyone dreamed of annexing Puerto Rico, should apply immediately to Puerto Rico; Congress,
these justices believed, would prefer to be able to study the situation and legislate specifically
for new territory. Id. at 239-43 (White, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 234-35 (majority opinion); see also Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260, 266
(19o9) (citing Dooley and stating that "[tihe authority of a military government during the
period between the cession and the action of Congress ... is of large, though it may not be of
unlimited, extent").
170. In 1913, the Court made clear it still approved of Santiago and De Lima's holdings
about the U.S. military government. See Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U.S. 139, 159-60
(1913).
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constitutional rights did not limit a U.S. military government in foreign
territory; in other words, the Court applied the bright-line rule that the
Constitution only applied in sovereign U.S. territory. This, we recall, was the
rule that Boumediene erroneously said the Insular Cases had rejected. Even
after the treaty of peace and cession had gone into effect, the Court
approved the continuation of military jurisdiction over civilians in sovereign
U.S. territory, free from constitutional restraints. The Court refused to
intervene when noncitizens tried in military courts appealed for its
assistance; statutory limitations on its jurisdiction apparently did not pose
constitutional problems. These decisions utterly discredit Boumediene's
reading of the Insular Cases.
V. THE U.S. MILITARY IN AND AROUND CUBA, 1898-1902
None of the canonical Insular Cases addressed by Boumediene arose from
the military occupation of Cuba. Munaf discussed a Cuba case but, as noted
above, appeared to be unaware that the U.S. military governed Cuba from
1898-1902, when a key precedent arose.'7' Cases arising from Cuba are
critical to understanding the Court's legal doctrines about war, territory, and
individual rights because, unlike Puerto Rico and the Philippines, but like
Guantanamo Bay today, Cuba was never formally annexed by the United
States. Like all other Insular Cases, the Cuba cases show that Boumediene
wholly misunderstood the legal framework and rules applied by the Court
and other legal actors during the insular era.
A. CASES INVOLVING SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR MILITARY OPERATIONS
Noncanonical Insular Cases, not mentioned in Boumediene, applied the
war-powers law enunciated in Civil War era decisions to hold that the United
States could use military measures against enemies without regard to
individual-rights protections of the Constitution.
1. Naval Seizure of Enemy Vessels as Prizes of War
The U.S. Navy's first hostile shot of the War of 1898 was in aid of the
seizure, as prize of war, of a Spanish merchant vessel in the waters between
Cuba and Florida.I7v Within four years of the war's end, the Supreme Court
would issue at least sixteen decisions involving vessels captured by the U.S.
Navy as prizes of war.173 Not one decision considered whether individual
171. See supranote 48.
172. A.B. FEUER, THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR AT SEA 23-24 (1995). The U.S. Supreme
Court later decided a prize case involving the seizure of this vessel, the Buena Ventura. See infra
note 173.
173. See, e.g., The Carlos F. Roses, 177 U.S. 655 (19oo); The Benito Estenger, 176 U.S. 568
(19oo); The Panama, 176 U.S. 535 (1900); The Adula, 176 U.S. 361 (19oo); The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (19oo); The Steamship Buena Ventura v. United States, 175 U.S. 384
(18gg); The Pedro, 175 U.S. 354 (1899); The Olinde Rodrigues, 174 U.S. 510 (1899).
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rights under the U.S. Constitution might protect either Spanish subjects or
the subjects of neutral nations who, through their conduct-such as running
a blockade-made their vessels and cargo liable to seizure. Such an idea
would have been quickly dismissed, since the Prize Cases of 1863 and many
other prior and subsequent decisions of the Court had firmly established the
contrary rule.' 74
2. Other Military Measures Against Enemy Civilians
Additional cases arising from military operations in and around Cuba
show that Boumediene misconstrued the prevailing constitutional doctrines of
the insular era. In July 1898, the general commanding the U.S. Army in
Cuba ordered the destruction, for military purposes, of buildings owned by a
Pennsylvania corporation.'75 The company sued the United States in the
Court of Claims, alleging that this was a taking without compensation in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court held unanimously
that domicile during the war in Spanish territory made the company an
"alien enemy," and therefore it "could not invoke the protection of the
Constitution in respect of its property used in business in Cuba, during the
war, any more than a Spaniard residing there could have done, under like
circumstances.",7 6 As the War Department's chief counsel for insular affairs
put it: "During the time and in the locality of military operations of actual
war the laws of peace are suspended and the most cherished rights of
individuals and communities may be ignored or obliterated should the
174. SeeKent, supranote 9, at 1893-1905.
175. SeeJuragua iron Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 297, 301-02 (1909).
176. Id. at 3o8. The Court decided a similar case arising inJuly 1898, but from Puerto Rico.
Ribas y Hijo v. United States, 194 U.S. 315 (1904). During the war, the U.S. Army seized a
Spanish-owned and Spanish-flagged vessel and used it for one year. See id. at 316. The Spanish
owner filed a claim in the nature of quantum meruit in the U.S. District Court for Puerto
Rico-a court created by the Foraker Act-and argued that the Constitution implied a contract
to make compensation. Id. at 319, 323. Judge William H. Holt denied the claim, holding that
"use of an enemy's property by the war power for war purposes" need not be compensated and
"[t] here is no constitutional limitation of the war power." Transcript of Record at 6-7, Ribas y
Hijo, 194 U.S. 315 (No. 151). The Supreme Court affirmed unanimously, rejecting the
contention that the Constitution created a right to compensation because "[tlhe seizure, which
occurred while the war was flagrant, was an act of war, occurring within the limits of military
operations," and "[a]ccording to the established principles of public law, the owners of the
vessel, being Spanish subjects, were to be deemed enemies [and t]be vessel ... therefore ...
enemy's property." Ribasy Hijo, 194 U.S. at 323.
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exigencies of the military situation actually or apparently require it."177 Two
unanimous decisions later reaffirmed these rules.78
B. THE NEGLECTED CASE OFNEELYV. HENKEL (1901)
Neely v. Henkel, concerning extradition from the United States to U.S.
military-governed Cuba, is tremendously interesting as it was the first U.S.
Supreme Court case to discuss the legality of humanitarian intervention in a
foreign country; 79 unfortunately, though, today it is often misconstrued as a
simple extradition dispute between independent nations. 8o Although a few
astute historians of the Court appropriately discuss Neely as an insular case,'
8
'
Neely is generally ignored in discussions about the Insular Cases' holdings
regarding individual constitutional rights.' 8' That is a mistake. As discussed
177. CHARLES E. MAGOON, BUREAU OF INSULAR AFFAIRS, WAR DEP'T, THE POWERS,
FUNCTIONS, AND DUTIES OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENTS MAINTAINED BY THE UNITED STATES IN
THE ISLANDS LATELY CEDED AND RELINQUISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SPAIN, CASE No. 1 102,
(1899), in REPORTS ON THE LAW OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN TERRITORY SUBJECT TO MILITARY
OCCUPATION BY THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES 1 1, 20 (2d ed. 1902).
178. Diaz v. United States, 222 U.S. 574 (1912); Herrera v. United States, 222 U.S. 558
(1912). Herrera made clear that the denouement of active military operations in one theater
does not terminate the United States' belligerent rights under the law of war; so long as "war
was flagrant elsewhere," the military commander in a subdued district "had power to do all that
the laws of war permitted, except so far as he was restrained by the pledged faith of the
government, or the effect of congressional action"-that is, without limitation by the rights-
granting provisions of the Constitution. Herrera, 222 U.S. at 572-73 (internal quotation
omitted).
This holding is important because critics of the United States' conduct of the conflict
against al Qaeda and the Taliban have often contended that, even granting arguendo that the
United States may employ military force and the laws of war on an active battlefield in, say,
Afghanistan, the mild sway of the Constitution and the U.S. criminal justice system must govern
areas distant from the battle-for instance, Guantanamo Bay. The Supreme Court agreed with
this in Boumediene, the majority found "few practical barriers to the running of the writ" to
Guantanamo in part because it is not located "in an active theater of war." Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723, 770 (20o8); see also id. at 769 ("The Government presents no credible arguments
that the military mission at Guantanamo would be compromised if habeas corpus courts had
jurisdiction to hear the detainees' claims.").
179. Neely v. Henkel, 18o U.S. 1o9 (19ol). The Court did not describe the invasion of
Cuba as a humanitarian intervention, but congressional documents and contemporary
commentary did. See, e.g., S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT RELATIVE TO AFFAIRS IN
CUBA, S. REP. NO. 55-885 passim (2d. Sess. 1898).
s8o. See, e.g., Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 677 (2008) (discussed in supra note 48); M.
Cherif Bassiouni, Reforming International Extradition: Lessons of the Past for a Radical New Approach,
25 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 389, 400 & n.62 (2003).
181. E.g., BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF
AMERICAN EMPIRE 133-36, 217, 236-37 (2oo6); Burnett, supra note 43, at 390; Sarah H.
Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century
Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 213-14 (2002).
182. See, e.g., Brief of Professors of Constitutional Law and Federal Jurisdiction as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 16-22, Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723 (Nos. o6-i 195, o6-1 196),
2007 WL 2441580 (discussing the Insular Cases at length without mentioning Neely); Azmy,
supra note 51, at 407-13 (same); Neuman, supra note 4, at 6-14, 26-31 (same). But see
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below, the "territorial incorporation" Insular Cases concerned peacetime
civilian governments of populous lands-Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and
Hawaii-that had been formally annexed to the United States by treaty and
given civil governments. Not surprisingly, in that situation the civilian
populations of the islands were found to be protected by at least the
"fundamental" constitutional rights during peacetime. Neely is an entirely
different case because Cuba's situation was different.'8s3 From the outset of
the war, U.S. policy set by Congress disclaimed any intention to annex
Cuba.8 4 In the Treaty of Peace, the two nations agreed that Spain would
relinquish sovereignty over Cuba, but the United States intentionally
declined to take it up; the United States' role would be as a temporary
trustee or custodian for the Cuban people until order could be restored and
a Cuban government created.I8 5 Congress never legislated a government for
Cuba. For the nearly four years of its existence, the U.S. government of Cuba
was military, administered through the President's authority as Commander
in Chief, who invoked the international laws of war for its powers and limits.
Neely is important because it unanimously held that Cuba never became part
of the United States for constitutional purposes, and that individual
constitutional rights could not be asserted against the U.S. occupation
government-notwithstanding the United States' total and exclusive control
over Cuba for several years. Neely is arguably the insular case most on point
to the situation at Guantanamo Bay, but the Court in 2oo8 and many
globalist commentators have not given it sufficient weight. Boumediene, for
example, cites Neely only for a factual point about the U.S. occupation of
Cuba' 86 but its legal significance is not discussed.
Neely arose from patronage appointments in the Havana post office
made at the instigation of powerful Ohio Senator Marcus Hanna and a
senior U.S. postal official in Washington, D.C.' 87 Charles Neely and Estes
Rathbone, recipients of the patronage appointments, were U.S. citizens
holding supervisory positions in the Havana post office when they
embezzled tens of thousands of dollars in 1899 and early 19oo, and then
NEUMAN, supra note 96, at 88 (discussing other opinions in Downes then stating: "Harlan
[dissenting in Downes] distinguished vehemently, if not wholly convincingly, his prior decision
in Neely v. Henkel (19o), which arose out of the American occupation of Cuba in the wake of
the Spanish-American War. 'Temporary' military occupation of foreign territory, without the
intention of acquiring sovereignty, did not bring it under the Constitution." (footnote
omitted)).
183. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad, I 1 o
COLUM. L. REV. 225, 239 (2oo) (contrasting the canonical Insular Cases, concerning
"territories over which the United States claimed full sovereignty," with "Neely, which addressed
the temporary occupation of Cuba").
184. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
186. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764-65.
187. See LEONARD D. WHITE, THE REPUBLICAN ERA: 1869-19o, at 271 (1958).
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escaped to the United States.'88 The U.S. Postmaster General in Washington
oversaw the Cuban postal service, while the rest of the Cuban government
was under the control of the War Department, which reported to the
President as Commander in Chief and exercised authority locally in Cuba
through the Governor General, a U.S. Army general.'5 9
Secretary of War Elihu Root and General Leonard Wood, the Governor
General of Cuba, ignored political pressure from Hanna and other
Republicans who did not want a major scandal to mar an election year, and
made sure that Neely and his confederates were criminally charged in
Cuba.190 The U.S. government then sought and received a warrant for
Neely's arrest in New York and brought him to federal court there for
extradition to Cuba pursuant to a hastily enacted U.S. statute allowing
extradition to a "foreign country or territory.., occupied by or under the
control of the United States."'9' Neely's constitutional and statutory
objections to extradition and trial in U.S. governed Cuba were brought to
the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court unanimously ruled against
Neely in early i9oi,just as the Court was putting the finishing touches on its
decisions in the pending cases of Downes, De Lima, and Dooley. Neely then
submitted another habeas petition with additional facts and briefing, and
the Court again unanimously denied it.,92 Despite the United States'
complete de facto and de jure possession and control of Cuba at the relevant
time, the Court in Neely applied a categorical rule under which no individual
constitutional rights could be asserted against the U.S. Government when
operating in foreign territory through the military. This holding is, of
course, wholly inconsistent with Boumediene's claims about the legal rules
applied in the Insular Cases.
During the period 1898-19o2, the U.S. Army was the government of
Cuba. The United States' brief to the Court in Neely announced that "[t]he
United States is at the present time, under the law of belligerent occupation,
the de facto and de jure sovereign in the island of Cuba, and as such is
possessed of all essential attributes of sovereignty.",93 Official legal opinions
188. See In re Neely, 103 F. 631, 632 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 19oo), affd, Neely v. Henkel, 18o U.S.
lo9 (1901); WHITE, supra note 187, at 271; Cuban Postal Frauds, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 9oo, at 1.
189. See CHARLESM. PEPPER, TO-MORROW IN CUBA 295-96 (1910); WHITE, supra note 187,
at 271.
19o . See DAVID F. HEALY, THE UNITED STATES IN CUBA, 1898-1902, at 139 (1963); LEECH,
supra note 107, at 385.
191. In reNeely, 103 F. at 631.
192. Neely v. Henkel, 18o U.S. lo9 (19o) (denying first habeas petition); Neelyv. Henkel,
18o U.S. 126 (19ol) (denying second petition).
193. Brief for the United States at 46, Neely, I8o U.S. 1o9 (Nos. 387, 4o6). This statement
shows the imprecision inherent in the words "sovereignty" and "sovereign." Spain had not
ceded Cuba to the United States and the United States had not annexed Cuba by treaty or
statute, so the United States' brief must have been using the term "dejure sovereign" to refer to
its status under international law-in relation to all other nations, public international law
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of the U.S. Attorney General described the United States' "occupation" of
and "dominion" over Cuba, as well as its exercise of "all the powers of
municipal government" in Cuba through the U.S. military.'94 Boumediene's
stated reasons why the Guantanamo facility should be considered effectively
U.S. territory today apply equally to all of Cuba circa 1898-1902-
"complete jurisdiction and control," "answerable to no other sovereign for
its acts" there, etc.'95 In Boumediene, these considerations about Guantanamo
Bay led the Court to find that the Constitution's protection of habeas corpus
rights "has full effect" there and to claim-incorrectly-that the Insular
Cases support this view..96 But in Neely, the Court held that Cuba "cannot be
regarded, in any constitutional, legal, or international sense, a part of the
territory of the United States" and that individual constitutional rights did
not bind the U.S. military government.'97
Mr. Neely made two principal arguments, both of which the Court
rejected. First, the Court rejected Neely's argument that Cuba could not be
considered a "foreign country" under the U.S. extradition statute because it
was occupied and governed by the United States. The Court looked to the
nature and purposes of the United States' actions in Cuba, as determined by
relevant statutes, the Treaty of Paris, and presidential proclamations. It held
that, even under U.S. military government, Cuba was nevertheless a foreign
country because "the avowed objects intended to be accomplished" by the
war and military occupation were "a temporary occupancy and control of
Cuba" for the purpose of holding the island "in trust for the inhabitants of
Cuba, to whom it rightfully belongs, and to whose exclusive control it will be
would have deemed the United States the sovereign of Cuba by virtue of the military
occupation-rather than under U.S. domestic law-that is, the Constitution. The United States'
oral statements to the Court in arguing Neely are somewhat more clear about this distinction. See
The Neely Extradition Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 19oo, at 7 (reporting that counsel for the United
States argued that "although Cuba was foreign to this Government, in the sense that it was not
incorporated as permanent domestic territory into the United States, it was, nevertheless,
territory pro tempore of the United States, subject to our jurisdiction and to our rights as the
sovereign power").
194. See Copyrights-Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippine Islands, 22 Op. Att'y Gen. 268, 269
(1898) ("Cuba ... [has] not, as yet, been formally ceded to the United States. So far as [it is]
subject to the control and government of this country, [it is] ruled under the principle of
belligerent right. [Cubans] have not become entitled to the rights and privileges of citizens of
the United States."); Cuba-Insurgents, 22 Op. Att'y Gen. 301, 302 (1899) ("Although the
treaty of Paris is not yet ratified, Spain has surrendered to the United States the possession and
control of Cuba, and the government of the island is now being administered under the law of
belligerent right by the military authorities of the United States, under the direction of the
President as Commander in Chief"); Cuba-Municipal Regulations-Public Works, 22 Op.
Att'y Gen. 526, 528 (1899) ("Cuba ... is now under the temporary dominion of the United
States, which is exercising there, under the law of belligerent right, all the powers of municipal
government.").
195. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 755, 770 (2oo8).
196. Id. at 771.
197. Neely, i8o U.S. at i19.
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surrendered when a stable government shall have been established by their
voluntary action.",9 8 In other words, the United States had not and did not
intend to annex Cuba.
Neely's second futile argument was that it was unconstitutional for the
United States to extradite him to a place under U.S. military control for the
purpose of a criminal trial which would lack the full procedural safeguards
of the U.S. Constitution. The Court held that the constitutional provisions
referenced simply "have no relation to crimes committed without the
jurisdiction of the United States against the laws of a foreign country.",99 In
effect, Neely held that the U.S. military government of Cuba was a "foreign"
government for constitutional purposes..2 - And the Constitution of course
does not apply to the actions of foreign governments.2 0 '
C. BOUMEDIENE 'S CONSPIRACY THEORY ABOUT THE ACQUISITIONAND LEGAL
STATUS OF THE GUANTANAMO BASE
Boumediene sketched an elaborate theory about the United States'
acquisition of Guantanamo Bay in 1903 to support a separation-of-powers
argument that a judicially enforced constitutional right to habeas must
protect Guantanamo detainees because otherwise Congress and the
President would be usurping the Judiciary's constitutional prerogative of
saying "what the law is."o2 But the Court seems to have been mistaken about
some key facts and legal issues.
198. Id. at 115, 120-21.
199. Id. at 122.
2oo. Neely's statements that Cuba "cannot be regarded, in any constitutional, legal, or
international sense, a part of the territory of the United States," and that "Cuba is none the less
foreign territory, within the meaning of [the extradition statute], because it is under a Military
Governor appointed by and representing the President," was quoted with approval in Pearcy v.
Stranahan. 205 U.S. 257, 264-65 (1907). See also Galban & Co. v. United States, 207 U.S. 579
(1907) (summarily affirming the power of the U.S. military government of Cuba to levy tariffs
by citing Neely and Pearcy).
201. Because Neely's co-defendant Rathbone was a protdg6 of Senator Hanna, the legality
of their convictions was reargued in Senate hearings instigated by Hanna in 1903 and 1904
aimed at discrediting General Leonard Wood, the former U.S. military governor of Cuba. At
the hearings, Wood testified that the courts in Cuba in which Neely and Rathbone were tried
under his watch "were part of the [U.S.] military government" and "the [U.S.] military governor
had full authority to appoint and remove members of the judiciary at will." The Nomination of
Brig. Gen. Leonard Wood to be a Major-General, United States Army: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
Military Affairs, 58th Cong. 343 (1904) (reply of Gen. Wood to the statement of E.G.
Rathbone). Notwithstanding the U.S. government's total de facto and de jure control in Cuba,
General Wood replied in response to Rathbone's charge that the prosecution had violated his
Sixth Amendment rights that "[i]n reference to the Constitution of the United States, Mr.
Rathbone is perfectly aware that Cuba is a foreign country" and, as such, the Constitution "did
not apply in Cuba." Id. at 343, 357.
202. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(i Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
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The Court in Boumediene seemed convinced that the Guantanamo
facility was at one time located in "unincorporated" territory of the United
States.2o3 "Unincorporated territory" is a term of art originating in the
canonical Insular Cases. It refers to (1) lands formally annexed to the
United States (2) but not yet "incorporated"-made an integral part of the
Union-by Congress, (3) in which the inhabitants nevertheless possess
certain fundamental constitutional rights.204 None of these things were ever
true about Cuba. The Boumediene Court seemed to believe that the United
States possessed "formal sovereignty over an[] unincorporated territory,"
namely Cuba, when the lease for Guantanamo Bay was signed in 1903.205
More specifically, the Boumediene Court apparently believed that the United
States' lease and occupation of Guantanamo went into effect while the U.S.
military still governed Cuba.2, 6 Based on this faulty factual assumption, the
Court reasoned that fundamental constitutional rights had, when the lease
was signed, been available to inhabitants of Cuba against the U.S.
government.20 7 Because of this, Boumediene viewed the 1903 lease
transaction-which gave the United States "complete jurisdiction and
control" but stipulated that "ultimate sovereignty" remained with Cuba20°8
as a sinister move by the U.S. government to take away Guantanamo's then-
existing status as territory in which fundamental constitutional rights
protected individuals, and thereby to undermine the ability of the judiciary
to enforce such rights. It will perhaps help to quote directly the Court's
assertions:
The Government's formal sovereignty-based test [for availability
of constitutional rights for noncitizens] raises troubling separation-
of-powers concerns as well. The political history of Guantanamo
illustrates the deficiencies of this approach.... At the close of the
Spanish-American War, Spain ceded control over the entire island
203. See id. at 757-59, 765.
204. See Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572,
599 n.3o (1976) ("In a series of decisions that have come to be known as the [Insular Cases],
the Court created the doctrine of incorporated and unincorporated Territories. The former
category encompassed those Territories destined for statehood from the time of acquisition,
and the Constitution was applied to them with full force. The latter category included those
Territories not possessing that anticipation of statehood. As to them, only 'fundamental'
constitutional rights were guaranteed to the inhabitants." (citations omitted)); see also Burnett,
supra note 31, at 8oo (explaining unincorporated territory was a type of "domestic territory-
that is, territory within the internationally recognized boundaries of the United States and
subject to its sovereignty").
205. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765.
2o6. See id. at 753-54.
207. See id. at 765 (suggesting that the Constitution was "on" when the United States
occupied Cuba and that the Executive had improperly tried to turn the Constitution "off" at
Guantanamo by "disclaim[ing] sovereignty in the formal sense of the term" over Guantanamo
and then leasing the territory back from the Cuban government).
2o8. See supra note 13.
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of Cuba to the United States .... From the date the treaty with
Spain was signed until the Cuban Republic was established on May
20, 1902, the United States governed the territory 'in trust' for the
benefit of the Cuban people. And although it recognized, by
entering into the 1903 Lease Agreement, that Cuba retained
"ultimate sovereignty" over Guantanamo, the United States
continued to maintain the same plenary control it had enjoyed
since 1898. Yet the Government's view is that the Constitution had
no effect there, at least as to noncitizens, because the United States
disclaimed sovereignty in the formal sense of the term. The
necessary implication of the argument is that by surrendering
formal sovereignty over any unincorporated territory to a third
party, while at the same time entering into a lease that grants total
control over the territory back to the United States, it would be
possible for the political branches to govern without legal
constraint.
Our basic charter cannot be contracted away like this.... To
hold the political branches have the power to switch the
Constitution on or off at will .... would permit a striking anomaly
in our tripartite system of government, leading to a regime in
which Congress and the President, not this Court, say "what the law
is." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). The test for
determining the scope of [the Constitution's Suspension Clause]
must not be subject to manipulation by those whose power it is
designed to restrain.209
To summarize, using the Court's own terms, the Boumediene Court
seems to have assumed (1) that the Constitution was "on" over the whole of
Cuba when the United States occupied it; (2) that the Constitution
continued to be "on" at the time the 1903 lease was signed-apparently on
the mistaken belief that, notwithstanding the withdrawal of U.S. forces and
the independence of Cuba in May 19o2, the United States in 1903
"continued to maintain the same plenary control it had enjoyed since
1898[;]"2 , o and (3) that the Executive had improperly tried to turn the
Constitution "off" at Guantanamo by "disclaim[ing] sovereignty" over
Guantanamo in the 1903 lease agreement through a kind of sale-leaseback
transaction with the new Cuban government.2 1 I None of this is correct.
Here is what actually happened. During and immediately after the war
with Spain, the United States established a coaling station, supply depot, and
209. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764-66 (citations omitted).
210. Id. at 765. Others had made the same error. See Amy Kaplan, Where is Guantdnamo?, 57
AM. Q. 831, 836 (2005) (describing the U.S.-Cuba lease for Guantanamo as "Cuba agree[ing]
to cede sovereignty over part of the territory it never controlled").
211. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765.
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post for soldiers on the islands and shores of Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.212 The
post was maintained until April 1902, when it was abandoned in anticipation
of the end of the U.S. military regime.-3 In May 1902, the United States
formally ended its military occupation of Cuba and withdrew from the
island, turning governing responsibilities over to a new Cuban
government.21 4 All U.S. forces left Cuba in 1902 except for a small group of
officers deployed at three coastal defense batteries,2 5 who remained to
instruct and command Cuban Army soldiers.216
As noted, Boumediene was incorrect that Cuba under U.S. military
occupation constituted "unincorporated" territory of the United States in
which fundamental constitutional rights were available. Congress must first
annex the territory to the United States by treaty or statute before it can be
further classified as incorporated or unincorporated. But even if Boumediene
was correct that U.S.-occupied Cuba was sufficiently under U.S. sovereignty
that it could constitute unincorporated territory in which fundamental
constitutional rights were available, that "unincorporated" status
nevertheless must have ended with U.S. withdrawal in May 1902. The
United States did not have any sovereignty or control over Cuba after May
19o2-Cuba was thereafter governed by the Government of the Republic of
Cuba, and was a sovereign nation.217 It is decidedly odd, then, that just after
acknowledging that "the Cuban Republic was established on May 20, 1902, "
Boumediene asserts that, in 1903 when the lease for Guantanamo was signed,
"the United States continued to maintain the same plenary control it had
enjoyed since 1898."2 8 The Court in Boumediene got the facts wrong.
In fact, when the U.S. military occupation gave way to the new Cuban
government in May 1902, private parties owned the land around
212. B.D. VARNER & DANIEL KOZE, U.S. NAvy, THE HISTORY OF GUANTANAMO BAY 3-5 (3 d
ed. 1964); Mary Ellen Chenevey McCoy, Guantanamo Bay: The United States Naval Base and
Its Relationship with Cuba 34-35 (Aug. 1995) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Univ. of Akron)
(on file with author). For a contemporaneous report on the construction of the coal depot, see
Conditions at Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1898, at 3.
213. See FINAL REPORT OF BRIG. GEN. LEONARD WOOD, U.S. ARMY, COMMANDING THE
DEPARTMENT OF CUBA (1902), in 9 ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE WAR DEP'T FOR THE FISCAL YEAR
ENDED JUNE 30, 1902: REPORT OF THE LIEUTENANT-GEN, COMMANDING THE ARMY &
DEPARTMENT COMMANDERS, H.R. DOc. No. 57-2, at 67, 69 (2d Sess. 1902) [hereinafter WOOD
1902 REPORT].
214. See WOOD 1902 REPORT, supra note 213, at 67; accord HEALY, supra note 19o , at 207;
JAMES. H. HITCHMAN, LEONARD WOOD AND CUBAN INDEPENDENCE, 1898-1902, at 184, 196-98
(1971).
215. SeeWOOD 1902 REPORT, supranote 213, at 69-71, 90.
216. Cf LANGLEY, supra note 63, at 122 (noting that before the U.S. Military Government
withdrew in 1902, the U.S. Army had trained "[flor coastal defense" "several companies of
Cuban soldiers to man the armaments").
217. Cf Cuba Will Accept Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1903, at 5 (reporting meeting between
President of Cuba and U.S. Minister to Cuba about bilateral treaty).
218. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764-65 (2oo8) (emphasis added).
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Guantanamo Bay,'219 which was under the jurisdiction of the sovereign
government of Cuba-it is simply not true that the American occupation
"continued" in the "same" fashion as before May 1902. An agreement for
the United States to lease an area at Guantanamo Bay for a naval base and
coaling station was not signed until February 1903,o well after transfer of
sovereignty and control to the new Cuban government.22' At the time of this
February 1903 agreement, it seems that there were no employable naval
facilities on the land around Guantanamo Bay.222 After the lease was signed,
United States and Cuban officials surveyed the area and signed a
supplemental lease for the future U.S. outpost.223 In March 1903, Congress,
for the first time, appropriated money for "public works" and occupation
219. SeeMcCoy, supranote 212, at47.
220. SeeVARNER & KOZE, supra note 212, at6.
221. The Cuban government did sign the 1903 agreement under some duress, but this
does not change the constitutional analysis. Duress is a pervasive feature of international
relations. During the second half of the U.S. occupation, the U.S. Congress and Executive
implemented a policy to fix in advance of the U.S. departure the future relations with an
independent Cuba. In March goi, Congress, through the Platt Amendment to an army
appropriations bill, outlined the undertakings that would have to be made in any new Cuban
constitution before the United States would leave the island. See Act of March 2, 19o, ch. 803,
31 Stat. 895, 897; see also HITCHMAN, supra note 214, at 1o9-1o, 113-18 (describing the origins
of the Platt Amendment). One required undertaking was "to enable the United States to
maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own
defense, the government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for
coaling or naval stations." See 31 Stat. at 898. With the approval and organizational assistance of
the U.S. military government, a Cuban constitutional convention had been meeting in Havana
at the same time as the U.S. executive officials and Congress were finalizing what became the
Platt Amendment. See HITCHMAN, supra note 214, at 94-109; JULIUS W. PRATT, AMERICA'S
COLONIAL EXPERIMENT 120 (1950). Certain provisions of the Platt Amendment, including the
requirement to provide the United States land for naval bases, were distasteful to many Cubans,
and the constitutional convention did not vote to include it in the new Cuban constitution until
June 90 1. See HEALY, supra note 19o , at 170, 177-78; HITCHMAN, supra note 214, at 115, 125-
27, 136-38, 14o-48, 150-55, 160-83; PRATT, supra, at 120, 122. It seems clear that the threat
that the United States would continue to occupy Cuba until the Platt Amendment was
embodied into the new Cuban constitution was what caused many reluctant members of the
constitutional convention to agree to do so. See HEALY, supra note i 9o, at 178.
222. See REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OF EQUIPMENT (1903), in ANNUAL REPORTS
OF THE NAVY DEP'T FOR THE YEAR 1903: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAvY,
MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS, H.R. Doc. NO. 58-3, at 295, 358 (2d Sess. 1903) [hereinafter NAvY
1903 REPORT] (stating in regard to "Guantanamo, Cuba" that "[a] naval coal depot is projected
at this port, but no steps have yet been taken toward its construction"); Naval Station in Cuba,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1903, at 8 (implying that there was no naval station in existence at
Guantanamo). For several years before the February 1903 lease agreement, Congress had been
appropriating money for naval projects and marine garrisons at currently existing naval stations
in the new insular possessions, namely at Cavite, Philippines; San Juan, Puerto Rico; Pearl
Harbor, Hawaii; and Tutuila, Samoa. There were no appropriations for building or maintaining
any facilities at Guantanamo. See, e.g., Act ofJuly 1, 1902, ch. 1368, 32 Stat. 662, 669, 671, 675-
76, 679, 681-83, 688.
223. McCoy, supra note 212, at 49-50.
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and use of Guantanamo as a naval station.224 Cuba and the United States
ratified the agreement and exchanged ratifications in October 1903.2-5
Cuba began to acquire the land pledged to the United States from private
owners.22 6 The U.S. Secretary of the Navy reported in November 1903 that
"[p] ossession of the waters, islands, and such portion of the mainland as may
have been acquired by Cuba will soon be taken" by the United States .27 In
other words, the United States was yet not in possession of the Guantanamo
Bay territory.228 Only in December 19o3-one and one-half years after the
United States ceased to occupy and govern Cuba--did the Cuban
government officially transfer control over the leased area to the United
States.229
To sum up, during the U.S. military occupation, individual
constitutional fights did not protect people in Cuba because Cuba was
foreign territory, notwithstanding the United States' total defacto control of
Cuba from 1898 to 1902. The Supreme Court so held in Neely in 19o-a
decision entirely consistent with voluminous Supreme Court precedent. The
U.S. occupation ended in May 1902 and Cuba became an independent
nation. Any U.S. military or naval facilities at Guantanamo were abandoned.
Since the U.S. government's control of Cuba from 1898 to 1902 did not
suffice to make individual constitutional rights available there, the United
States' departure and the advent of an independent Cuban government
could not somehow bring the Constitution into force in Cuba. Even under
Boumediene's mistaken legal theory that Cuba was "unincorporated territory"
of the United States during the 1898-1902 military occupation, and
therefore that the Constitution protected individual rights in Cuba during
224. See Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1010, 32 Stat. 1177, 1188. It did so again in a
supplemental appropriation the next year. SeeAct of Feb. 18, 1904, ch. 16o, 33 Stat. 15, 29-30.
Construction of the base began in 1904. SeeVARNER & KOZE, supra note 212, at 9.
225. NAVY 19 o 3 REPORT, supra note 222, at 14.
226. Id. at 15.
227. Id.; see also Theodore Roosevelt, President of the U.S., Special Session Message (Nov.
10, 1903), reprinted in 14 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS (NEW
SERIES) 6741, 6742 (James D. Richardson ed., 19o9) (reporting to Congress that "[t]he
negotiations as to the details of these naval stations [in Cuba] are on the eve of completion").
228. See Cuba Offers Naval Station, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1903, at 4 ("The Cuban Government
to-day handed to United States Minister Squiers a proposition which, if accepted by the United
States, will result in the immediate turning over of the Guantanamo Naval Station to the United
States.").
229. REPORT OF THE CHIEF OF THE BUREAU OF NAVIGATION (1904), in ANNUAL REPORTS OF
THE NAVY DEP'T FOR THE YEAR 1904: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, MISCELLANEOUS
REPORTS, H.R. Doc. No. 58-3, at 467, 526 (3d Sess. 1904) ("On the loth of December 11903]
at noon formal possession was taken of the concession granted for the Guantanamo naval
station."); accord VARNER & KOZE, supra note 212, at 9; McCoy, supra note 212, at 53. It was
reported in the press that the actual transfer of physical control had been "effected in a quiet
manner" sometime in November 1903. See Transfer of Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1903,
at i.
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that time, the reign of the Constitution must have ended when the United
States left Cuba in May 1902. So when the United States transacted in
February 1903 with the Republic of Cuba to lease territory at Guantanamo
Bay, it was Cuban territory that was leased. That territory had no U.S.
constitutional status of any kind. Boumediene's conspiracy theory-that the
1903 lease's provision giving total control of the leased land to the United
States but stating that Cuba possessed "ultimate sovereignty" was an attempt
to "manipulat[e]" away the constitutional protections available to people at
Guantanamo-has no basis in fact or law.
VI. THE LIMITED DOMAIN OF THE DOCTRINE OF TERRITORIAL INCORPORATION
The canonical Insular Cases that Boumediene relied upon do not support
the Court's 2oo8 holding that noncitizen military detainees held in territory
outside the dejure sovereign territory of the United States have enforceable
individual rights under the Constitution. The reason for this is simple. The
territorial incorporation doctrine developed by the canonical Insular Cases,
and relied upon by Boumediene, concerned populous territories after the
United States formally and fully annexed them by the treaty of peace and
cession on April 11, 1899. The constitutional issues raised in these cases
were fairly ordinary questions about civilian life in U.S. territory during
peacetime. The canonical Insular Cases relied upon by Boumediene did not
raise or decide questions about constitutional rights outside the sovereign
territory of the United States, or questions about the availability of
constitutional rights to alleged enemies during wartime. No relevant actor at
the time-not the Executive, Congress, the Court, or the private litigants-
understood these canonical Insular Cases the way the Boumediene Court did:
as establishing that constitutional rights could be available extraterritorially,
and for alleged military enemies at that. In fact, the Court itself made clear
in the very same canonical Insular Cases relied upon by Boumediene that the
earliest moment at which individual constitutional rights could possibly
become available was the formalization of the annexation of territory to the
United States. Formal annexation was a sine qua non requirement for
individual constitutional rights.
A. DOWNESV. BIDWELL (19o)
As discussed above, Congress's Foraker Act for Puerto Rico imposed a
duty on goods shipped between the mainland United States and Puerto
Rico. 3o There was no tax or duty on goods shipped between or among U.S.
states and continental territories.23' The Foraker Act duty was set at a rate
230. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
231. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cls. 5-6 ("No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported
from any State. No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the
Ports of one State over those of another....").
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different from and lower than the duty on goods imported into the United
States from foreign countries.2 32 In Downes v. Bidwel4 the most important of
the canonical Insular Cases, a fruit importer challenged the constitutionality
of $659.35 paid under this unique Foraker Act duty, which had been
exacted on oranges imported into New York from Puerto Rico in November
1900.233 The importer argued that Puerto Rico had become part of the
United States at the time of the ratification of the Treaty of Paris and that
therefore the Foraker Act violated the Constitution's Uniformity Clause-
"all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States"234--because oranges imported from other parts of the United States
besides Puerto Rico were not subject to the same statutory duty.235
Every justice in Downes agreed that the earliest point at which the
Constitution could possibly have applied in Puerto Rico was when the
exchange of ratifications of the Treaty of Peace ended the war with Spain
and accomplished the cession of Puerto Rico to the United States-that is,
April 1 1, 1899.236 Recall that the war began in April 1898, and by late July,
all fighting had ended. The U.S. military government of Puerto Rico was up
and running by late summer 1898. The Treaty of Paris was signed in
December 1898. The United States was at that time at peace and exercised
full, complete, and undisputed sovereignty over Puerto Rico. But none of
these events, singly or in combination, was sufficient to trigger application of
the Constitution to Puerto Rico-according to every justice of the Court.
Justice Brown, who wrote an "opinion of the court" in Downesjoined by
no other justice, noted that "the Constitution does not apply to foreign
countries,"237 and held that even a formal "act of cession" of territory to the
United States by treaty does not "extend" the Constitution to that new U.S.
territory automatically.23s Rather, in line with "the practical interpretation
232. SeeForaker Act, ch. 191,§3,31 Stat. 77,77 (1900).
233. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 247 (1901).
234. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
235. See Downes, 182 U.S. at 247-48.
236. See id. at 256; id. at 337 (White, J., concurring) (joined by Justices Shiras and
McKenna); id. at 345-46 (Gray, J., concurring); id. at 348 (Fuller, CJ., dissenting) (joined by
Justices Harlan, Brewer, and Peckham).
237. Id. at 270 (majority opinion); see id. at 269 (stating that, in Ross v. McIntyre, the Court
held "that the Constitution had no application, since it was ordained and established 'for the
United States of America,' and not for countries outside of their limits" (quoting Ross v.
McIntyre, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891))).
238. Id. at 264 ("[T]he government and laws of the United States do not extend to such
territory ["territories previously subject to the acknowledged jurisdiction of another sovereign"]
by the mere act of cession."); see also id. at 286 ("The executive and legislative departments of
the government have for more than a century interpreted this silence [in the Constitution
about whether it applies to U.S. territories] as precluding the idea that the Constitution
attached to these territories as soon as acquired, and unless such interpretation be manifestly
contrary to the letter or spirit of the Constitution, it should be followed by the judicial
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put by Congress" and the Executive upon the Constitution for over a
century, Justice Brown held that "the Constitution is applicable to territories
acquired by purchase or conquest only when and so far as Congress shall so
direct."239 Nevertheless, after the United States' formal acquisition of
territory, constitutional "principles" or "principles of natural justice inherent
in the Anglo-Saxon character" protect inhabitants from abuses such as
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.24o
The other eight justices rejected Brown's radical view-that the
Constitution did not protect the individual rights of inhabitants in U.S.
territory with a congressional government and in peacetime, unless and
until Congress had acted to "extend" the Constitution. For these eight
justices, the completion of the formal annexation on April 11, 1899, had
constitutional significance even if Congress did not, by statute, expressly
provide that the Constitution was applicable.24'
Justice White's lengthy, dense concurring opinion in Downes, joined by
Justices Shiras and McKenna, was the origin of the doctrine of territorial
incorporation relied upon by Boumediene.24 2 White reaffirmed his agreement
with the Court's recent unanimous decision in Neely v. Henkel, which found
that Cuba, though occupied and controlled by the U.S. military, had not
been annexed by the United States and was still therefore "foreign" for
constitutional purposes.243 This meant that the customary international laws
department."); id. at 266 (stating that even after Florida was acquired by treaty from Spain, it
was "not part of the United States within the meaning of the Constitution").
239. Id. at 278-79; see also id. at 271 ("[W]here the Constitution has been once formally
extended by Congress to territories, neither Congress nor the territorial legislature can enact
laws inconsistent therewith."); id. at 279 ("We are also of opinion that the power to acquire
territory by treaty implies, not only the power to govern such territory, but to prescribe upon
what terms the United States will receive its inhabitants, and what their status shall be .... ").
240. Id. at 28o; see also id. at 263, 283. Brown also described constitutional "limitations" that
exist by "inference" and from "the general spirit of the Constitution." Id. at 268 (quoting Late
Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 44
(189o)).
241. See supra note 236 and accompanying text. The orthodox view of the other justices
held that the Constitution was omnipresent and always in effect, even though at certain times
and places it did not provide protections for persons or property. See e.g., Downes, 182 U.S. at
288-89 (White, J., concurring) ("The government of the United States was born of the
Constitution, and all powers which it enjoys or may exercise must be either derived expressly or
by implication from that instrument.... Every function of the government being thus derived
from the Constitution, it follows that that instrument is everywhere and at all times potential in
so far as its provisions are applicable.").
242. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text; see also Downes, 182 U.S at 342
(White,J., concurring) ("[I]t seems to me it is not open to serious dispute, that the military arm
of the government of the United States may hold and occupy conquered territory without
incorporation for such length of time as may seem appropriate to Congress in the exercise of its
discretion."); id. at 337 (emphasizing a passage in Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511,
542 (1828), which states that until a conquered enemy territory is "ceded by treaty," it may be
held "as a mere military occupation").
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of war, and any applicable statutes and treaties, but not individual
constitutional rights, limited the U.S. military occupation government. It is
therefore clear that White and the justices joining him in Downes viewed de
jure sovereignty as a necessary prerequisite for invocation of constitutional
rights.244
As to the facts of Downes, White framed the question as whether
"Congress in governing the territories is subject to the Constitution" and found
that Congress was bound by certain fundamental limitations at the moment
the annexation to the United States became effective by the exchange of
ratifications.245
Justice Gray concurred in Downes, staking out a pragmatic position
about the instantiation of constitutional government in Puerto Rico. For
Gray, "civil government," that is, government created by Congress for
peacetime, was a necessary precondition for the availability of individual
constitutional rights.246 Until Congress legislated, the Executive branch
necessarily had to continue to govern using its military powers, even after
the effective date of the treaty of peace and cession.247 And even after
Congress, in peacetime, creates a civil government, Gray held that "[i]f
Congress is not ready to construct a complete government for the conquered
territory, it may establish a temporary government, which is not subject to all
the restrictions of the Constitution. Such was the effect of the [Foraker
Act] ."248
Both Chief Justice Fuller's dissent, joined by Harlan, Peckham, and
Brewer, and Justice Harlan's separate dissent make clear that they believed
constitutional rights could only attach in Puerto Rico at the moment of
formal cession to the United States, when full political jurisdiction and the
right to legislate were acquired. 49 Because he had written the unanimous
244. Downes, 182 U.S at 288-89 (White,J., concurring).
245. Id. at 291 (emphasis added).
246. Id. at 345-46 (GrayJ., concurring).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 346-47 (emphasis added).
249. See id. at 36o (Fuller, CJ., dissenting) (stressing the holding of Cross v. Harrison that
"by the ratification of the treaty with Mexico 'California became a part of the United States"'
and thus came under the Constitution (quoting Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164, 197
(1853))); id. at 367 (stressing the importance of the moment of the "cession of
territory"(quoting United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 87 (1833))); id. (stressing
the moment when the "nation acquir[es] territory, by treaty or otherwise" (quoting Pollard v.
Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 225 (1845))); id. at 368 (stressing the moment when "political
jurisdiction and legislative power over any territory are transferred from one nation or
sovereign to another" (quoting Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542 (1885)));
id. (stressing the moment "[wlhen a cession of territory to the United States is completed by the
ratification of a treaty"). In this context, one can understand what specifically Fuller meant by
his looser language. E.g., id. at 361 (suggesting that the Constitution operates "everywhere
within the dominion of the United States" (quoting Dred Scott v. Sandford, 6o U.S. (19 How.)
393, 451 (1856))).
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opinion in Neely, Harlan in Downes felt obliged to respond to White's use of
Neely to establish the nonapplicability of the Constitution over Puerto Rico
after the effective date of the treaty of peace and cession. Harlan
distinguished Neely as irrelevant because while Cuba remained a "foreign"
country notwithstanding the U.S. military occupation, and therefore the
Constitution did not provide individuals with rights against the government
of Cuba, Downes involved "a territory of the United States acquired by
treaty."25o Harlan was very clear about the moment when constitutional
rights became available in Puerto Rico:
When the acquisition of territory becomes complete, by cession,
the Constitution necessarily becomes the supreme law of such new
territory .... The Constitution is supreme over every foot of
territory, wherever situated, under the jurisdiction of the United
States . . . 5
B. DE LIMAv. BIDWELL (1901)AND OTHER EARLYINSULAR CASES
As discussed above, all the justices in De Lima, Dooley and other decisions
agreed that the U.S. military lawfully governed Puerto Rico under the laws of
war prior to the effectiveness of peace and annexation and, even after the
island became sovereign U.S. territory, until Congress created a civil
government.2 52 These decisions are thus wholly at odds with Boumediene's
interpretation of the canonical Insular Cases. Decided in December 19O1,
the Fourteen Diamond Rings case raised the same question with regard to the
Philippines as De Lima had regarding Puerto Rico-whether after the
ratification of the treaty of peace and cession a U.S. tariff collector in the
continental United States could continue to consider the Philippines one of
the "foreign countries" under the congressional tariff and therefore exact
duties on goods coming from the Philippines. The Court held that the
Philippines cannot "be distinguished" from Puerto Rico in regard to the
"foreign country" provision of the tariff statute, and so the De Lima "decision
is controlling."253 According to the Court,
The Philippines, like Porto Rico, became, by virtue of the treaty,
ceded conquered territory or territory ceded by way of
indemnity.... The Philippines were not simply occupied but
acquired, and having been granted and delivered to the United
States, by their former master, were no longer under the
sovereignty of any foreign nation.254
250. Id. at 388 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
251. Id. at 38 4-8 5 .
252. See supra notes 139-43, 153-56, 159-67 and accompanying text.
253. Fourteen Diamond Rings, 183 U.S. 176, 177 (1901).
254. Id. at 178.
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More specifically, the Court stated:
The Philippines thereby ceased, in the language of the treaty, "to
be Spanish." Ceasing to be Spanish, they ceased to be foreign
country. They came under the complete and absolute sovereignty
and dominion of the United States, and so became territory of the
United States over which civil government could be established.255
Dorr v. United States addressed whether certain individual constitutional
rights applied in Filipino territorial courts256 created by Congress under an
organic act of 1902,257 enacted after the war for Filipino independence had
been put down. The bigger question raised in Dorrwas the nature and scope
of any constitutional limitations on Congress's power to "to govern...
ceded territory not made a part of the United States by Congressional
action," but annexed to the United States by the treaty of peace and
cession.258 In Doff, concerning the post-annexation Philippines, just as in
Downes, concerning post-annexation Puerto Rico, the crucial constitutional
moment was congressional acceptance of the cession of territory in the
treaty.259
C. RASMUSSEN MAKES "INCORPORATION" THE LAW OF THE LAND
The 1905 case Rasmussen v. United States26o settled Justice White's
incorporation doctrine from Downes as the rule of Court.26' The Court's
discussion in Rasmussen, especially Justice Harlan's concurrence, shows very
clearly that the issue in the case concerned Congress governing people in a
territory ceded to the United States, and viewed acquisition of sovereignty
through cession as the trigger for application of the U.S. Constitution.
Rasmussen arose in Alaska, which had been ceded by Russia to the
United States in 1867, but in 1905 was still five decades away from
Statehood. The defendant was convicted at trial by a jury of six-as was
required by the congressionally enacted Alaska Code-6 2-of the
misdemeanor of "keeping of a disreputable house."26 3 He claimed that the
six-member jury violated the Sixth Amendment right to a full common-law
255. Id. at 179.
256. Dorrv. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 139 (1904).
257. Act ofJuly 1, 1902 (Philippine Bill), ch. 1369, 32 Stat. 691.
258. Dorr, 195 U.S. at 149.
259. Id.
26o. Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 5 16 (1905).
261. According to Supreme Court Reporter Charles Henry Butler, afterJustice White orally
delivered the Court's opinion in Rasmussen he said to Butler, "now Downes v. Bidwell is the
opinion of the Court and I want you to make it so appear in your report of this case." CHARLES
HENRY BUTLER, A CENTURY AT THE BAR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 94
(1942).
262. Act ofJune 6, 19oo, ch. 786,§ 171,31 Stat. 321, 358-59.
263. Rasmussen, 197 U.S. at 518.
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jury.264 According to the Supreme Court, the U.S. government in defending
the conviction "did not dispute the obvious and fundamental truth that the
Constitution of the United States is dominant where applicable;" but the
United States asserted that the Sixth Amendment "did not apply to Congress
in legislating for Alaska."26 5 The issue turned, said the Court, on whether
Alaska had been incorporated into the Union.266 If not, the Court
concluded:
[T]he Constitution ... [did] not require [Congress] to enact for
ceded territory, not made a part of the United States by
Congressional action, a system of laws which shall include the right
of trial by jury, and that the Constitution does not, without
legislation and of its own force, carry such right to territory so
situated.267
Note that the Court was considering only "ceded" territory when it discussed
the application of the Constitution. Examining congressional enactments
relating to Alaska, the Court held that after cession to the United States in
1867, Congress "incorporated [Alaska] into the United States as a part
thereof," and therefore the Sixth Amendment had become applicable.
s68
Justice Harlan, the Court's most vigorous opponent of any
constitutional theory which limited the application of the Constitution on
American soil, made clear in his concurrence that he viewed the reign of
individual constitutional rights as coextensive only with "territory after it has
come under the sovereign authority of the United States," when the people
of the territory are therefore "subject to the full authority of the United
States for purposes of government." 69 Harlan also was quite clear about how
and when the application of the Constitution was triggered:
Immediately upon the ratification in 1 867 of the treaty by which
Alaska was acquired from Russia, that territory, as I think, came
under the complete, sovereign jurisdiction and authority of the
United States, and, without any formal action on the part of
Congress in recognition or enforcement of the treaty, and whether
Congress wished such a result or not, the inhabitants of that
Territory became at once entitled to the benefit of all the
guarantees found in the Constitution of the United States for the
protection of life, liberty, and property.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 5 19.
266. Id. at 5 19-2o.
267. Id. at 5 21 (quoting Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149 (1904)).
268. Id.; see also id. at 523.
269. Id. at 529-30 (Harlan,J., concurring).
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After such ratification no person charged with the commission
of a crime against the United States in that Territory could be
legally tried therefor otherwise than by what this court has
adjudged to be the jury of the Constitution.270
Similarly, Justice Brown in his concurrence in Rasmussen viewed Russia's
cession and the United States' acquisition of full sovereignty as marking the
moment at which the Constitution could begin to apply. 271
After Rasmussen, Justice Harlan's concurring and dissenting opinions
continued to be an easy way to see that all justices on the Court agreed that
the Constitution did not bind the United States in foreign lands until they
had been formally annexed to the United States and sovereignty extended
over them. Trono v. United States,272 for example, was one of the many cases
the Supreme Court decided concerning the application of the Bill of Rights
in the territorial court system created in the Philippines by Congress's
organic act of 1902. Mr. Trono had been tried by information before a
single judge and acquitted of capital murder but convicted of assault. On
appeal, the Philippine Supreme Court exercised its power, which it had held
during Spanish rule as well, to overturn an acquittal and enter ajudgment of
conviction.2 7, The U.S. Supreme Court split over whether the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibited this. More interesting
for present purposes isJustice Harlan's dissent:
[F]rom the moment of the complete acquisition of the Philippine
Islands by the United States, and without any act of Congress, or a
proclamation of the President upon the subject, the people of
those islands became entitled, of right, to the benefit of all the
fundamental guaranties of life, liberty, and property to be found in
[the Constitution.].... [N]o person within the territory and
subject to the sovereign jurisdiction of the United States can be
legally deprived of his life or liberty for crime committed by him
against the United States, except in the mode prescribed by the
Constitution of the United States.274
Thus, starting with Neely and continuing through Downes, De Lima,
Dooley, Rasmussen, and other precedents, the full Court was in agreement
270. Id. at 5 29 .
271. Id. at 531 (Brown, J., concurring) (stating that the constitutional right to a common-
law jury trial was made applicable in Alaska "by the treaty of cession with Russia [which]
provided that 'the inhabitants of the ceded territory... shall be admitted to the enjoyment all
the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States; and shall be maintained
and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion'" (alteration in
original)).
272. Tronov. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905).
273. Id. at 522.
274. Id. at 536 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
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that de jure U.S. ownership and sovereignty over a territory was a necessary
precondition to the availability of individual constitutional rights.
Boumediene's "functional approach to questions of [the Constitution's]
'extraterritoriality'"275 has no basis in the Insular Cases.
D. BOUMEDIENE 'S MISREADING OFBALZAC V. PORTO RICO
Boumediene misread Balzac v. Porto Rico,276 finding in it support for the
notion that fundamental constitutional rights of individuals bind the U.S.
government wherever the government exercises significant control as a
practical matter.77 Balzac described "fundamental" constitutional rights
being available to residents in "territory belonging to the United States
which has not been incorporated into the Union,"7s otherwise known as
"unincorporated territory." As discussed above, the Boumediene Court may
have misunderstood "unincorporated territory" to be territory under the
control but not formal sovereignty of the United States, like Guantanamo
Bay.279 If so, that is an error. "Unincorporated" (or "not incorporated")
territory, a term of art originating in the canonical Insular Cases, refers to
(i) lands formally annexed to the United States (2) but not yet
"incorporated"-made an integral part of the Union-by Congress, (3) in
which the inhabitants nevertheless possess certain fundamental
constitutional rights.28 ° Puerto Rico was-and still is-unincorporated
territory, but Guantanamo Bay is not.
Boumediene's misreading of Balzac-erroneously finding in Balzac
support for a "flexible" rule under which the Constitution provides rights to
military enemies outside sovereign U.S. territory-might also stem from
Balzac's potentially ambiguous statement that "[tihe Constitution of the
United States is in force in Porto Rico, as it is wherever and whenever the
sovereign power of that government is exerted."2s The Boumediene Court
may have believed that "sovereign power" referred to defacto U.S. control of
a piece of land. That is also a mistake. As the preceding sections
demonstrated, the Court's territorial incorporation case law shows that all
justices agreed that the earliest moment at which the Constitution came into
effect was upon the formal annexation to the United States and creation of
275. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008).
276. Balzac v. Puerto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
277. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 758. Boumediene also misstated a key fact underlying the Balzac
case. See supra note 42.
278. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 305, 309.
279. See supra Subpart V.C.
280. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
281. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312.
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civil government by Congress. This is what "sovereign power" must refer
to.V
8 2
Thus, when properly understood, even the canonical Insular Cases
evaluated by the Boumediene Court establish that presence in dejure sovereign
territory is a necessary precondition for the existence of individual
constitutional rights. It is not even necessary to read the more obscure,
noncanonical Insular Cases to see just how incorrect Boumediene was.
VII. NAVAL STATIONS, COALING STATIONS, AND OTHER MILITARY OUTPOSTS
During the great debate about the Constitution and imperialism during
the 1898-19oo period, even anti-imperialists with strong constitutional
objections to annexing Puerto Rico and the Philippines and treating the
inhabitants as less than full American citizens were perfectly at ease with
another form of territorial acquisition and autocratic government: the
purchase or lease of small tracts of land for military purposes, such as
coaling or naval stations, which were to be governed by the military without
any constitutional rights for the inhabitants. This was not merely a
theoretical question. The United States annexed Guam in 1898, took
control of Samoa in 1899, leased from Panama a strip of land for the
interoceanic canal in 1903, and leased land at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba for a
naval station in 1903. Under Boumediene's theory of the Constitution's
domain, individual constitutional rights should have protected people at
each of these locations because the United States had, at a minimum,
complete defacto control, if not also de jure sovereignty. But the opposite was
true during the insular era-no individual constitutional rights were
available at these locations-because of the categorical rule that
constitutional rights existed in sovereign U.S. territory under congressional
civil government, not in U.S. occupied foreign lands and not even in
sovereign U.S territory when it was governed by the U.S. military. There are
no Supreme Court decisions in the insular era concerning the constitutional
status of Guam, Samoa, Guantanamo, or the Panama Canal Zone. But there
is much to learn from the opinions of executive branch actors like the
Attorney General and military officials, actions of Congress, and
commentary by informed observers.
282. See, e.g., De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 3o8 (igo6) ("Congress, having
entire dominion and sovereignty over territories, has full legislative power over all subjects upon
which the legislature of a state might legislate within the state." (citation omitted)); Rassmussen
v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 520 (1905) (discussing rules derived from Downes v. Bidwell
concerning "Congress, in legislating" for the Philippines, after "by the treaty with Spain the
Philippine Islands had come under the sovereignty of the United States and were subject to its
control as a dependency or possession").
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A. MOST ANTI-EXPANSIONISTS DID NOT THINK IT UNCONSTITUTIONAL To
INSTITUTE PERMANENT MILITARY GOVERNMENT OVER NAVAL OUTPOSTS AND
COALING STATIONS
Anti-expansionists with principled constitutional objections to
annexation of the Philippines and Puerto Rico as "second-class" territories
did not generally oppose-or have any constitutional scruples about-
acquiring ports, harbors, or other small pieces of territory for use as U.S.
naval outposts or refueling stations for the Navy and U.S. merchant vessels.
An excellent example of this is the so-called Vest Resolution. Because
debates about treaties occurred in secret executive sessions, anti-
expansionist U.S. Senators desiring to rouse public opinion against
ratification of the Treaty of Paris in late 1898 and early 1899 skirted this
rule by introducing resolutions as vehicles for public debate about questions
they wanted to raise about the treaty. The most important of these
resolutions, named for its sponsor Senator George Vest, resolved that:
[U]nder the Constitution... no power is given to the Federal
Government to acquire territory to be held and governed
permanently as colonies.
... [A]ll territory acquired by the Government, except such small
amount as may be necessary for coaling stations, correction of boundaries,
and similar governmental purposes, must be acquired and governed
with the purpose of ultimately organizing such territory into States
suitable for admission into the Union.283
Under Boumediene's understanding of the scope of constitutional rights, the
distinction Vest offers makes no sense. Yet Vest's view was mainstream, stated
by numerous legal and political figures, while the Boumediene understanding
of constitutional doctrine was never seen during the insular era.284
For example, in a December 1 898 interview, William Jennings Bryan-
the most important Democratic politician in the country at the time-
maintained, on the one hand, that "[o]ur form of government [and] our
traditions.., all forbid our entering upon a career of conquest."28 5 But, on
the other hand, he recommended that the United States "reserve a harbor
and coaling station in Porto Rico and the Philippines in return for services
rendered and I think we would be justified in asking the same concession
from Cuba. '"2s 6 Senator George Perkins, a Republican from California,
opposed annexing the Philippines: "it seems to him that to acquire territory
283. 32 CONG. REC. 20 (1898) (emphasis added).
284. To be clear, Congress never adopted the Vest Resolution; it is cited because its
contents reveal common understandings about constitutional law, not because it is itself
enacted law.
285. Interview of William J. Bryan, in Savannah, Ga. (Dec. 13, 1898), reprinted in REPUBLIC
OR EMPIRE: THE PHILIPPINE QUESTION 13, 14 (1899).
286. Id. atl15 .
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in the [Philippines] islands or on the Asiatic coast is contrary to the spirit of
the Constitution." 287 But nevertheless, Perkins was "of the opinion that the
United States" should maintain "a military, naval, and coaling station in the
islands."28 The influential Senator John T. Morgan, Democrat of Alabama,
believed that colonialism was, in his words, "repugnant to the principles of
our national Constitution."28 9 He introduced legislation to provide
republican governments for Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Hawaii. But
he also repeatedly argued that the United States could acquire land for
naval outposts, coaling stations, or an isthmian canal and impose military
government, without any individual constitutional rights protections.290o
Many other prominent anti-expansionists held similar views: a colonial
government over subject peoples would be unconstitutional, but seizing a
few harbors here and there and governing them militarily, as naval bases or
coaling stations, posed no legal dilemmas.291 In 19o3, Guantanamo Bay was
leased by the United States from Cuba for just these purposes and governed
on the basis of these understandings.
Expansionists recognized the importance of their opponents' view that
the Constitution did not stand in the way of the acquisition and military rule
over small pieces of territory. The McKinley administration pressed this
point to the Supreme Court during oral argument on the first set of Insular
Cases, trying to move the justices from general agreement that the
Constitution did not prohibit arbitrary rule of small military reservations to
the larger point that the United States could annex territory yet still deny
287. Senator Perkins Asks Advice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1899, at 4.
288. Id.
289. Morgan, supra note so3, at 643-44.
290. See, e.g., id. (arguing that the United States must obtain "naval reservations" in the
Philippines, "a naval station in Pango-Pango Bay, Samoa" and other overseas "military
outposts"); Investigation of Panama Canal Matters: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Interoceanic
Canals, 5 9th Cong. 2263 (1907) (statement of Senator Morgan) (1907) (stating that the U.S.
military government in the Panama Canal Zone was "perfectly constitutional ... and legitimate,
and is according to the settled and uniform practice of the Government of the United States"
when exercised by the Executive in "any reservation set apart for military purposes, [even
though] the country may be in a state of peace").
291. See, e.g., Carl Schurz, American Imperialism, reprinted in REPUBLIC OR EMPIRE, supra note
285, at 329, 337-38, 355 (contending that annexation of the Philippines and Puerto Rico, and
governing them as subject colonies, would violate the first principles of American government,
but then asking rhetorically "can we not get as many coaling stations as we need without owning
populous countries behind them that would entangle us in dangerous political responsibilities
and complications?"); Philippine Race Problem, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 14, 1899, at 4 (reporting a speech
of Senator McLaurin opposing the Treaty of Paris and annexation of the Philippines, during
which he denied the constitutionality of acquiring territory to hold as a permanent colony but
stated: "of course subject to the exception of small tracts acquired for specific Governmental
purposes, like coaling stations and guano islands under the act of 1856").
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some or all constitutional rights to the inhabitants.292 Justice White's seminal
opinion in Downes picked up on this move.293
B. A CASE STuDY ON GUAM AND SAMOA: FORGOTTEN ISLANDS OF THE UNITED
STATES, GOVERNED BY MILITARY POWER FOR DECADEs
In 1898 and 1899, the United States acquired Guam and Samoa,
respectively, both populated, overseas territories where it established naval
bases and put the populations under military rule. For decades afterwards,
the President governed under his war power and the U.S. military, civilian
executive branch, Congress, and other observers assumed that the
individual-rights provisions of the Constitution did not protect the
Guamanians and Samoans-precisely because the small islands were military
outposts and Congress had not put them under a civil government. The
theory of temporary military rule of U.S territory pending the institution of
congressional government, approved in numerous Supreme Court decisions
such as Dooley, Santiago, and Cross v. Harrison, was extended for several
decades in Guam and Samoa. In the case of Samoa, there was the additional
factor that for decades after U.S. control began, no treaty or act of Congress
recognized or accepted the cession of the islands by Samoan leaders to the
United States. Samoa could therefore be analogized to Cuba, foreign
territory under temporary military occupation where, under Neely v.
Henkel,2 94 constitutional rights could not be asserted as limits on the U.S.
military government.
Guam, a volcanic island in the remote western Pacific, was ceded to the
United States by Spain in the Treaty of Paris.295 In December 1898, even
before the treaty came into effect, President McKinley put Guam and its
292. See INSULAR CASES, supra note 98, at 3o8 (reporting oral argument of Attorney General
Griggs: "Suppose a cession of a small island with a half a dozen inhabitants is desired as a fort,
or a military reservation, or a coaling station, or a place to land a cable, must the United States
agree to permit those inhabitants to remain and accept them as citizens? Why should this
Government be considered to have less power in this respect than other nations? What clause of
the Constitution so compels?").
293. SeeDownes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 311 (1901) (White,J., concurring) ("Suppose the
necessity of acquiring a naval station or a coaling station on an island inhabited with people
utterly unfit for American citizenship and totally incapable of bearing their proportionate
burden of the national expense. Could such island, under the rule which is now insisted upon,
be taken? Suppose, again, the acquisition of territory for an inter-oceanic canal where an
inhabited strip of land on either side is essential to the United States for the preservation of the
work. Can it be denied that, if the requirements of the Constitution as to taxation are to
immediately control, it might be impossible by treaty to accomplish the desired result?").
294. See supra Subpart V.B.
295. Treaty of Paris, supra note 64, art. II, at 755. The McKinley Administration wanted
Guam as a naval base because of its strategic-geographic importance in light of the United
States' expansion into the Pacific (Hawaii and the Philippines). See CAMPBELL, supra note 78, at
3 03; LEECH, supra note 107, at 212.
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approximately ten thousand people under the administration of the Navy.29 6
The President and Secretary of Navy's instructions to the naval governor of
Guam provided that "the absolute domain of naval authority.., necessarily
is and must remain supreme in the ceded territory until the legislation of
the United States shall otherwise provide."97 Thereafter the whole of Guam
was considered simply a United States "naval station,"298 "under the absolute
control and sole jurisdiction of the Navy Department."29 As the President's
order implied, the absence of a congressional civil government required that
a military government exist instead.3oo Congress agreed with this legal
analysis-by failing to give the island an organic act for civil government,
Congress suggested, by operation of section 1 891, Revised Statutes, that the
Constitution did not have "the same force and effect" in Guam as it did in
"organized" territories of the United States.sol
Unlike Guam, Samoa was not a conquest of war and was not formally
annexed to the United States during the insular era. Decades before 1898,
the Samoan Islands attracted the United States' interest because their
location in the Pacific made them an ideal place for vessels heading to
China or Japan from San Francisco, Hawaii, or other points east to stop for
rest, provisions, or fuel.3o2 In a bilateral treaty signed in 1878, the United
States obtained the right to use the harbor of Pago Pago and to establish
296. See HENRY P. BEERS, DEP'T OF THE NAVY, ADMINISTRATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE REPORT
No. 6, AMERICAN NAVAL OCCUPATION AND GOVERNMENT OF GUAM, 1898-1902, at 18 (1944)
(discussing the President's order); OFFICE THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, DEP'T OF THE
NAVY, U.S. NAVY REPORT ON GUAM 1899-195o , at 2 (195 o ) (estimating 1o,ooo).
297. BEERS, supra note 296, at 18. The Navy was directed to "take such steps as may be
necessary to establish the authority of the United States and to give [Guam] the necessary
protection and government." DORIS COULTER COGAN, WE FOUGHT THE NAVY AND WON: GUAM'S
QUEST FOR DEMOCRACY 16 (2OO8) (citing Exec. Order io8-A (Dec. 23, 1898)).
298. See WILLIAM F. WILLOUGHBY, TERRITORIES AND DEPENDENCIES OF THE UNITED STATES
295 (1905) (describing how the President provided a government for Samoa by designating it
as a "naval station" and "direct[ing] the secretary of the navy to take the necessary action for the
establishment and maintenance there of the authority of the United States"); id. at 302 ("The
legal situation of [Guam] is precisely that of Samoa. All government powers are vested in the
hands of the naval officer in command of the naval station."); E.J. Born, Our Administration in
Guam, 71 INDEPENDENT 636, 637 (1911) (describing how Guam had "been maintained as a
naval station ever since" the executive order of December 23, 1898, ruled by a "naval officer as
Commandant of the Naval Station and Governor of Guam").
299. Commercial Pac. Cable Co. v. United States, 1912 WL 1211, at *2 (Ct. Cl. 1913)
(reporter's description of court's findings).
300. Cf Woog v. United States, 48 Ct. Cl. 8o, 1912 WL 1172, at *8 (Ct. Cl. 1913) (stating
that Guam from the moment of cession "was necessarily governed by the military power of this
country, because the island has never been organized as a Territory").
301. See Provisions Common to all the Territories, tit. 13, ch. i, § 1891, 1 Rev. Stat. 325,
333 (1878) ("The Constitution and all laws of the United States which are not locally
inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within all organized Territories, and in every
Territory hereafter organized as elsewhere in the United States.").
302. SeeJOHN M. DOBSON, AMERICA'S ASCENT 41 (1978).
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there a coaling or naval station.30 3 After England and Germany obtained
similar privileges, the 1 88os saw increasing tension and jockeying for control
by the three foreign powers.30 4 In 1889, the three powers concluded an
agreement-without Samoan consent-guaranteeing the "independence of
the Samoan Government," and the islands' status as "neutral territory," and
devising a system of local government of commercial affairs to be jointly
administered by U.S., German, and British representatives.05 Then in 1899,
the United Kingdom allowed the other two powers to split Samoa between
them.3o6 The resulting trilateral treaty did not purport to vest sovereignty in
the United States.3o7 After the U.S. Senate approved the treaty, President
McKinley declared that the islands of Samoa, home to approximately 5000
native people,3o8 were "placed under the control of the Department of the
Navy, for a naval station," and directed a naval officer to act as "governor."309
Like Guam, Samoa was now under a military government.3, 0 In 19oo, the
chiefs of the most important eastern island, Tutuila, executed an instrument
purporting to unilaterally "cede and transfer" it to the United States.31"
Though neither Congress nor the President formally responded, in 1902
303. Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, U.S.-Samoa, art. II, Jan. 11, 1878, S. EXEC. DOc.
No. 46-2 (1879). In 1898, work began on the naval station which had been in planning stages
since 1894. SeeJ.A.C. GRAY, AMERIKA SAMOA: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN SAMOA AND ITS UNITED
STATES NAvAL ADMINISTRATION 105-07 (1960).
304. See CAMPBELL, supra note 78, at 76-83; DOBSON, supra note 302, at 42-44; WALTER
LAFEBER, THE NEW EMPIRE 35-36, 55-56 (1963).
305. General Act Providing for the Neutrality and Autonomous Government of the Samoa
Islands, U.S-Ger.-U.K., June 14, 1889, 26 Stat. 1497. The Senate approved the treaty and
Congress appropriated money for the naval station at Pago Pago on Tutuila Island. See Act of
March 2, 1889, ch. 371, 25 Stat. 8o9, 814; Act of April 4, 18go, ch. 63, 26 Stat. 34, 39.
3o6. A treaty, again excluding Samoa as a party, provided that the United Kingdom and
Germany renounced in favor of the United States all their fights and claims over the eastern
islands of Samoa, and the United Kingdom and United States renounced rights and claims over
western islands in favor of Germany. See Treaty of Berlin of 1899, U.S.-Ger.-U.K, Dec. 2, 1899,
31 Stat. 1878; see also CAMPBELL, supra note 78, at 312-13 (describing the events).
307. See W.M. CROSE, AMERICAN SAMOA: A GENERAL REPORT BY THE GOVERNOR 9-10
(1913).
3o8. In 19oo, the naval governor of Samoa estimated that Tutuila, the largest and most
populous island of the American portion, had 4000 to 5ooo inhabitants. Benjamin F. Tilley, The
United States in Samoa, 52 INDEPENDENT 1838, 1846 (19OO).
309. General Orders No. 540 (19oo), reprinted in ALEXANDER STRONACH, CODIFICATION OF
THE REGULATIONS AND ORDERS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF AMERICAN SAMOA BY ORDER OF THE
GOVERNOR 73, app. 1 (1917) (issued by SecretaryJohn D. Long to transmit the instructions of
President McKinley).
310. See GRAY, supra note 303, at 125 (stating that President McKinley placed Samoa under
"military jurisdiction").
311. The entire document is reproduced in GRAY, supra note 303, at 112-17. It stated that
the undersigned Samoan chiefs "cede and transfer to the Government of the United States the
Island of Tutuila and all things there to rule and to protect it." Id. at 114.
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President Roosevelt did send a "thank you" note and some gifts.312 Congress
waited until 1925 to expressly note that the United States had
"sovereignty... over American Samoa"313 and did not accept the chiefs'
deeds of cession until 1929.3'4 At that time, Congress belatedly delegated to
the President and his appointees-or rather, made express its earlier silent
delegation by acquiescence-"all civil, judicial, and military powers" in
Samoa,3'5 putting Samoan government on a congressional basis for the first
time.
During the decades of naval government, and "[i]n the absence of
congressional legislation, authority of the naval governor of Guam" and
Samoa was considered "supreme."3, 6 It was agreed that individual rights
provisions of the Constitution did not restrict the naval governments'
activities. In a 1903 legal opinion, the Attorney General of the United States
noted "the absence of the Constitution" because "[t]he Constitution of the
United States had not been extended to Guam."3'7 According to the
Attorney General, the naval governor's power "as a military governor was
intended to be plenary. He had authority to do what the exigencies of
military government required, and held the supreme legislative, executive,
and judicial authority of the island."3,8 The next year, another Attorney
General opinion declared that the "political status" of Guam and Samoa "is
anomalous. Neither the Constitution nor the laws of the United States have
been extended to them, and the only administrative authority existing in
them is that derived mediately or immediately from the President as
312. See FELIX M. KEESING, MODERN SAMOA 129 (1934). In 1904, the Samoan chief
purportedly ceded a few additional islands in eastern Samoa to the United States. See Office of
Insular Affairs, American Samoa, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.doi.gov/oia/
Islandpages/asgpage.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2ot 1). Again, the United States did not formally
accept the cession for decades. Id.
313. Act of Mar. 4, 1925, ch. 563, 43 Stat. 1357, 1357 (providing "[t]hat the sovereignty of
the United States over American Samoa is hereby extended over Swains Island").
314. S.J. Res. 110, 7oth Cong., 45 Stat. 1253(1929).
315. Id.
316. S. Doc. NO. 67-238, at 11 (1922) (citing Judge Advocate General of the Navy, Legal
Op. 9351-1436:4 (1915)) (regarding Guam). The same legal analysis would apply afortiori to
Samoa because it was constitutionally "foreign" to the United States in a way that annexed
Guam was not.
317. Guam-Spanish Law-Condemnation of Property, 25 Op. Att'y Gen. 59, 6i (1903).
This opinion might seem-in retrospect-to be erroneous because it adopted the language of
Justice Brown's opinion in Downes, which never commanded majority support on the Court and
was soon supplanted by the doctrine of territorial incorporation. But the language does
accurately convey the widely accepted legal proposition that constitutional fights did not run
against a caretaker U.S. military government over U.S. territory that would eventually be
supplanted by a congressionally approved civil government.
318. Id. In 1899, a U.S. Navy Lieutenant described the naval governor's power in Guam as
"unlimited." Louis M. Nulton, The Expedition to the Island of Guam, 51 INDEPENDENT 1357, 1357
(1899); see also KEESING, supra note 312, at 132 (stating that the naval governor of Samoa had
"absolute power").
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Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States."3,9 A 19o6
opinion of the Solicitor General of the United States, approved by the
Attorney General, cited Dooley and held that the "military government" of
Guam was authorized by the President's "war power... with the silent
acquiescence of Congress, in accordance with the doctrine that a temporary
and provisional government of this nature continues ex necessitate rei until
further action by Congress."2 ° This legal analysis applies equally to the naval
government of Samoa.32' In 1911, the High Court of American Samoa,
headed by the naval governor, rejected claims that the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments applied as limits on the military courts in Samoa.322 Congress's
knowledge and acquiescence in the Executive's interpretation of the
Constitution cannot be doubted.323 The Navy Department324 and governors
of Guam and Samoa325 maintained for decades afterward that the
319. Guam and Tutuila-Military Governors-Commissions, 25 Op. Att'y Gen. 292, 292-
93 (9o4).
320. Subig Bay Naval Reservation-Jurisdiction of the Navy Department, 26 Op. Att'y Gen.
91, 98 (19o6) (citing Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (19O1); Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S.
(16 How.) 164 (1853)).
321. Cf. Island of Tutuila-Status-Customs Duties, 23 Op. Att'y Gen. 629, 629-30 (1902)
(stating that Samoa "has no government but that of a naval officer appointed by United States
authority, except local town governments"). Samoa was also arguably "foreign" under Neely until
Congress accepted the cession in 1929. If that was the case, the Constitution would not have
supplied the inhabitants with enforceable individual rights.
322. American Samoa v. Willis, 1 Am. Samoa 635, 646 (191 1). In addition to emphasizing
that Congress has not accepted the cession of Samoa to the United States (by implication,
Samoa was still foreign), and that Samoa was governed as a naval station under the military
powers of the President-factors which we have seen mean that the Constitution was
inapplicable-the court also noted that it would be impractical to use juries and grand juries
because "[t]here are very few who could be called upon forjury duty, among the whites, as the
majority of them are not Citizens of the United States or of Tutuila. The natives are uncivilized
and are incapable of self-government." Id.
323. Congress appropriated and legislated for Guam and Samoa. See, e.g., Act of March 3,
190 1, ch. 852, 31 Stat. 1107, 2io8; ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE NAw DEPARTMENT FOR THE YEAR
19oo, H.R. Doc. No. 56-3, at 68 (2d Sess.19oo) [hereinafter NAvY's 19oo REPORT]. Congress
also received the legal opinions of the Attorney General and other executive branch reports
about the military governments. See, e.g., NAVY'S 19oo REPORT (reporting to Congress about the
naval governments of Guam and Samoa).
324. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NAvY DEPARTMENT FOR THE FiscAL YEAR 1907, H.R. Doc.
NO. 6o-3, at 25 (19o8) ("The island of Tutuila, Samoa, and the island of Guam stand in a
peculiar position with respect to the administration of their affairs. These islands have never
been organized as territories by any act of Congress or otherwise. Their political status is
anomalous. Neither the Constitution nor the laws of the United States have been extended to
them."); see also S. Doc. NO. 67-238, at 109 (1922) (same).
325. See, e.g., CROSE, supra note 307, at i1 ("'Neither the Constitution nor the laws of the
United States have been extended to' Samoa and Guam." (quoting 25 Op. Atty Gen. 91, 97-98
(1904))).
Naval governors occasionally invoked the U.S. Constitution when they banned
objectionable native practices. See, e.g., Richard P. Leary, U.S.N. Gov. of Guam, Proclamation
(Jan. 1, 1899) (banning slavery and peonage in Guam because they are "subversive of good
government, ... an obstacle to progressive civilization, a menace to popular liberty, and a
IOWA LAWREVIEW
Constitution did not limit the governments of the islands. Military and
civilian commentators agreed.3s6 As late as 1946, the Navy reported to the
United Nations that "the Constitution of the United States does not extend
to American Samoa."327 In 1949, a congressional committee on Guam
reported that "[t]he Constitution of the United States does not apply to
Guam."328
Scholars whose work likely influenced Boumedien's reading of the
Insular Cases have bolstered arguments in favor of individual constitutional
rights for Guantanamo detainees by citing cases finding rights available for
inhabitants of Guam and Samoa.329 But the cited cases, decided after fifty
violation of the sacred privileges guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States"), reprinted
in JOSEPH WHEELER, REPORT ON THE ISLAND OF GUAM, JUNE 19oo, WAR DEPT. ADJUTANT-
GENERAL'S OFFICE DOC. No. 28, at 46, 46-47 (19oo). Notwithstanding a few references to the
Constitution, it seems clear that the naval governors did not view the Constitution's protections
of individual rights as controlling their actions. They seem to have cited the Constitution not as
fundamental law but rather as one among a number of moral or policy considerations guiding
their actions. This interpretation seems especially likely considering that they promulgated
numerous regulations that would have been flagrantly unconstitutional had their actions been
limited by the Constitution's individual rights provisions. For instance, in Guam, a "military
commission" tried criminal cases through 1899; starting in 9oo, a "civil" court (in name only)
presided over by a naval officer was used. See BEERS, supra note 296, at 68-69. Natives in both
Samoa and Guam were prohibited to sell land to any non-natives, except to the U.S.
government for public purposes. See A.M. NOBLE, CODIFICATION OF THE REGULATIONS AND
ORDERS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF AMERICAN SAMOA 54 (1921) (Samoa Regulation No. 4 of
1900); Governor of Guam's General Orders of 1899, reprinted in WHEELER, supra, at 39-41 .
326. PRATT, supra note 221, at 221 (stating that the naval governors of Guam and Samoa
were "restrained by no constitution, no organic act"); Edwin G. Arnold, Self-Government in U.S.
Territories, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 655, 664-65 (1946) ("Guam and Samoa have been dependent areas
of the United States, under Navy administration, since the islands were acquired nearly 50 years
ago. Despite the fact that half a century has gone by, no action has been taken to extend to the
22,000 Guamanians and the 16,ooo inhabitants of American Samoa the basic privileges of
American democracy."); Roy E. James (former Naval Military Government Officer in Guam),
Military Government: Guam, 15 FAR E. SURV. 273, 277 (1946) ("The Guamanian ... finds it
difficult to understand why the United States still governs his island as though it were
conquered enemy territory. He wonders why the people of the United States do not extend to
him the right to participate in his own government. He cannot understand why we are so
reluctant to guarantee him by act of Congress the basic liberties guaranteed to other Americans
by the Constitution and the laws of the United States.").
327. See ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, REPORT TO UNITED NATIONS ON GUAM,
AMERICAN SAMOA, AND OTHER ISLAND POSSESSIONS ADMINISTERED BY THE NAVY DEPARTMENT 30
(1946).
328. H.R. REP. NO. 81-1365, at 2 (1949) ("The Constitution of the United States does not
apply to Guam[.] Except during the period of Japanese occupation, the Navy Department has
since 1898 exercised sole responsibility for the administration of Guam in every phase of
activity, with the naval governor the absolute and final authority in all matters of government.").
329. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush,
82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 286 n.138 (2009) (citing King v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. 11 (D.D.C.
1977)); Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional Methodology After Rasul v.
Bush, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2073, 2074 (2005) ("Treating [Guantanamo] as tantamount to a
territory should entail that the rights of foreign nationals there are comparable to their rights
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years of military rule in Guam and Samoa, had been replaced by civilian
oversight by the Department of the Interior, and after Congress and the
Executive branch had taken several significant actions to make the islands
"domestic" for constitutional purposes and to indicate an intent to protect
the rights of the inhabitants of Guam3so and Samoa.33, It is hardly surprising
that, after all of these developments, lower federal courts would determine
that Guam and Samoa had become so substantially similar to Puerto Rico,
for example, that the doctrines of territorial incorporation and fundamental
rights were applicable. Congress and the Executive have taken the opposite
view of Guantanamo Bay.332
in overseas territories such as Puerto Rico or Guam, a fuller set of rights than foreign nationals
could claim in wholly extraterritorial locations.").
330. In 1930, the naval governor of Guam promulgated a bill of rights. See SEC'Y OF THE
NAVYJAMES FORESTAL'S SPECIAL CIVILIAN COMM., COMM. To STUDY THE NAVAL ADMIN. OF GUAM
AND AM. SAM., REPORT ON THE CIVIL GOVERNMENTS OF GUAM AND AMERICAN SAMOA, Discussion
and Explanation, at 8 (1947). Congress's 1950 Organic Act of Guam created a three-branch
form of local government; granted U.S. citizenship to Guamanians; created a federal district
court; and promulgated a Bill of Rights very similar to what the U.S. Constitution protects. See
Organic Act of Guam, ch. 512, §§ 3-5, 22, 64 Stat. 384 (1950) (current version at 48 U.S.C.
§ 1421 a (2oo6)). The following year, Guam was included within the jurisdiction of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. See Act of Oct. 31, 1951, Pub. L. No. 248, sec. 34, 65 Stat. 710, 723
(1951) (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1424 (2oo6)). The Organic Act of Guam also declared that
"Guam is ... an unincorporated territory of the United States," id. sec. 3, thereby expressly
invoking the Downes v. Bidwell line of cases and their holding about the availability of
fundamental constitutional rights in populated territories governed under the authority of
Congress-as Guam would now be. See generally Pugh v. United States, 212 F.2d 761, 762-63
(9th Cir. 1954) (noting section 3's reference to the Insular Cases). Two years after the Organic
Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 reconfirmed U.S. citizenship for Guamanians
and defined "[t]he term 'United States', except as otherwise specifically herein provided, when
used in a geographical sense" to mean "the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto
Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands of the United States." Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101 (a) (38), 66 Stat. 163, 171 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(38) (2006)).
331. In 1929, Congress formally accepted, ratified, and confirmed the cessions of territory
offered in 19oo and 1904 by Samoa leaders and gave formal legislative approval to the existing
naval government. S.J. Res. 110, 7 oth Cong., 45 Stat. 1253 (1929). In 1931, the American
naval governor promulgated a bill of rights. See ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, supra
note 327, at 30 ("While the Constitution of the United States does not extend to American
Samoa, Section 1o5 of the Codification of the Regulations and Orders for the Government of
American Samoa contains most of the guarantees included in the first ten amendments of the
United States Constitution known as the Bill of Rights."). In 1951, the President confirmed the
transfer of administration of Samoa from the Navy to the Department of the Interior, further
signifying Samoa's "domestic" status. See Exec. Order No. 10264, 16 Fed. Reg. 6417 (July 3,
1951). The INA classified Samoa as an "outlying possession[] of the United States,"
§ iol (a) (29), and granted U.S. citizenship to Samoans, § 301 (a) (5). In 196o, the Secretary of
the Interior, acting with congressional authorization pursuant to the 1929 joint resolution,
approved a constitution for Samoa, which organized a government and provided a Bill of
Rights. See Michael W. Weaver, The Territory Federal Jurisdiction Forgot: The Question of Greater
FederalJurisdiction in American Samoa, 17 PAC. RIM L. & POL'YJ. 325, 347 (2oo8).
332. For instance, the Executive branch has repeatedly stated that Guantanamo Bay is
outside the United States and, as a result, noncitizens there have no constitutional rights to
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CONCLUSION
Boumediene is one of the most celebrated Supreme Court decisions in
recent history. But in terms of the application of standard judicial methods,
it is also one of the most clearly wrongly decided. To answer a difficult and
important constitutional question of the type presented in Boumediene, one
would be well advised to consult a range of sources of constitutional
meaning, among them certainly the text, the original understanding of the
Founding generation, the practices of the U.S. government over history,
judicial doctrine, and general constitutional principles. The Boumediene
Court did not closely analyze the text of the Constitution, but should have.s3
The original meaning of the Constitution should have cut against the
detainees, because Boumediene concluded that both English and American
Founding era history-thought to be incorporated by reference in the
Habeas Suspension Clause of the Constitution-were inconclusive as to the
existence of the claimed right.334 As to historical practices of the U.S.
government since the Founding, Boumediene itself admitted that it was an
unprecedented decision.335 The actual practice of the Executive branch and
Congress had, since the Founding, been to regard noncitizens outside the
United States, and military enemies no matter where located, as lacking
constitutional protection.336 Regarding the factual, historical questions
about the origins and nature of the U.S. government's control over
Guantanamo in 1903, the Boumediene Court advanced a novel theory about
U.S. government "manipulation" that is at odds with the facts.337 Boumediene
found highly relevant the general constitutional principle of separation of
powers.33s But its application of that principle was troubling. For one thing,
near-absolute congressional control over federal court jurisdiction has been
assert against the U.S. government. See, e.g., Brief for the Respondents at 9-14, Rasul v. Bush,
542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343); Brief for the Petitioners, supranote 14, at 16 n.lo.
333. The most plausible textual analysis of the relevant constitutional provisions is that
noncitizens outside the United States are not protected by the Suspension Clause. See Kent,
supra note 3, at 52 1-23.
334. SeeBoumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 752 (2008). See generally Pushaw, supranote 19,
at 2025 (noting Justice Scalia's argument in dissent that if the Constitution's original meaning
was truly inconclusive, Boumediene "had no basis to strike down the interpretation of [the
Suspension] Clause by Congress and the President as not covering foreign enemy combatants
in Guantanamo. The Court avoided its duty to defer to the political branches' reasonable
constitutional judgments about military affairs.").
335. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770 ("It is true that before today the Court has never held
that noncitizens detained by our Government in territory over which another country maintains
dejure sovereignty have any rights under our Constitution."); see alsoJohnson v. Eisentrager, 339
U.S. 763, 768 (1950) ("We are cited no instance where a court, in this or any other country
where the writ [of habeas corpus] is known, has issued it on behalf of an enemy alien who, at no
relevant time and in no stage of his captivity, has been within its territorial jurisdiction.").
336. See generally Kent, supra note 9; Kent, supra note 3.
337. See supra Part V.C.
338. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 742-46, 764-66, 772.
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a key factor making judicial review work in our system of separated
powers,339 but Boumediene seemed uninterested in discussing that. Moreover,
Boumediene suggested that if the Court could not deploy the Constitution to
conduct judicial review this would be tantamount to allowing "the political
branches to govern without legal constraint."34o This is a strikingly aggressive
claim of judicial supremacy, giving essentially no consideration to the
Executive and Congress's independent duties to uphold the Constitution
and laws of the United States. It also slights the important historical role that
international law has played as the primary limit on the United States'
extraterritorial and wartime activities.34'
Text, original meaning, the historical practices of the U.S. government,
and general constitutional principles provide little support for the result in
Boumediene, which leaves judicial doctrine to bear the load. Boumediene
implied that a key Civil War precedent supported its approach,34' but that is
not correct.343 Even supporters of the Boumediene decision do not defend the
Court's blatant misconstruction of the most relevant modern precedent,
Johnson v. Eisentrager.344 And then we come to Boumediene's reading of the
Insular Cases. Boumediene relied substantially on the Insular Cases to reject a
"formalistic, sovereignty-based test" for the availability of constitutional
rights and employ "a functional approach to questions of [the]
extraterritoriality" of the Constitution's protection of individual rights,
339. Cf PeterJ. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 1o8 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1892 (2oo8)
(describing the "traditional view" that Congress has plenary control over how much of Article
III jurisdiction to allow courts to exercise); Martin H. Redish, Text, Structure, and Common Sense
in the Interpretation of Article IIl, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1633, 1637 (1990) ("[T]he inescapable
implication of the text is that Congress possesses broad power to curb the jurisdiction of both
the lower courts and the Supreme Court."). But see, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of
Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205, 271-72 (1985)
(arguing that Congress may not strip away both Supreme Court and lower federal jurisdiction
over certain categories of cases, including those arising under the Constitution).
340. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765.
341. See generally Kent, supra note 9; Kent, supra note 3.
342. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 769, 794 (relying on Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2
(1866)).
343- See generally Kent, supra note 9, at 1845-47 (demonstrating that during the Civil War
era, noncitizens located outside the United States, and declared to be military enemies by
Congress, were understood to lack any protection from the U.S. Constitution).
344- See, e.g., Cole, supra note 19, at 49 ("The result in Boumediene was also surprising
because the government had precedent on its side. In 1950, the Supreme Court had expressly
ruled that the writ of habeas corpus was unavailable to enemy fighters captured and detained
abroad during wartime. Both the district court and the court of appeals had found that
decision, Johnson v. Eisentrager, to be controlling, and no subsequent case law had directly
undermined its reasoning."); Richard A. Epstein, How To Complicate Habeas Corpus, N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 2oo8, http://www.nytimes.com/2oo8/o6/2i/opinion/21epstein.html (stating that
the Boumediene decision was "correct" and that he had joined an amicus brief urging the result
the Court reached, but criticizing Boumediene's treatment of Eisentrageras "sleight of hand").
The Court's "sleight of hand" with regard to Eisentrager actually debuted several years
earlier in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 475-8o (2004); id. at 487-88 (Kennedy,J., concurring).
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under which constitutional protections for noncitizens could be available
even outside sovereign U.S. territory.345 Yet this Article has demonstrated
that the Insular Cases say precisely the opposite of what Boumediene claims
they do about the scope of constitutional rights.
345. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 762, 764. Boumediene even justified its misreading of Eisentrager
on the ground that, "if the Government's reading of Eisentrager were correct"-that
constitutional rights are unavailable to noncitizens who are outside the sovereign territory of
the United States-"the opinion would have marked not only a change in, but a complete
repudiation of, the Insular Cases' ... functional approach to questions of extraterritoriality." Id.
at 764.
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APPENDIX
Table x. Timeline of Key Events
1895: Cuban revolution against Spanish rule begins
1896-1897: Filipino revolution against Spanish rule
Apr. 1898: Spanish-American War begins. Congress authorizes use of
force to free Cuba from Spanish rule. The United States
proceeds to attack Spanish forces in Cuba, Puerto Rico,
Guam, and the Philippines
July 1898: U.S. Congress votes to annex Hawaii
Aug. 1898: United States-Spain armistice, leaving the United States in
control of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and Manila and
environs (the rest of the Philippines is in control of
indigenous rebel forces or ungoverned). U.S. military
governments are instituted in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam,
and at Manila
Dec. 1898: Treaty of Paris signed. Spain agrees to cede Puerto Rico,
Guam, and the entire Philippines to the United States;
Spain agrees to withdraw from Cuba, leaving the United
States as caretaker. President McKinley institutes military
government in Guam
Feb. 6, 1899: U.S. Senate gives its advice and consent to ratification of the
Treaty of Paris; Filipino insurrection against U.S. rule began
two days earlier
Apr. 11, 1899: Treaty ratifications exchanged; treaty enters into force,
including its provisions ceding Puerto Rico, Guam and the
Philippines to the United States. U.S. military governments
continue as before in Puerto Rico, Guam, the Philippines,
and Cuba
Aug. 1899: The United States, United Kingdom, and Germany agree
that the United States and Germany will split up Samoa
between them
June 1899: U.S. Provisional Court for Puerto Rico created by military
governor's order
Feb. 19oo: President McKinley institutes military government for
Samoa
Apr. igoo: Ex parte Baez decided
May 19oo. Congress's Foraker Act, creating civilian government for
Puerto Rico and imposing tariff between Puerto Rico and
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the mainland, goes into effect; U.S. military government of
Puerto Rico ends
Nov. i9oo: William McKinley defeats William Jennings Bryan, winning
second term. Bryan had declared imperial rule over
colonies like the Philippines to be unconstitutional; In re
Vidal decided
Dec. 19oo-
Jan. i90o1: Original Insular Cases argued before U.S. Supreme Court
Jan. 19o 1: Neely v. Henkel decided
Mar. 19o1: U.S. Congress enacts the Platt Amendment, defining future
U.S.-Cuba relations, including the requirement that Cuba
allow the United States to have a naval base there
May i 9 1: First set of Insular Cases decided: Downes v. Bidwell, De Lima
v. BidweU, Dooley v. United States, Goetze v. United States,
Armstrong v. United States, Huus v. New York and Puerto Rico
S.S. Co.
Sept. 19oi: Pres. McKinley dies from assassin's bullets; Theodore
Roosevelt sworn in
Dec. 1901: Fourteen Diamond Rings and second Dooley case decided
Apr. 1902: The United States abandons its coaling station, supply
depot, and post for soldiers at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, in
anticipation of the end of U.S. military occupation of Cuba
May 1902: End of U.S. occupation of Cuba; new Cuban government
assumes sovereignty
July 1902: U.S. Congress passes Organic Act creating civil government
for the Philippines. Governor Taft declares insurrection
against U.S. rule in the Philippines to be at an end
Feb. 1903: The United States and Cuba sign an agreement for the
United States to lease an area at Guantanamo Bay for a
naval base and coaling station
Oct. 1903: After the United States and Cuba separately ratify their
agreement to lease land at Guantanamo Bay for a naval
station, ratifications are formally exchanged
Dec. 1903: Cuba formally transfers land at Guantanamo Bay to the
United States for purposes of building a naval station
1904: Dorr v. United States andj Ribas y Hijo v. United States decided
1905: Rasmussen v. United States decided
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1909: Juragua Iron Co. v. United States and Santiago v. Nogueras
decided
1913: Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales and MacLeod v. United States
decided
1922: Balzac v. Porto Rico decided
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Table 2. Supreme Court's Insular Cases Discussed in Article
Wartime Military Post-cession to Post-cession
military occupation US, pre- to US, under
measures of foreign congressional congressional
against enemy territory govt., control by govt.
civilians in military of US
enemy territory territory
Cuba Juragua Iron Neely v. n/a n/a
Co. v. US Henkel
(1909); (1901);
Herrera v. US Galban &
(19 12); Diaz v. Co. v. US
US (1912)i (1907)"
Philippines MacLeod v. Fourteen Dorr v. US
US (1913) iii  Diamond Rings (1904);
(19 ° 1)iv Trono v. US
(1905Y
Puerto J. Ribas y Hijo De Lima v. Exparte Baez Downes v.
Rico v. US (1904)" Bidwell (19oo); In re Bidwell
(1901); Vidal (1 9 oo); De (19o1);
Dooley v. Lima v. Bidwell Balzac v.
Bidwell (190 1 ); Dooley v. Porto Rico
(1901); Bidwell (19o); (1922)'x
Ochoa v. Santiago v.
Hernandez Nogueras
y Morales (19o9); Basso v.
(1913)' ii  US (1916)viii
Samoa n/a
Guam
Alaska n/a n/a Rasmussen v.
US (1905) x
n/a means that the category is not applicable. An empty box indicates that the category is
applicable but there are no relevant Supreme Court decisions. Supreme Court cases are listed if
they contain a holding or dicta about the constitutional status of governmental action. Note
that where cases are listed in a given category, the list is not necessarily exhaustive.
i. Discussed supra Part VA-B.
ii. Discussed supra Part V.A.
iii. Discussed supra W.A.
iv. Discussed supra Part VI.B.
v. Discussed supra Part VIB-C.
vi. Discussed supra Part V.A.2.
vii. Discussed supra Part IV.A.2.
viii. Discussed supra Part IV.B.
ix. Discussed supra Part VI.A, D.
x. Discussed supra Part VI.C.
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